The beginning of the end<\/p>\n
When the Indonesian Military (TNI) mooted the idea for a
\n\"Return to the 1945 Constitution\" on Tuesday, it immediately
\nrevived our memories of that fateful day in 1959, when then
\npresident Sukarno pronounced those very same words that brought
\nthe country back to its original basic law. Whether history is
\nabout to repeat itself depends on one's interpretation of the
\nevents surrounding the famous July 5, 1959 decree by Sukarno.<\/p>\n
Most existing history textbooks still tell us that Sukarno
\ntook that crucial decision because circumstances left him with no
\nother option. The nation, then ruled by a provisional
\nconstitution that adopted the parliamentary system, was mired in
\ncrisis which had virtually crippled the government, while
\ndiscontent in the regions culminated in armed rebellions in some
\nprovinces. Many historians today still view the 1959 dekrit as
\nIndonesia's salvation from anarchy and the brink of collapse.<\/p>\n
Another, newer interpretations of the 1959 events suggests
\nthat Sukarno's move marked the beginning of the end of the
\ndemocratization process that the nation had been going through
\nsince the 1945 proclamation of independence. The dekrit was
\nsimply a tool that gave the legitimacy for Sukarno, whom hitherto
\nhad been nothing more than a figurehead, to wrest power from the
\nparliament.<\/p>\n
The dekrit ended the parliamentary system that had been in
\nplace since 1950, and returned Indonesia to a presidential system
\nof government. Of course, Sukarno could not have done it alone.
\nThe Army happily collaborated with him, but in return, it earned
\nadditional political powers for itself.<\/p>\n
To many revisionists, the \"Return to the 1945 Constitution\" in
\n1959 dealt the fatal blow to the democratization and nation-
\nbuilding processes of the young republic, and plunged Indonesia
\ninto two successive dictatorships for the next 39 years. It also
\nmarked the official entry of the military into the political
\narena, something that we still have to live with today.<\/p>\n
The 37-article 1945 Constitution, drawn up in haste by our
\nfounding fathers in the wake of the independence proclamation,
\nleft many issues so vague that they were open to interpretation.
\nThe interpretation of those in power essentially prevailed.<\/p>\n
Sukarno exploited the 1945 Constitution to turn himself into a
\nlegitimate dictator until 1966. Soeharto, who emerged from the
\nheavily politicized Army, used the basic law more effectively if
\nnot ruthlessly, which allowed him to stay in power until he was
\nforced to resign in 1998 by a popular uprising.<\/p>\n
Notice how neither Sukarno nor Soeharto were ever interested
\nin amending or replacing the 1945 Constitution. They even turned
\nit into a holy script. That's because the Constitution was
\ndictator-friendly, although that was never the intention of our
\nfounding fathers when they drafted the basic law.<\/p>\n
One can read many things into TNI's decision to moot the idea
\nof a \"Return to the 1945 Constitution\" right on the eve of the
\nannual meeting of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) which
\nstarts today. We leave it to the experts to speculate about the
\nmotive behind the TNI's move, but some people may find the
\nproposal appealing as an option, given that the nation is now
\nfacing a possible constitutional crisis.<\/p>\n
The most crucial agenda in this year's MPR meeting is to
\nfinalize the constitutional amendments that started in 1999. It
\nis imperative that the MPR completes its task this year so that
\nthe nation can elect its political leaders and government in the
\n2004 election under a new and more democratic system.<\/p>\n
But as the MPR is about to complete its task with the fourth
\npackage of amendments, it is understandable that more
\ndisagreements are emerging as political groups, including the
\nTNI, realize the implications on their own political standing
\nbeyond 2004.<\/p>\n
Although the MPR gathering this time may not seem as exciting
\nas in previous years, its decisions are crucial in deciding the
\nfuture and shape of this nation. For many political groups, the
\nreal battle is in the next few days.<\/p>\n
If the MPR cannot reach an agreement, then the nation would
\ndefinitely find itself in a constitutional crisis that would
\njeopardize the chances of the 2004 election ever taking place.
\nTNI's proposal for a \"Return to the 1945 Constitution\" could then
\nbecome one of the only few options available to Indonesia.<\/p>\n
But given Indonesia's bitter history with the 1945
\nConstitution, returning to the dictator-friendly basic law comes
\nwith a very high risk that all MPR members might want to ponder.
\nWhile the idea of an independent commission to prepare a new
\nbasic law or amend the existing constitution is still the most
\nideal path for Indonesia, the MPR has a duty to complete its task
\nof completing the amendment process.<\/p>\n
Whatever shortcomings one finds in the four packages of
\namendments to the 1945 Constitution, they still stand a better
\nchance then the original text in sparing Indonesia from being
\nplunged back into darkness once again. Going by history, if that
\nwere to happen, it would take us three to four decades to get rid
\nof future dictators.<\/p>\n
The outcome of this year's MPR meeting is therefore critical
\nbecause it could either mark the beginning of the end of the
\ndemocratic process that began in 1998, or the beginning of the
\nend of the authoritarian system that began in 1959.<\/p>\n
The decision rests with the MPR members. Let's hope they make
\nthe right choice.<\/p>",
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