The future of ABRI's dual function<\/p>\n
By Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): For people who do not know enough about the
\nhistory of Indonesia and its Armed Forces, it seems rather
\nstrange that the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) has a
\nsociopolitical function. For most people, especially from the
\nWest, armed forces are supposed to be military organizations
\nwithout a political role.<\/p>\n
In Indonesia, the Armed Forces originated from a levee en
\nmasse of the people to build a revolutionary formation
\nimmediately after Sukarno and Mohamad Hatta proclaimed
\nindependence in 1945. The people wanted to safeguard its newly
\nacquired independent status for which it had been longing very
\nstrongly.<\/p>\n
The name of the revolutionary formation was Badan Keamanan
\nRakyat (BKR) (People's Security Body). Beside the BKR, other
\nrevolutionary formations were Barisan Banteng, Pesindo and
\nHizbulla. But most of them were part of, or closely related to,
\npolitical parties which were established at that time, while the
\nBKR aligned itself totally to the nation's struggle as a whole.<\/p>\n
The BKR was, therefore, not established by a government's
\ndecree and was not a government agency. It was basically a
\npeople's revolutionary formation. That was the reason why the BKR
\nand its members regarded themselves as freedom fighters who were
\nresponsible for the achievement of the nation's goals. And not
\nmerely as military soldiers.<\/p>\n
Later, the government saw the need of having a military
\norganization as part of the establishment and decided to
\nrecognize the BKR as the official Indonesian Armed Forces, thus
\nthe Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR) (People's Security Army) was
\nborn. The date was Oct. 5, 1945, which became the Armed Forces'
\nanniversary.<\/p>\n
As members of the TKR as a military organization, the officers
\nand soldiers were placing themselves under strict military
\ndiscipline. However, they still considered themselves freedom
\nfighters responsible for the achievement of the nation's goals.<\/p>\n
That could be clearly observed from the attitude of Gen.
\nSudirman as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, which name
\nchanged from TKR to Tentara Republik Indonesia and later to
\nTentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI).<\/p>\n
Gen. Sudirman never refrained from expressing the TNI's
\nopinion, but also never disobeyed the government's decisions and
\ninstructions. The only time Gen. Sudirman disobeyed president
\nSukarno's orders was in December 1948, when Sukarno, Hatta and
\nother members of the cabinet stayed in Yogyakarta to await the
\nentrance of the Dutch invasion into the city.<\/p>\n
Sukarno ordered Sudirman to join the members of the government
\nto stay in town and to be imprisoned by the Dutch troops. But
\nSudirman refused, although at that time he was very ill. Sudirman
\nwas of the opinion that he should be with his troops to fight a
\nguerrilla war against the Dutch invasion.<\/p>\n
Sudirman was right, because his presence with the troops
\nstrengthened the morale of the people and the TNI who were badly
\ninfluenced by the capture of almost the entire government.<\/p>\n
History has proved that the guerrilla war of the TNI and the
\npeople could force the Dutch to recognize the independence of
\nIndonesia and terminate its long-time colonial supremacy of the
\narchipelago.<\/p>\n
However the TNI's dual function doctrine won official status
\nonly in late 1950s. And its real strong exposure came later in
\n1965 after the communist coup.<\/p>\n
At that time, the sociopolitical function of the TNI became
\nnecessary to prevent a leadership vacuum among many government as
\nwell as other organizations. From 1960 onward, the Indonesian
\nCommunist Party (PKI) had been very successful in infiltrating
\nmany organizations, including political parties, the government,
\nstate enterprises and others.<\/p>\n
After 1965, there was a cleanup of members of the PKI and its
\nsympathizers. To prevent a leadership vacuum because of the
\nremoval of those people, many organizations requested TNI
\nofficers to replace them.<\/p>\n
That was the beginning of pengkaryaan as part of the
\nsociopolitical function, namely the assignment of TNI or ABRI
\npersonnel in nonmilitary functions.<\/p>\n
Before 1965, the sociopolitical function was implemented
\nmainly in the form of advice of TNI leaders to the government.
\nThere was a minor change when the Indonesian government
\nnationalized Dutch companies during the Irian Jaya conflict and
\npresident Sukarno ordered TNI officers to function as managers in
\nthese companies.<\/p>\n
When Sukarno introduced \"Guided Democracy\", all members of the
\nlegislature were appointed by him. Among the appointed members
\nwere TNI officers. However, this early manifestation of
\npengkaryaan only involved a small number of TNI personnel. At
\nthat time, the term pengkaryaan was not yet used.<\/p>\n
After 1965, pengkaryaan became an important method to maintain
\nthe leadership and management of many organizations and
\ninstitutions. Because people at that time realized the necessity
\nof pengkaryaan, nobody was against it.<\/p>\n
There was even a strong tendency among government institutions
\nand state enterprises to request the presence of TNI leaders in
\ntheir organizations because many people were still afraid of a
\npossible counteroffensive by the communists and their
\nsympathizers.<\/p>\n
Gradually a change took place in society. The New Order
\nadministration became successful in running education and
\ntraining activities. More and more people graduated from several
\nkinds of higher learning institutions both at home and abroad.<\/p>\n
In the late 1970s, one could observe a change in the attitude
\nof people vis--vis pengkaryaan. People started to talk about the
\nabundant presence of TNI personnel in nonmilitary organizations.
