The evolving strategic balance in Asia<\/p>\n
By Juwono Sudarsono<\/p>\n
The following article is based on prepared remarks made at the
\nChina-Indonesia Security Dialog, organized by the China Institute
\nof International and Strategic Studies and the National Defense
\nUniversity in Beijing on March 28-29, 1996.<\/p>\n
BEIJING: The evolving strategic balance in Asia and the
\nPacific today comprises the changing political, economic and
\nmilitary priorities of China, the United States, Japan and
\nRussia. By 2010 the strategic quadrangle should be consummated
\ninto a new stable distribution of power reflecting a more
\nenduring political, economic and military arrangement among the
\nfour major powers.<\/p>\n
The strategic balance has far reaching implications for the
\nAsia-Pacific and profoundly affects the development trajectories
\nof other states in the region. More importantly, the effective
\nimplementation of cooperative engagement and comprehensive
\nsecurity require understanding of the current transition from a
\nsituation largely determined by the combined preponderance of the
\nUnited States and Japan to a more balanced equilibrium
\nincorporating the role of China and Russia.<\/p>\n
The transition is definitely moving toward a more Asia-centric
\nsecurity paradigm with China and Japan as chief determinants.
\nChina's role is especially pivotal for the simple reason that it
\nwill be the second largest economy in the world by 2005. China's
\nvast physical expanse, population and its geopolitical setting
\nconnecting the Asia land mass of Northeast Asia and Southeast
\nAsia merit the attention and understanding of all of its Asia-
\nPacific neighbors.<\/p>\n
Although greater attention and effort will continue to focus
\non economic interaction involving all APEC economies, the
\ncontinued success of that process will be determined by how the
\nsecurity dimension will be handled within a new distribution of
\npower among China, Japan, the United States and Russia. A clearer
\nidentification of the convergence between economic transformation
\nand changing security priorities need to be mapped out and
\nperiodically assessed. Therein lies the challenge of matching
\nprogress in Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) with
\ntangible benchmarks in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
\nconsultative process.<\/p>\n
As economic growth in the region advances and the need to
\nsecure energy resources becomes more acute, military tensions in
\nthe region increase the possibility that combined strategic,
\nconventional and low intensity considerations will have to be
\nfactored in along with diplomatic maneuvering over global trade,
\ninvestment and financing rules. Nations which need to sustain
\ngrowth rates of 8 percent to 10 percent for the next decade must
\ncalibrate their energy needs and link that strategy with
\nappropriate security policies commensurate with the region's
\nspecific features.<\/p>\n
Although in security terms Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia
\nare related, there is merit in separating the two regions into
\ndistinct categories. Each region has its peculiar strategic
\ncircumstance and local characteristics. The South China and East
\nChina sea lines of communication, for example, are crucial for
\nJapan's economic viability since they comprise more than 80
\npercent of Japan's sea-borne trade. That viability affects the
\nquality of U.S.-Japan alliance structure which in turn influences
\nthe strategic balance in the Korean peninsula.<\/p>\n
The sensitivity of the North Korea nuclear weapon build-down
\nthrough the October 1994 Agreed Framework attest to the delicate
\nnature of combining nuclear, conventional, and low intensity
\nlevels of military strategy. These will influence the scope and
\ntiming of Korean unification.<\/p>\n
The Spratly Islands dispute is too intricate to be discussed
\nthrough diplomatic means alone. Every percentage growth rate that
\nan Asia Pacific nation strives to sustain ultimately affects the
\nenergy needs of its immediate and region-wide neighbors.
\nDepending on the situation, forward based strategies through
\nprepositioning and selective theater forces deployment will have
\nto be linked to a credible deterrence capability.<\/p>\n
In the decade ahead, that deterrence will increasingly involve
\nthe use of electronic-based air and naval forces capable of
\nintegrating radar, surveillance and communications systems. The
\nair, sea, rail traffic and logistical systems which China is
\ndeveloping with its neighbors in mainland Southeast Asia are
\nenhancing inter-region cooperation. New technologies employed in
\nconjunction with the imperative to secure access to off-shore and
\nundersea energy resources will become more significant. Along
\nwith increased regionalism and globalism in trade, investments
\nand finance, all economies in the region must factor in the
\nsecurity dimension.<\/p>\n
Increased linkages between enhance economic imperatives and
\nneed for commensurate military capabilities result in four
\nnational trends that merit special attention.<\/p>\n
* The availability of surplus weapons and equipment from NATO and
\nex-Warsaw Pact countries have also encouraged substantial growth
\nin defense expenditure. Though these developments do not
\nnecessarily lead to a regional arms race, even phased
\nmodernization sustained well into the next century can affect
\npriorities and perceptions of national security.<\/p>\n
* Given the uncertainties of the evolving strategic environment,
\nmany Asia Pacific countries are developing their defense industry
\ncapabilities. In the past five years Japan, China, the two
\nKoreas, Singapore and other countries in the region have invested
\nheavily in local defense industries. No country can be completely
\nindependent of foreign suppliers. But the emphasis towards
\ngreater self reliance is understandable, since a significant
\nportion of defense industry enhancement may result in spin-offs
\nto the broader civilian economy;<\/p>\n
* Following the adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention in
\nNovember 1994, many nations in the region have legally acquired
\nterritorial rights of the exclusive economic zone. Substantial
\nresource opportunities have led to expanded security concerns and
\nresponsibilities. Since jurisdiction over these territorial
\nwaters overlap, there is greater need to coordinate policies
\nexploring options on establishing joint responsibilities rather
\nthan claims of based on sovereignty.<\/p>\n
* The paradox of growing economic success leading to
\naffordability in purchasing new weapons and new equipment pose
\nserious challenges to building confidence among nations that have
\nfacilitated, if not stimulated, defense spending. Intra-regional
\ndefense cooperation on a bilateral and or multilateral dimensions
\nrequire skill and patience to match progress reached in economic
\ncooperation. Additionally, there has been an important image-
\nbuilding and prestige factors involved depending on the
\nleadership style adapted in individual countries.<\/p>\n
The writer is Vice Governor of the National Resilience
\nInstitute, Jakarta.<\/p>",
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