The 1998 student movement revisited<\/p>\n
Ari A. Perdana
\nCentre for Strategic and International Studies
\nJakarta
\nAri_Perdana@csis.or.id<\/p>\n
Calling for reform, follow us! Calling for succession, follow
\nus! No need to doubt, friends, just hold our hands. Ever onward,
\nwe will win! That was one of the most popular chants yelled by
\nstudents during the 1998 movement.<\/p>\n
It has been four years since the student movement in 1998
\nsuccessfully brought Soeharto down from power. It was
\nunpredicted, even unexpected, that Soeharto could be toppled by
\nsuch a movement. Similar previous movements and political
\nattempts to bring him down from power had never been successful.
\nFor more than 30 years, Soeharto had built a system that
\ngenerated some kind of shield that protected against any
\ndisturbances to his power.<\/p>\n
But May 21, 1998, was the last day he was in power. The drama
\nof the student movement that began in late 1997 and early 1998
\nculminated in mid-May 1998. The death of four Trisakti University
\nstudents in Jakarta, followed by a citywide racial riot, were the
\nturning points. In the following weeks, thousands of students
\noccupied the House of Representatives, calling for the
\nimpeachment of Soeharto. But Soeharto, without waiting for the
\nlegislature to impeach him, announced his resignation as
\npresident.<\/p>\n
Undoubtedly, the student movement was one of the most, if not
\nthe most, influential aspects in bringing Soeharto down from
\npower.<\/p>\n
But it is also a fact that the 1998 student movement only
\nsucceeded in forcing Soeharto to step down. The movement did not
\ntopple the New Order regime totally. Many actors of that era
\nstill survive on the current political stage. But more
\nimportantly, the movement was not able completely to transform
\nthe system and paradigm of the New Order. The current system
\ninherited many things from the past that were supposed to be
\ncorrected. For example, corruption continues, and is even getting
\nworse. In other words, the 1998 movement was unable to bring
\nabout a complete revolution.<\/p>\n
Senior sociologist Arief Budiman once said that historical
\nrevolutions had to meet several requirements to be considered
\nsuccessful. First, there has to be a solid, organized mass.
\nSecond, the presence of a strong, symbolic leadership. Third,
\nusually a revolution is triggered by a certain event. In some
\ncases we can add a fourth aspect, which is an alternative
\nideology.<\/p>\n
The 1998 movement mainly relied on historical momentum, which
\nwas the economic crisis. The masses were not completely solid and
\norganized. Some campuses and action units may have already had a
\nsolid basis, but in general the students did not yet have a
\ncommon ground regarding the direction of the movement. There was
\neven friction among the students, which after Soeharto had
\nresigned resulted in the movement splitting up.<\/p>\n
The 1998 movement did not have a charismatic and symbolic
\nleadership. Even the students at the time tended to reject the
\nleadership of any certain public figure or university. The
\nmovement also was not based on any ideology. Some might have
\ndeclared themselves to be \"leftists\" or \"Islamic activists\", but
\nthe student movement in general was not ideologically driven.
\nThis was understandable as any ideological movement might have
\nbeen easily repressed by the ruler.<\/p>\n
To some extent, the absence of an organized mass, symbolic
\nleadership and an alternative ideology provided the students some
\nadvantages. The students could claim their movement was a moral,
\nrather than a political movement. In this way, they could also
\nclaim to be speaking for the people suffering in the economic
\ncrisis, without being suspected of acting as agents for certain
\npolitical interests.<\/p>\n
But the student movement appeared to lack a strong basis to be
\na long-term sustainable movement. The movement was supposed to
\nbroaden its scope to become a people's movement, in which other
\nelements of civil society would have melted into a single unity.
\nHowever, the Trisakti incident happened before this collaboration
\nbecame solid. As a result, the student and non-student elements
\nwere no longer hand-in-hand after Soeharto resigned.<\/p>\n
Even the students themselves seemed to be split when B.J.
\nHabibie replaced Soeharto. Some students, especially those
\naffiliated with the Islamic factions, supported Habibie. Others
\nconsidered him as someone from the past who should also be
\ntoppled.<\/p>\n
The lack of a long-term common platform among the students
\npaved the way for politicians to steal the show. The reform
\nagenda was then brought into the formal state institutions.
\nHowever, the existing institutions and political system were the
\nsame as those in the New Order era. For example, the election
\nsystem still produces legislators who do not represent voters.
\nRather, they look after the interests of their parties in trading
\nfor power.<\/p>\n
And now, after four years, the reform movement has yet to pay
\nthe appropriate dividends. Some may even consider that the
\nmovement died prematurely. Hence, corrective measures to bring
\nthe reform movement back on track should be taken. This will
\nrequire contributions from those who still are concerned about
\nreform. But it should be done collectively, by all elements of
\ncivil society, including students, academics, non-governmental
\norganization activists and many more.<\/p>\n
And how about politicians? Well, we can drop them from the
\nequation.<\/p>",
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