Thaksin's chance for leading role in the region<\/p>\n
John D. Ciorciari, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore<\/p>\n
When Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad stepped down
\nlast October, he brought an end to an era of Southeast Asian
\npolitics. Mahathir was the last of a generation of core ASEAN
\nleaders, including Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Indonesia's
\nSoeharto, to depart from office.<\/p>\n
His longevity and relative economic success, combined with his
\nbold and outspoken foreign policy, made him a leading voice for
\nASEAN, both within and beyond the region. Consequently, his
\nretirement arguably left something of a vacuum in ASEAN
\nleadership.<\/p>\n
Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra appears the most eager
\nto seize this opportunity for a greater role in the region. The
\nquestion is how effective he can be in augmenting his position.<\/p>\n
Thai prime ministers have rarely bid for regional leadership.
\nUnstable domestic politics, tenuous civil-military relations, a
\ndogged southern separatist movement and protracted border
\nconflicts have provided ample preoccupation for Thaksin's
\npredecessors.<\/p>\n
Demonstrations and military intervention in 1992 undermined
\nthe country's image as a stabilizing democracy, and the 1997
\nAsian financial crisis hit Thailand hard, derailing many years of
\nprogress towards a greater economic role in Southeast Asia.
\nDiscomfort with English-language diplomacy and scant experience
\nin foreign affairs also limited many Thai leaders' ambitions
\nabroad.<\/p>\n
Only with Thaksin has Thailand seen a prime minister with the
\napparent mix of will and capability to exercise greater regional
\nand sub-regional leadership. Thaksin speaks English, exhibits
\ncomfort in front of the camera, and travels abroad more often
\nthan any Thai leader in recent history.<\/p>\n
As a former communications magnate, he enjoys extensive
\ncontacts in the international business community. He also shows
\nno lack of initiative.<\/p>\n
In 2002, he launched the Asia Bond project to promote
\ninvestment in Asian economies and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue,
\nwhich engages 18 states from East Asia to the Middle East with
\nThailand as its hub.<\/p>\n
Thailand is also centrally positioned in the region, with
\nextensive access to both the South China and Andaman seas.<\/p>\n
Planned intra-ASEAN roads and railways, a new international
\nairport and seaport, and the planned trans-isthmian canal should
\nfurther add to the country's economic and political centrality.<\/p>\n
But with about one-eighth of ASEAN's population and one-fifth
\nof its combined gross domestic product, Thailand is no regional
\nhegemony. It does not have the size or demographic weight that
\nhave long made Indonesia the \"natural\" leader of Southeast Asia.
\nIt also faces ambivalent neighbors, wary of what they see as
\ntraditional Thai designs to dominate its immediate neighborhood
\non the mainland peninsula.<\/p>\n
Indeed, Thaksin's opportunity for a larger regional role
\nderives primarily from default. Indonesian President Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri faces considerable challenges at home and an
\nuncertain political future. She has demonstrated little apparent
\ninterest or ability in driving the ASEAN agenda, as her
\npredecessors have. Filipino President Gloria Arroyo is similarly
\nbeset with domestic challenges and faces accusations of excessive
\ncloseness to Washington.<\/p>\n
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has quietly maintained
\nSingapore's economic and military position, but the city-state's
\nsmall size, ethnic composition and strategic vulnerability place
\nrestraints on the roles it can play abroad. Singapore has
\nspearheaded ASEAN's engagement with Europe, Northeast Asia and
\nLatin America, and led the regional drive towards free-trade
\nagreements with external powers.<\/p>\n
But as he prepares to step down, Goh continues to take a
\nsubtle, cautious approach to foreign policy.<\/p>\n
The same is true of new Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah
\nBadawi, who has made much of his intention to pursue a \"quieter\"
\npolicy than his controversial predecessor. His approach may yield
\nconsiderable dividends, but given his country's modest size and
\nresources, a Malaysian leader less outspoken than Mahathir is
\nunlikely to assume his stature in regional affairs.<\/p>\n
By contrast, Thaksin is highly outspoken and appears
\nrelatively unafraid to take political risks. Strong economic
\nperformance has won him unprecedented political popularity at
\nhome and places his Thai Rak Thai party in a very strong position
\nfor the coming general election.<\/p>\n
Although widely accused of stifling political opposition, co-
\nopting the media, and catering to big business interests, he
\nappears to have achieved at least short-term dominance on the
\nThai political landscape. Many believe Thaksin is attempting to
\nfashion a political order akin to that in Singapore or Malaysia,
\nin which one dominant party leads a democratic state with a heavy
\nhand in security and economic affairs.<\/p>\n
Thaksin has also been controversial but strong-willed on the
\nsecurity front. His \"war on drugs\" last year brought about the
\ndeath of roughly 2,500 people and drew heavy fire from human-
\nrights activists and the Democrat Party. But his unrelenting
\nattack on the Thai drug trade has brought him more domestic
\nsupport than opposition.<\/p>\n
Thaksin's ambition, economic success and relatively strong
\ndomestic position make him the most likely ASEAN leader to seek a
\ngreater regional voice in the post-Mahathir period.<\/p>\n
It is highly unlikely that Thailand will ever achieve the
\nprimacy that Indonesia enjoyed at selected points in ASEAN's
\nhistory; it's also improbable that Thaksin will take on the same
\ndegree of vocal leadership that Mahathir sometimes exercised.<\/p>\n
He will not be able to push Indonesia and Malaysia to back
\nmajor political or security initiatives, and he will not dominate
\nASEAN economic expansion, but Thailand is well positioned to
\nenhance its role as the leading mainland node in the regional
\npolitical system. He can also play a vocal and instrumental role
\nin coordinating economic and security initiatives among like-
\nminded countries inside and outside of the region.<\/p>\n
For Singapore, a modest rise in Thailand's regional influence
\ncould prove a blessing. The two countries share basic free-market
\nideology and close military ties. Their views on a number of key
\npolitical issues, such as free trade, managed free-market
\neconomics, terrorism, American and Chinese regional influence,
\ndomestic law and order and the Myanmar question are roughly
\naligned.<\/p>\n
Singapore may benefit from a larger neighbor willing to take
\nthe lead and, occasionally, the brunt of other countries'
\ncriticism in pushing its agenda. As Deputy Prime Minister Lee
\nHsien Loong prepares to take the reins, he will face the same
\ndilemmas his father did in asserting the nation's interests.<\/p>\n
A modest reorientation of the Southeast Asian power structure
\nand development of a stronger mainland node may prove even more
\nconducive than the old \"ASEAN core\" to the pursuit and
\nrealization of Singaporean interests.<\/p>\n
The writer is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of
\nDefense and Strategic Studies and a Wai Seng Senior Research
\nScholar at Oxford University.<\/p>",
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