\nPeople were talking about the large number of governors and
\ndistrict chiefs (bupati).<\/p>\n
This new mood was also a product of an increasing irritation
\nof the way the government under the leadership of president
\nSoeharto was ruling the nation. There was a growing antipathy
\ntoward pengkaryaan. Because most people could not see the
\ndifference between pengkaryaan and the sociopolitical function,
\nmore and more people wanted to have a change of ABRI's
\nsociopolitical function.<\/p>\n
There are now three main categories of opinion toward the
\nfuture of ABRI's sociopolitical function:
\n 1. Those who want no more sociopolitical function for ABRI. It
\nmeans that there will be no more pengkaryaan. But it will not be
\npossible to prevent the ABRI leadership to maintain a sense of
\nresponsibility for the future of the nation. ABRI's ethical norms
\nas reflected in the Sapta Marga oath required by each ABRI member
\nto bear the responsibility of guarding the nation and the
\nachievement of its goals. In this case, ABRI will return to its
\nposition of 1945 until the late 1950s. It depends very much on
\nthe character of the people who are leading ABRI how far the ABRI
\nleadership will express its attitude and opinion to the
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
However, there is a consequence of this option, namely that
\nmembers of ABRI are participating rightfully in the general
\nelection. ABRI members cannot be denied the right to vote and to
\nbe elected. Of course, an ABRI member wants to became a candidate
\nto be elected, he should request a temporary or full dismissal
\nfrom ABRI.<\/p>\n
People in favor of this option should also realize that the
\ntermination of the sociopolitical function does not include the
\nend of ABRI's territorial function. They should know that the
\nterritorial function is not a part of the sociopolitical function
\nbut is a significant part of the implementation of ABRI's
\noperational doctrine Sistem Hankamrata (the People's Defense and
\nSecurity System). Without the territorial function there can be
\nno successful defense of the nation.
\n 2. The continuation of the present setup but with a significant
\ndecrease of the pengkaryaan. People who prefer this option feel
\nthat ABRI's sociopolitical function is important for a strong and
\naffective management of the nation. But they also realize that
\nthere is too much ABRI presence in several nonmilitary
\norganizations. They admit that there is still a need for ABRI
\npersonnel in the civil administration and the legislature. But
\nthe number should be limited. They also think that ABRI members
\nshould not participate in the general election. Therefore, ABRI
\npersonnel should be appointed to become a member of the House of
\nRepresentatives and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). But
\nthe number of the House members should be limited to 50 from the
\npresent number of 75. The number of governors and district chiefs
\nshould also be limited to a maximum of 25 percent of the total
\nnumber.
\n 3. The third possibility is a continuation of the sociopolitical
\nfunction, but a very restricted pengkaryaan. Pengkaryaan should
\nbe limited only to the appointment of ABRI personnel to become
\nMPR members. No more pengkaryaan for governors, district chiefs,
\nmembers of national as well as local governments. An ABRI member
\ncan be appointed a certain government job, but that is because of
\nhis professional ability. For example, an ABRI officer who is
\nknown for his professional expertise in nuclear science could be
\nappointed as head of the National Atomic Energy Agency. In this
\noption ABRI personnel do not participate in the general election.<\/p>\n
In my view, the third option would be the most preferable
\nchoice for all parties. Perhaps, in the long run, Indonesia could
\ngo for the first option, but not in the next five years.<\/p>\n
It is also important that the Police should be separated from
\nABRI, as it was before 1967. Indonesia needs a more professional
\nand effective National Police. Many people want to place the
\nNational Police within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.<\/p>\n
In my view, to become more effective and professional, the
\nNational Police should be under a new Department of Law
\nEnforcement, which could also include the Attorney General's
\nOffice. The National Police should become a civilian institution
\nand its members partly civilians in uniform.<\/p>\n
If people want to enhance the provincial government security
\ncapability, the best way is to improve the already existing
\nPolisi Pamong Praja. The National Police should concentrate on
\nwide-ranging criminal and other law enforcement problems, similar
\nto the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United
\nStates.<\/p>\n
Hopefully the coming MPR General Session in 1999 will be able
\nto make decisions on these topics.<\/p>\n
The writer is former governor of the National Resilience
\nInstitute now ambassador-at-large to the Non-Aligned Movement.<\/p>\n
Window A: There was even a strong tendency among government
\ninstitutions and state enterprises to request the presence of
\nTNI leaders in their organizations because many people were
\nstill afraid of a possible counteroffensive by the communists
\nand their sympathizers.<\/p>\n
Window B: After 1965, pengkaryaan became an important method to
\nmaintain the leadership and management of many organizations
\nand institutions. Because people at that time realized the
\nnecessity of pengkaryaan, nobody was against it.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/the-future-of-abris-dual-function-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}