The Cold War may be reignited<\/p>\n
By Muhammad Takdir<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): On consecutive days in mid-March 1999, the
\nSenate and House voted in Capitol Hill to endorse the national
\nmissile defense system. Their votes signified the closest
\ndeployment of the most advanced technology in missile defense
\ntechnology since President Ronald Reagan delivered his famous
\nstar wars speech in 1983. America's drive to develop missile
\ndefense weapons systems is putting Washington in high voltage and
\ncontroversial positions, both domestically and abroad. However,
\nthe two votes move the U.S. one step closer to deployment of the
\nmissiles and increase pressure on the Clinton administration to
\ndecide in June 2000 to commit to deployment.<\/p>\n
Development of the program reflects strong aspirations within
\nthe U.S. national budget, submitted by President Bill Clinton to
\nCongress on Feb. 1, 1999. The budget requested an extra US$6.5
\nbillion for more work on the national missile defense system over
\nthe next six years, bringing the total earmarked for the system
\nto $10.5 billion between now and 2005. The Senate and House votes
\nensure the program is politically visible by presenting and
\nmandating the national missile defense deployment \"as soon as it
\nis technologically feasible\".<\/p>\n
Besides the National Missile Defense (NMD) system, programs
\nalso stress the importance of study and research in the
\ndeployment of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems. As deployed
\nin the 1991 Gulf War, the latter is designed to neutralize a
\nstrike on U.S. forces or their allies by destroying incoming
\nenemy missiles, either against medium or short-range missiles.<\/p>\n
The Clinton administration has announced steps to advance the
\nTMD program by proposing joint-research projects between Japan
\nand the U.S., with Japan earmarking about $8 million for TMD
\nresearch and development programs. Most international observers
\nspeculate that the missile defense shield might be extended to
\ninvolve Taiwan and South Korea in the process of achieving its
\nultimate goal.<\/p>\n
As Josep L. Galloway said, the Clinton calculation regarding
\nthe program is not hard to follow (see Seeking a Silver Bullet,
\nU.S. News & World Report, March 29, 1999). The recent China spy
\nscandal in Los Alamos and the successful North Korean missile
\ntest in Aug. 31, 1998, raised the stakes for the U.S. and opened
\na bag full of questions. In terms of domestic political
\nobjectives, we can say that Clinton -- ever-deft at catching
\nlate-breaking waves and co-opting conservative initiatives
\n(Senator Thad Cohran, a Republican from Mississippi, introduced
\nthe bill mandating deployment of NMD systems) -- withdrew his
\nlong-standing threat to veto a missile defense bill. Everybody
\nknows it was President Clinton who \"killed\" star wars in a
\nflourish upon taking office in 1992.<\/p>\n
In a statement responding to the congressional endorsement of
\nballistic missile defense, Clinton expressed gratitude that the
\nSenate, on a bipartisan basis, included in its NMD legislation
\ntwo amendments which significantly changed the original bill
\nwhich he strongly opposed. Clinton emphasized the growing danger
\nof what he called \"outlaw nations\" developing and deploying long-
\nrange missiles that could deliver weapons and cause mass
\ndestruction against the U.S. and its allies.<\/p>\n
Although Clinton called the program a \"limited NMD\" against
\nthese threats, disassociating the approach from the star wars
\nprogram, he was clearly disposed to the new policy. Such a stance
\nis fraught with political danger and international risk,
\nespecially when we consider that arms-control negotiations with
\nRussia may be thrown into jeopardy.<\/p>\n
Clinton himself aligned the program with achieving U.S. arms-
\ncontrol objectives, including negotiating any amendments to the
\nAnti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty signed by the U.S. and the
\nSoviet Union in 1972 that may be required to accommodate possible
\nNMD deployment. But the point is, can the U.S. guarantee that
\nRussia's political and military leaders will agree to sharply
\nreduce strategic nuclear missiles, in the absence of the ABM
\ntreaty's constraints on defense against those missiles?<\/p>\n
Reasons proffered among the politicians, both Republicans and
\nDemocrats, in Capitol Hill, were that the ABM treaty is a
\nhistorical irrelevancy, a Cold War anachronism which should be
\nabandoned. In response to this viewpoint, Russia's President
\nBoris Yeltzin has repeatedly stated that Russia will not reduce
\nits nuclear arsenal unless the U.S. adheres to the ABM treaty.
