The future of ASEAN-China ties<\/p>\n
Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network\/Bangkok<\/p>\n
Assessing the future of the currently excellent ASEAN-China
\nrelationship is not an easy task. How does one improve rock-solid
\nties? Indeed, this would be very difficult to do.<\/p>\n
When the ASEAN-China Eminent Persons Group was set up early
\nthis year to prepare a report on how ASEAN-China relations are
\nexpected to evolve over the next 15 years, its 22 members
\nstruggled to identify the guiding principles and areas of
\ncooperation that would best nurture their friendship.<\/p>\n
For thousands of years, Southeast Asia countries have been
\nliving with this mammoth giant to the north. The work of the
\neminent persons group marked the first time that China and its
\nsmall neighbors tried to come to terms with each other and agree
\non a set of rules that would set the tone for future relations.<\/p>\n
After four meetings and dozens of hours of debating and
\ndrafting, the group has completed its report, which will be
\nofficially delivered to ASEAN foreign ministers on Dec. 11 in
\nKuala Lumpur before their bosses meet the next day at the ASEAN
\nSummit with their Chinese counterpart. The report will also
\ncertainly be looked at with interest by attendees of the \"East
\nAsian Summit\" on Dec. 13.<\/p>\n
The guiding principles that representatives from ASEAN and
\nChina agreed on drew heavily from the UN charter and the 1976
\nTreaty of Amity and Cooperation concerning respect of national
\nsovereignty and non-interference.<\/p>\n
In addition, the report reiterated that their future
\ncooperation must be \"strengthened and deepened\" and be
\n\"consensus-based, open and inclusive\". Most importantly, the
\ngroup agreed that ASEAN-China relations must not over-shadow
\nother existing areas of international cooperation and their own.<\/p>\n
In the past 15 years, ASEAN-China ties have undergone several
\nstrains, with the most critical crisis related to a maritime
\nconflict a decade ago.<\/p>\n
Mutual mistrust peaked in March 1995, when ASEAN issued its
\nstrongest condemnation of China's aggression on Mischief Reef in
\nthis disputed region of the South China Sea. It was a wake-up
\ncall for China, which ever since the incident has been committed
\nto fostering better relations with ASEAN.<\/p>\n
Since dialog-based relations were established in 1996, a total
\nof 48 ASEAN-China mechanisms, ranging from science and technology
\nto trade and tourism, have been set up to strengthen ties. In
\ncomparison, ASEAN-U.S. cooperation has been marked by only 15
\nsuch mechanisms in their 28 years of \"dialog relations\".<\/p>\n
What is at stake for ASEAN is obvious. ASEAN would like an
\nearly conclusion of an ASEAN-China free trade agreement, which
\nwas originally planned for completion by 2010. Cooperation within
\nAPEC and other regional groups, such as those between countries
\nin the Mekong corridor, must be strengthened.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, such efforts must be more holistic and
\nencompassing, and come to include investment and economic
\ncooperation. China's investment in ASEAN is still small in
\ncomparison with that of the U.S., Japan and Taiwan.<\/p>\n
As part of the scheme, the idea of an ASEAN-China Center has
\nbeen put forward. Modeled on the ASEAN-Japan Center established
\nin 1981, the proposed center would promote trade, investment and
\ntourism, and have multi-functional purposes. It would also
\ninclude research and coordinating units for investors and traders
\nfrom China and ASEAN.<\/p>\n
To strengthen people-to-people contacts in China and ASEAN and
\nto increase their awareness and promote cultural understanding,
\nthe report recommends the establishment of an ASEAN-China
\nFoundation that would take care of educational exchanges and
\ncultural cooperation. ASEAN and China have yet to agree to how to
\nfund the center and foundation.<\/p>\n
Of late, China has also worked diligently to promote cultural
\ncooperation, including in regards to the media. As a rising
\npower, economic and political clout must be supported by
\ninformation networks and language exchanges. To the surprise of
\nmany, China media have the strongest institutional ties with
\nASEAN media despite their different media cultures and freedoms.
\nIn the near future, Confucius Institutes will be set up in major
\ncities to promote Putonghua (Mandarin).<\/p>\n
On key transnational issues such as cross-border crimes, drug
\nsmuggling, human trafficking, terrorism and maritime security,
\nChina and ASEAN had nothing to quarrel about. However, the mood
\nshifted when it came to the area of political and security
\ncooperation, which was marked by notable recalcitrance.<\/p>\n
China has been very proactive, taking the bull by the horns.
\nWhile preparing for the Eminent Persons Group report, China has
\nbeen very engaged and forthcoming in committing itself to future
\ncooperation in both the disputed areas of South China Sea and the
\ndefense sphere. But ASEAN has been more circumspect, as if its
\nmembers first need a better understanding of China's motives.<\/p>\n
At this juncture, China can look back with pride and
\nappreciation that it has overcome ASEAN hostility in the South
\nChina Sea in less than 10 years through effective uses of
\nregional forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC and
\nvarious consultative forums.<\/p>\n
As a group, ASEAN countries still feel that additional
\nconfidence-building measures are essential to propel bilateral
\ncooperation. That explains why ASEAN has turned down China's
\noverture to begin ASEAN-wide security and defense cooperation
\nwith China, even though it could start with defense
\nconsultations.<\/p>\n
As such, it displays a patina of deep-rooted fear. The
\ngrouping recently agreed to start an inaugural defense
\nministerial meeting. The preparatory work for the first meeting
\nwill be discussed in Kuala Lumpur early next month ahead of the
\nASEAN summit.<\/p>\n
The report has one caveat. However useful ASEAN-China
\nrelations might be, they must not be forged at the expense of
\nASEAN ties with other major powers such as the U.S., Japan, India
\nand Australia. These ties must be constructed as part and parcel
\nof the broader strategic outlook of the region and beyond, ie,
\nSouth Asia and Central Asia.<\/p>\n
China's enthusiasm in forging military and defense ties with
\nASEAN can be understood as part of its new strategic thinking and
\nits desire to provide for the first time an alternative alliance
\nfor Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
Beijing would like to create a special sense of strategic
\npartnership with ASEAN, just as it has done with countries in
\nCentral Asia. Since the end of World War II, the region has been
\naccustomed to and dominated by U.S. security perceptions and
\nmilitary inter-operatability. In 2020, China's military ties with
\nASEAN, if they are to be of any real significance, will
\ndefinitely come under a new doctrine that will challenge the
\nlong-dominant U.S. strategic mind-set in the region.<\/p>",
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