The fine art of picking the nation's chosen few<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): When then Lt. Gen. Soeharto was entrusted by the
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly to form a cabinet in 1966, it was
\nthe first time in years in which the process could be considered
\ndevoid of bickering over who would get which ministerial post.<\/p>\n
Installed in July of the same year, this was the \"Kabinet
\nAmpera\", named for the acronym Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat (Message
\nof the People's Suffering). The term, embodying demands for
\nreform, was coined in student demonstrations protesting what was
\nperceived as total neglect for the people's suffering amid years
\nof jockeying for political power.<\/p>\n
Since that time, researcher Daniel Dhakidae says, the country
\nhas seen what he describes as \"business cabinets\", a departure
\nfrom the era of the country's first president, Sukarno, when the
\nselection of ministers depended heavily on the lobbying of the
\nstrongest parties in government.<\/p>\n
As described in detail in Herbert Feith's The Decline of the
\nConstitutional Democracy, each brief cabinet period from 1949 to
\n1957, despite attempts at coalition, was ruined by politicians
\nand members of the military who disagreed with one policy or
\nanother of the party in power.<\/p>\n
The now defunct Indonesian Nationalist Party and the Moslem-
\nbased Masyumi were among those fighting for strategic positions.<\/p>\n
The most durable cabinet was the one under Prime Minister
\nMohammad Natsir, which served from 1957 to 1959. Others had an
\naverage of a year, and the shortest-serving one was brought down
\nin a matter of months. None had the opportunity to bring about
\nthe programs urgently needed to address the frail condition of
\nthe new republic.<\/p>\n
Cabinets, Feith wrote, \"... concerned themselves ... less with
\nthe enforcement of law and more with the fashioning of ideology\".<\/p>\n
Eventually, the parliamentary system under which these
\ncabinets rose and fell was ended. Blamed for being too \"liberal\"
\nand largely responsible for the political chaos, the
\nadministration in 1959 gave in to pressure to return to the
\npresidential system endorsed by the 1945 Constitution. No one, it
\nseemed, including the Armed Forces and Sukarno, had the patience
\nto stand by any longer.<\/p>\n
This continued through the early years of the ensuing decade
\nand the formation of the \"Ampera\" cabinet. In 1968, the \"Kabinet
\nPembangunan\" (Development Cabinet) was installed.<\/p>\n
Base<\/p>\n
Cabinets from that year to the one installed in 1993 -- named
\nin succession \"Kabinet Pembangunan\" I to VI -- were the subject
\nof a survey by Daniel and the research department of the Kompas
\ndaily comparing their social base in the New Order years.<\/p>\n
Cabinets were primarily recruited from the bureaucracy, Golkar
\n(referring to Keluarga Besar Golkar, or the Golkar \"family\",
\nincluding its affiliated organizations and ABRI) and academia.<\/p>\n
Top people in Golkar's youth organization, KNPI, governors and
\nmilitary chiefs of strategic areas, and high ranking officials in
\nministries were the main potential candidates.<\/p>\n
The survey concluded that the social base of the cabinets
\nincreasingly narrowed to the bureaucracy, as indicated in the
\ncomposition of the 1993 cabinet.<\/p>\n
Other sources of recruitment were rare; five years ago, the
\nAssociation of Moslem Intellectuals (ICMI) was a notable source.<\/p>\n
The risk of a cabinet with members mainly from the
\nbureaucracy, Daniel wrote, was the lack of creativity which
\noutsiders could bring.<\/p>\n
\"Maybe this contributed to their lack of efficiency,\" Daniel
\nsaid this week. Although outsiders were rare, businessman Abdul
\nLatief, appointed manpower minister, was one exception.<\/p>\n
Daniel said this composition reflected that \"technical
\ncapability was not a main criteria, compared to loyalty\".<\/p>\n
In anticipating the cabinet announced yesterday, many hoped
\nministers would be picked for their capability. Political
\nprofessor Maswadi Rauf of the University of Indonesia added that
\nmore representation of provinces should also be taken into
\naccount.<\/p>\n
Learning from history, both scholars separately said while the
\nselection of ministers would likely remain the President's
\nprerogative, the President should consult with more parties in
\nthe future.<\/p>\n
Maswadi and expert in administrative law Yusril Ihza Mahendra
\ndisagreed with the idea of adopting a commission hearing of
\nministerial candidates with legislators.<\/p>\n
Maswadi says the President should consult not only legislators
\nbut all necessary parties, \"because we do not recognize an
\nopposition party\" which could hold the government to
\naccountability.<\/p>\n
Daniel, on the other hand, says a hearing with legislators
\ncould be made mandatory, as in the United States.<\/p>\n
He adds it is high time for a \"talent-scouting team\", like in
\nthe U.S. and South Korea, where ministerial candidates are sought
\nhigh and low in universities, companies or other institutions.<\/p>\n
The widespread gossip facing each new lineup, while exciting,
\n\"is sad,\" he says, with nobody other than the President knowing
\nthe names of ministerial candidates.<\/p>\n
So far, this has indeed been President's Soeharto's sole
\nprerogative.<\/p>\n
Sources close to old State Secretariat insiders and palace
\nofficials confirm that the President always prepared his cabinet
\na few months before the announcement.<\/p>\n
He keeps files of potential candidates of different
\nbackgrounds, expertise and reputation, they said.<\/p>\n
\"The President closely studies the people he may need in the
\nnext cabinet. He follows their progress and tries to cross check
\nhis opinion with other people,\" a source said.<\/p>\n
\"When his wife Ibu Tien was still alive, it was natural that
\nthe couple sometimes discussed (candidates).\"<\/p>\n
However, she did not wish to interfere in her husband's
\ndecisions, sources added.<\/p>\n
Often, the President reappoints a minister in the same
\nposition or in another post. Before a cabinet was dissolved, he
\nwould meet with some of them and tell them either indirectly or
\nfrankly whether he still wanted them.<\/p>\n
One sign a minister may not be reappointed was when the
\nPresident did not address he or she at the farewell party, a
\nsource said. \"Some ministers felt that they would still be
\nreappointed although the President had politely told them about
\nhis decision.\"<\/p>\n
A few days before the cabinet announcement, he usually asks
\nhis adjutants to call the candidates and instruct them to come to
\nhis Jl. Cendana residence in Central Jakarta.<\/p>\n
\"They were asked to come alone. The President would tell the
\ncandidate his plan and ask him or her to keep the secret until
\nthe announcement. The President would also indicate that his
\nfinal decision would only be known in the announcement,\" the
\nofficial says, adding that secrecy was key in case of a change in
\nplans.<\/p>\n
The President, he says, would usually ask the candidate to
\nconsult with his or her family and inform him in the event of a
\ndecision to not accept the post.<\/p>\n
The source adds: \"There was a funny story five years ago, when
\na politician came to Jl. Cendana after receiving a call from
\nsomeone claiming to be an adjutant of the President. He was very
\ndisappointed after officials at the residence told him that his
\nname was not in the list of Pak Harto's guests.\"<\/p>\n
In the absence of any visible talent-scouting, the
\nPresidential telephone call remains the sure-fire sign.
\nFormerly, those with a hunch or hope that they might be summoned
\nwould wait at home, or bar all from touching the phone for
\nseveral days. Now, the mobile phone has changed all that.<\/p>\n
When the fateful call comes, however, the chosen few may have
\nto be careful about concealing a location unbefitting a new
\nminister.<\/p>\n
\"The important thing,\" another official says, \"is not to have
\nany sounds in the background which could cast uncertainty in the
\nmind of the President.\" (anr\/prb)<\/p>",
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