\nRussian Foreign Minister Igor Yvanov, said that further cuts in
\nstrategic offensive weapons can be made if there is a clear
\nvision of preserving and observing the treaty.<\/p>\n
The question now is that if the Senate defeats the ABM treaty
\nprotocols negotiated between Moscow and Washington, is there any
\npossibility the treaty will become null and void? In March 1999,
\nthe Russian Duma took an encouraging step toward obtaining final
\napproval of START II. However, I am not sure whether the Russians
\nwant to move ahead on the START III framework -- a blueprint
\nnegotiated between Clinton and Yeltzin in 1997 to cut Russian and
\nU.S. arsenals by 80 percent from Cold War levels -- while
\nmaintaining the ABM treaty as a cornerstone of strategic
\nstability, as Clinton wishes.<\/p>\n
What becomes clear from that picture, is that U.S. programs on
\nmissile defense deployment could start a new arms race, re-
\nigniting the Cold War after burying it nine years ago. The
\nprograms would certainly antagonize other nuclear powers such as
\nRussia and China, causing them to retain or develop additional
\nlong-range missiles that could evade or overcome such a defense.<\/p>\n
Aside from the continuing debate in which missile defense
\ndeployment as a political issue has achieved critical mass, the
\nfuture of the programs, both in terms of NMD and TMD deployment,
\nis not as promising, given the long history of antimissile system
\nfailures. The $5 billion spent by the U.S. government in the
\n1960s bought a system that shut down only five months after
\ncommencing operation. Analysts said the reasons were simple:
\nthings did not work as the U.S. had expected and it cost too much
\nto operate.<\/p>\n
Another $55 billion spent on star wars in the 1980s ironically
\nproduced similar results and met a similar end. John Pike of the
\nFederation of American Scientists, a leading missile-defense
\nexpert and critic said: \"They have not been able to get these
\nthings to work. One big problem they face is that the critical
\ntechnology -- using heat-seeking sensors to intercept missiles --
\nhas a terrible track record. There have been 15 hit-to-kill tests
\nsince 1980. In only two did the test interceptor hit something\".<\/p>\n
Finding a technology that works, at a price even the richest
\nnation in the world can afford, has always been the underlying
\nproblem with antimissile defense systems. Chairman of the Joint
\nChiefs of Staff Gen. Henry Shelton, in an interview with Sea
\nPower Magazine in February 1999, acknowledges the technological
\ndifficulties.<\/p>\n
Shelton said that it was a simple fact that the U.S. does not
\nyet have the technology to field a NMD. \"We have, in fact, put
\nsome $40 billion into the program over the last 10 years. But
\ntoday we do not technologically have a bullet that can hit a
\nbullet.\" Even after more than 40 years of research -- and
\nspending over $100 billion -- intercepting ballistic missile
\nwarheads remains a major technological hurdle.<\/p>\n
Disregarding the program's technical and political barriers,
\nWashington keeps putting the plan on the table and authorizing
\nspending whatever it takes to develop an antimissile defense
\nsystem over the next six years. It appears determined despite
\nleaks that it does not work or has not proven itself, the cost to
\ntaxpayers, its impact on global stability and its effectiveness
\nin operation.<\/p>\n
The Cohran Bill which backs up the system, is just like a
\nblank check for any defense contractor interested in and capable
\nof functioning the system. Defense contractors under Boeing Co --
\none of the Pentagon's close working partners -- have until June
\n2000 to coordinate a program of four flight tests. At the same
\ntime, Clinton will review whether the system can be put into
\noperation or should remain in research. Whatever the result,
\nperhaps the deployment of a missile defense system, as in the
\nstar wars program, is not only fiscally irresponsible, but also
\nrepresents a false sense of security among U.S. policy makers.<\/p>\n
Indeed, this is the chance for key global actors, including
\nthe U.S., to begin the 21st century with large concessions and
\nagreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. Such
\na scenario is most likely further than a dream, unless the U.S.
\ncan find a way to protect their interests by not developing a
\nmassive missile defense system.<\/p>\n
The writer works at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign
\nAffairs. He has written this article in a personal capacity.<\/p>\n
Window: ...the deployment of a missile defense system, as in the
\nstar wars program, is not only fiscally irresponsible, but also
\nrepresents a false sense of security among U.S. policy makers.<\/p>",
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