Testing One-China policy<\/p>\n
Indonesia's decision to reject the planned visit by Taiwan
\nPresident Chen Shu-bian last week at the last minute was an
\nembarrassing episode for the government, but it would have been
\nfar more embarrassing, and possibly even disastrous for
\nIndonesia, if the visit had been allowed to go ahead.<\/p>\n
It is simply too difficult to predict how a politically and
\neconomically mighty Beijing would have responded to a visit by
\nTaiwan's top leaders to Indonesia. But it was not worth the risk.
\nWisely, the government of Indonesia did not want to take any
\nchances, and foiled the visit 24 hours before it was due to
\nproceed.<\/p>\n
The government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
\nmust have had some clear idea about how angry Beijing would have
\nbeen. China made its point clear about four months ago when
\nTaiwan Vice President Annette Lu came to Indonesia. Although she
\ncame here as a \"tourist\", and made her entry through Bali,
\nBeijing would have none of this, and made a strong protest,
\ndemanding that Jakarta adhere to its \"One-China\" policy.<\/p>\n
The geopolitical situation today has drastically changed from
\nwhat it was, say, four or six years ago, when Indonesia could
\nentertain top Taiwan government officials \"vacationing\" in the
\ncountry and still convince Beijing of its consistency in its
\npolicy of recognizing Beijing as the sole representative of
\nChina.<\/p>\n
In 1998, Taiwan Prime Minister Vincent Siew visited Jakarta in
\nhis \"personal capacity\" and met with president Soeharto. In 1996,
\nTaiwan President Lee Teng-hui spent his holiday in Bali at the
\nsame time that his Indonesian counterpart was visiting the
\nisland. These visits prompted Beijing to protest, but Indonesia
\nmanaged to deal with these and repaired the damage quickly.<\/p>\n
That was then. This is now.<\/p>\n
Today, Beijing has far greater clout in the conduct of its
\nforeign policy, commensurate with its growing economic power. No
\ncountry in the world can ignore or offend China, including
\nreceiving top Taiwan leaders, and hope to get away with it. There
\nwill be reprisals, politically as well as economically.<\/p>\n
Taiwan has succeeded in flexing its economic clout to secure
\nsupport from the international community. An economically
\npowerful Beijing can do the same, and far more effectively.<\/p>\n
Although Indonesia's economic ties with Beijing today are
\nnowhere as close as its relations with Taiwan, it would be
\nfoolish for Indonesia to simply ignore them.<\/p>\n
There are already early dividends from the economic ties with
\nBeijing: Indonesia has won a multibillion dollar contract to
\nsupply liquefied natural gas, China has pledged to give $400
\nmillion in semi-concessionaire loans to Indonesia and China will
\nopen its vast market to members of the Association of Southeast
\nAsian Nations (ASEAN) through a free-trade agreement in 2010.
\nInexpensive Chinese manufacturing products are flooding our
\nmarkets and Chinese companies are starting to invest in the
\ncountry.<\/p>\n
This is not to belittle the economic importance of Taiwan to
\nIndonesia. Taiwan politicians, in calling for economic reprisals
\nagainst Jakarta after last week's abrupt cancellation of
\nPresident Chen's visit, rightly pointed out that Taiwan was a
\nmajor source of foreign investment in Indonesia, and also a major
\ndestination for Indonesian workers.<\/p>\n
But it seems totally unfair for Taiwan to continue using its
\neconomic clout to test the loyalty of its friends like Indonesia,
\nespecially at a time like this when our country has been going
\nfrom one crisis to another. It is unfair because the question of
\none China is really for the people of China, both on the mainland
\nand on Taiwan, and for them alone to resolve. They should not
\nimpose their problem on their friends.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's position, like most of the rest of the world, on
\nthis issue has been clear and consistent. We have continued to
\nadhere to the One-China policy. That has not changed, not even
\nwhen Indonesia severed diplomatic ties with Beijing between 1965
\nand 1990, and it is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n
The task at hand now is for both countries to repair the
\ndamage caused by last week's episode.<\/p>\n
The existing strong economic bonds between Indonesia and
\nTaiwan are beneficial to both countries, and there is no reason
\nwhy they cannot continue, even as Indonesia is fostering economic
\nrelations with China. After all, Taiwan companies too are hopping
\non the bandwagon to invest in China.<\/p>\n
Without formal diplomatic ties, Indonesia-Taiwan relations
\nhave expanded to include even pop culture, which brings young
\npeople in the two countries together. The concert of Taiwan's F-4
\npop idols in Jakarta next month, and the growing popularity of
\nTaiwan's TV soap operas, are cases in point.<\/p>\n
There is too much at stake for both Indonesia and Taiwan to
\nallow relations to turn sour simply because of a few bruised
\negos.<\/p>",
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