The great reverse
\nBoth Southeast Asia and the U.S. have to adjust to China's rising
\nstar<\/p>\n
Marvin Ott
\nYale Center for the Study of Globalization
\nWashington<\/p>\n
\"Let him who tied the bell on the tiger take it off -- whoever
\nstarted the trouble should end it.\" -- That is how China's
\nambassador to Singapore recently asked his host country to repair
\nthe ties damaged by a Singapore leader's visit to Taiwan.<\/p>\n
Although Singapore has maintained unofficial ties with Taiwan
\nsince it normalized relations with Beijing in 1990, the Chinese
\nambassador said he was \"shocked, disappointed, and baffled\" by
\nthen Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's unofficial visit to
\nTaipei. Lee was then about to take over as Premier.<\/p>\n
In the larger scheme of things, this may prove to be a passing
\ncloud, but the incident puts in sharp relief a remarkable
\ntransformation of Chinese power in the region. How China will be
\nwielding its newly acquired power in the coming months and years
\nwill be keenly watched in Southeast Asia. Will China's rise be as
\npeaceful as Beijing claims, or will it give in to the temptation
\nof throwing its weight around?<\/p>\n
Since the 1980s the region has emerged as a dynamic economy,
\nand a reform-minded China has grown into an economic dynamo and
\nthe region's potential great power.<\/p>\n
Over the last fifteen years or so, China's gross domestic
\nproduct has grown at annual rates of around nine percent, with a
\nlarge swath of the coast from Hainan to Shanghai producing rates
\neven higher.<\/p>\n
This, in turn, has supported annual double-digit increases in
\nmilitary expenditures. Growing armed forces budgets have been
\nbroadly committed to a program of military modernization and
\nprofessionalization, with a heavy emphasis on modern technology
\nand personnel sufficiently educated to use it.<\/p>\n
Expert observers foresee a Chinese military capable of
\nprojecting force on a sustained basis beyond China's coastal
\nperiphery within 10-20 years. By any measure, China has emerged
\nwith startling suddenness as a regional great power still in the
\nearly stages of its ascent.<\/p>\n
While any precise measure of China's national capabilities
\nwill be elusive, the trend and the potential are quite clear.
\nChina's capabilities are multi-dimensional: Economic, military,
\nand increasingly diplomatic and political.<\/p>\n
The days of rigid, ideologically strident Chinese \"diplomacy\"
\nhave long since been superseded by a cosmopolitan sophistication
\nthat would do Zhou Enlai proud. The growth of Chinese power
\nassumes added significance from the fact that for the first time
\nsince the height of the Ming Dynasty, China is without any threat
\nfrom its traditional strategic rivals: Russia and Japan.<\/p>\n
Beijing has the strategic luxury of exerting power to its
\nsouth without fearing for the security of its northern, western
\nand eastern borders. Finally, for Southeast Asia, Chinese power
\nhas an additional potential dimension -- the presence of large
\n(and economically potent) ethnic Chinese populations in almost
\nevery major urban center.<\/p>\n
Capabilities are one thing; intentions are another. Here the
\ncrystal ball suddenly becomes very murky. Chinese officials have
\nbeen very insistent that China's intentions toward Southeast Asia
\nare entirely benign -- nothing other than to join with the region
\nin a common endeavor of economic development and regional peace
\nand security.<\/p>\n
Beijing has energetically pushed trade and investment ties,
\nincluding a centerpiece China-ASEAN free trade agreement.
\nBilateral framework agreements for cooperation on multiple fronts
\nhave been negotiated with every Southeast Asian government.
\nPolitical and diplomatic interactions at all levels have become a
\nregular, even daily, feature of the news.<\/p>\n
Also Beijing has made clear its desire to extend cooperation
\ninto the security sphere. China has become a primary supplier of
\neconomic and military assistance to Burma, Cambodia, and Laos.
\nMeanwhile, Chinese officials and scholars seek to allay unease by
\nnoting that the traditional tribute system of China's imperial
\npast was, by Western standards, quite benign.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, doubts arise on several grounds.<\/p>\n
First, history strongly suggests that when new great powers
\narise, the implications for smaller or weaker nations on their
\nperiphery are not always pleasant. Examples include Germany and
\nCentral Europe, Japan and East Asia, Russia and Central Asia and
\nthe Caucasus, and the United States and Latin America. It remains
\nto be seen whether China is uniquely immune to the temptations of
\nstate power.<\/p>\n
Territorial irredentism is a potent political force, and there
\nare growing fears that Beijing, against all sane counsel, could
\nactually resort to force against Taiwan. In 1992, the Chinese
\nPeople's Congress codified in legislation Beijing's claim that
\nthe South China Sea is rightfully the sovereign territory of
\nChina. Since the flare-up in the Mischief Reef dispute in the
\nmid-1990s, China has soft-pedaled its claims. But it has not
\ndisavowed them and continues to strengthen outposts in the
\nSpratley Islands.<\/p>\n
Another sign that Beijing is concerned with more than economic
\ngrowth is the hawkish language used by Chinese academics.
\nOfficially sanctioned Chinese scholars characterize U.S.
\nstrategic intentions toward China as \"encirclement\" and
\n\"strangulation.\" They identify Southeast Asia as the weak link in
\nthis chain and the point where China can break through and defeat
\nAmerican attempted \"containment.\" In private, Chinese diplomats
\nhave been known to use the Churchillian phrase \"soft underbelly\"
\nto refer to Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
On yet another front, China's ambitious program for harnessing
\nand exploiting the Mekong River will have an important side
\neffect, intended or otherwise: Downstream states, like Laos,
\nCambodia, and Vietnam, will be hostage to Chinese decisions
\nconcerning water flow. The Mekong is as much the economic life-
\nblood for these nations as the Nile is for Egypt.<\/p>\n
Finally, the very agreements and linkages with Southeast Asia
\nthat Beijing cites as evidence of benign intent may also be seen
\nas a web designed to tie these states to China. Contemporary
\nBurma comes close to fitting the profile of a Chinese client
\nstate.<\/p>\n
What emerges from this picture is a multifaceted strategic
\nchallenge to Southeast Asia. Chinese diplomats have worked
\nassiduously and successfully to portray that challenge as
\nopportunity and not threat. Recent public opinion polling shows
\nclear evidence of their success. China registers favorably with
\npublics throughout most of Southeast Asia. This coincides with a
\nprecipitous drop in favorable opinions of the U.S. since the
\nadvent of the Iraq war.<\/p>\n
The durability of these sentiments is a question. What is
\ncertain, however, is that growing Chinese power must be at the
\ncenter of any regional security strategy formulated by the
\nSoutheast Asian states -- and by the U.S.<\/p>\n
The writer is Professor of National Security Policy at the
\nNational War College in Washington, DC. The views expressed are
\nthe author's and not necessarily those of the United States
\nDepartment of Defense.<\/p>",
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