The Aceh conflict: The long, bumpy road to peace<\/p>\n
Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Senior diplomat, Jakarta<\/p>\n
From the outset, it has always been clear that the road to
\npeace in Aceh would be a bumpy one, especially during the first
\ntwo months after the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities
\nAgreement (COHA) in Geneva on Dec. 9.<\/p>\n
As of Dec. 30, 2002 there were already some 50 incidents of
\nfighting between Free Aceh Movement (GAM) troops and Indonesian
\nsecurity forces.<\/p>\n
Yet, the general effect of the signing had been widespread
\noptimism verging on euphoria.<\/p>\n
The fact is that the guns are not yet silent, and it will not
\nbe until July that these guns will be removed from politics.<\/p>\n
But the people believe that they already had peace in their
\nhands and would not let go of it. Sick and tired of decades of
\narmed conflict during which more than 10,000 persons, mostly
\ncivilians, died, the Acehnese want peace that badly. With hopes
\nand expectations raised so high, the risk is that if the peace
\nprocess failed, the letdown could be very severe.<\/p>\n
A multi-agency UN team visited Aceh in order to assess the
\nrequirements of the rehabilitation of the province. The initial
\nfinding was that the province was in dire need of financial aid
\nto rebuild schools and health facilities. In Jakarta, the
\ngovernment organized a team to distribute humanitarian aid.<\/p>\n
The government also pledged to give priority to the hundreds
\nof thousands of Acehnese who had been displaced by the conflict.<\/p>\n
Within the month, the joint security committee, which monitors
\nthe cease-fire, was partly deployed.<\/p>\n
There was a dramatic reduction in the incidence of killings.<\/p>\n
These positive developments could have gained momentum.<\/p>\n
Instead, the process got bogged down.<\/p>\n
It did not take long before the Indonesian Military (TNI) and
\nGAM accused each other of cease-fire violations. There were press
\nreports of civilians intimidating the peace monitors. At any
\nrate, for their safety, the monitors were eventually withdrawn.<\/p>\n
The government complained that the committee had become
\nineffective in the field because of the negative statements of
\nGAM personalities. GAM has been brazenly holding pro-independence
\nrallies and carrying out a public disinformation campaign to
\npromote a public perception that the final result of the
\nimplementation of the agreement would be independence.<\/p>\n
It also undertook heavy recruitment in villages. It smuggled
\nin weapons to arm its expanded fighting force. It continued to
\nbuild and expand its political structure in villages. This
\nunderground government went so far as to collect a \"Nanggroe
\ntax.\" This was, of course, a form of extortion.<\/p>\n
The government noted that with very little time left before
\nthe end of the demilitarization phase, there was no indication of
\nthe system, plan and process of placement of GAM weapons..<\/p>\n
The government then registered a strong protest with the Henry
\nDunant Centre (HDC), charging that GAM was in material breach of
\nits obligations.<\/p>\n
On this basis, it demanded in early April the immediate
\nconvening of the Joint Council, which is composed of high
\nofficials of the government, the GAM and the HDC.<\/p>\n
When GAM indicated that it had no intention of attending such
\na meeting, the government at once started preparing for military
\noperations. In mid-April, however, GAM communicated through HDC
\nthat it was ready to attend the meeting. They still had to agree,
\nhowever, on the date and place of the meeting.<\/p>\n
The government proposed Tokyo, GAM wanted Geneva. The
\ngovernment agreed, and set it on April 25, a Friday, considering
\nthat in the past GAM preferred to meet on weekends. GAM indicated
\nits agreement, but not long after changed its mind again. The
\ngovernment offered a compromise where the opening formalities
\nwould be held on 25 with the respective advance parties in
\nattendance, and the actual discussions on the 26 and 27. Again,
\nHDC could not persuade the GAM to agree to this compromise.<\/p>\n
GAM would agree to meet on the 27, a Sunday.<\/p>\n
But what could be accomplished in one day when there were so
\nmany sensitive and complex issues to straighten out? HDC was not
\nable to bring the GAM to the meeting, so it could not be held..<\/p>\n
The government had taken all pains to be flexible even when
\nits patience was stretched to the limit. On the other hand, GAM
\nwas not only inflexible, it also displayed a streak of
\nobstructionism and disdain.<\/p>\n
The big question now is: What next?<\/p>\n
The answer may be derived from a consideration of GAM's past
\nbehavior. Since negotiations began in January 2000, this has
\nfollowed a pattern of perfidy.<\/p>\n
GAM would accept an arrangement such as the humanitarian pause
\nbut would use it only for the purposes of consolidating its
\nforces, only to resume fighting when it would be confident that
\nit had sufficiently gathered political and military strength.<\/p>\n
For its part, the government has been consistent with its
\nstatement of Aug. 19, that it would adhere to a strategy of
\nexhausting all peaceful means before deciding on an \"appropriate
\naction,\" which many would interpret as a military operation.<\/p>\n
The Joint Statement of May 10, and the COHA of Dec. 9 are not
\nperfect documents, but they constitute a sufficiently clear road
\nmap, with the acceptance of the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD)
\nlaw as a starting point, followed by cessation of hostilities, an
\nall-inclusive dialog and finally the election of 2004.<\/p>\n
So, while the HDC-facilitated talks are important, they do not
\nrepresent the heart of the matter. Their shared mission is not to
\nfind the road to peace, but to make peace the way to achieve
\ntheir common objective. And the only way to achieve that common
\nobjective is to adhere to the letter and spirit of the COHA and
\nto sustain the focus on the common objective.<\/p>\n
By exercising patience and flexibility, the government
\nbelieves that it has secured the higher moral ground.<\/p>\n
If it must now reformulate its policy, it is important that it
\nmust do so in a way that it keeps its hold on that higher moral
\nground. The government has two options: it can undertake some
\nkind of military action, or it can retry the peace process.<\/p>\n
Resuming the peace process does not appear to be a politically
\nattractive option for some. On the other hand, the view that
\npeace should be endeavored at all costs has been strongly
\nexpressed by many prominent politicians, ulemas and Acehnese in
\ngeneral. As the agreement provides for a five-month period during
\nwhich the placement of arms is to be accomplished, theoretically
\nthe government has the option to wait until after July 9, the
\ndeadline for the placement of the GAM's weapons, before it can be
\njustified in carrying out a military operation in the province.<\/p>\n
When a decision is finally made to take military action,
\noperations should be carefully planned so that what is waged is
\nnot war in the traditional sense, but a \"humanitarian war\", that
\nis based on a recognition that the exceedingly complex political
\nsituation cannot be resolved through military force alone.<\/p>\n
Moreover, there is the risk that military action may backfire
\nif sizable civilian casualties are incurred. Hence, the operation
\nshould be designed not only to win battles and skirmishes, but
\nprimarily the hearts and minds of the Acehnese.<\/p>\n
Even the justified use of military force must take all
\nprecaution against \"collateral damage.\" A large number of
\ncivilian casualties could engender a new sense of grievance on
\nthe part of the people of Aceh, thereby frustrating the
\nattainment of the objectives of a humanitarian war.<\/p>\n
Indeed, it is imperative that the people of Aceh support the
\noperation at least to some extent, and should therefore be
\nconducted in such a way that it is perceived as not in disregard
\nof their interests and their lives. The humanitarian aspect of
\nthe operation should be of primary consideration.<\/p>\n
This means that it should not be an effort of the military
\nforces alone. Social, political, economic and public relations
\nconsiderations should be integrated into the substance of the
\noperational plan, and should involve appropriate operational
\ncontributions from the government agencies concerned with the
\ndelivery of social services.<\/p>\n
Above all, military personnel in the field must not only
\nrespect the human rights of the people of Aceh even in the heat
\nof the fighting, but must also be seen as doing so by an
\nobservant world that will be keenly monitoring the progress of
\nthe operation.<\/p>\n
Above all, the effort should be as brief as possible.<\/p>\n
As the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu put it, \"There is
\nno instance of any nation having gained a benefit from prolonged
\nwar.\" Certainly not if it will take another 26 years, as it has
\nhappened in Aceh.<\/p>\n
The author, a senior diplomat, is the Indonesian government's
\nchief negotiator for Aceh. This paper is an abridged paper of his
\npersonal account of his involvement in the Aceh diplomacy. The
\nfull version of the paper will soon be available at our website,
\nwww.thejakartapost.com<\/p>",
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