Taking the long view in countering terrorism<\/p>\n
Barry Desker, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore<\/p>\n
The emergence of the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) threat in Southeast
\nAsia has spawned a cottage industry of books and commentaries
\ndiscussing terrorism in the region.<\/p>\n
Most of the analyses are by counter-terrorism specialists,
\ntheorists in international relations and political pundits.<\/p>\n
Those who have spent years studying the region, including area
\nspecialists and scholars in Islamic studies, have been absent
\nfrom the debate. Instead, they have decried the lack of depth in
\nthese analyses.<\/p>\n
One reason for their late involvement: Most were mesmerized by
\nthe moderate character of Islam in the region. There was denial
\nthat there are groups intent on disrupting the peaceful evolution
\nof societies, such as Indonesia, in a transition to democratic
\ngovernance.<\/p>\n
Lacking the long view these specialists could provide, the
\ndebate on JI resulted in the perception that militancy in Islam
\nis a recent phenomenon.<\/p>\n
In reality, radical interpretations of Islam are not a new
\ndevelopment. In the 1870s, religious Muslims who returned from
\nthe haj inspired by the austere Wahabi fundamentalism they
\nencountered in Mecca embarked on the Padri wars in West Sumatra.<\/p>\n
The use of the term \"padri\" was an astute recognition of the
\noverlap between fundamentalists of different religious faiths:
\nThe white robes of the Wahabi followers and their religious zeal
\nreminded local villagers of Christian missionaries or padres.<\/p>\n
At the beginning of the 20th century, pamphleteers and editors
\nin Singapore, then the hub of the regional Malay-language media,
\nspread competing Islamic doctrines around the region. They set
\nthe stage for a political contest between the Kaum Muda (the
\nreformists) and the Kaum Tua (the traditional establishment).<\/p>\n
In the 1950s, the new Indonesian republic faced a major
\nchallenge from the Darul Islam revolt, which was supported by
\nAbdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Basyir, the leaders of today's JI.<\/p>\n
Colonial regimes in the region, as well as post-colonial
\nleaderships, agonized over the role of Islam and recognized the
\nchallenge posed by Islamic radicals bent on overturning the
\nexisting state order.<\/p>\n
Radical interpretations of Islam will be a recurrent
\nchallenge, as today's JI shows. Like other similar movements in
\nthe Islamic world which describe themselves as Salafi, JI sought
\na revival of the pristine Islam of the founding ancestors
\n(salaf), by replicating the historic conquest of pagan Arabia.<\/p>\n
The JI redefined jihad to justify revolutionary violence
\nagainst internal and external enemies of Islam. Like Osama bin
\nLaden, its leaders justified violence against Muslim rulers on
\nthe grounds that they suppressed Islamic law and were therefore
\napostates to be punished with death. Violence against Americans
\nand other \"Crusaders\" was justified on the grounds that they
\npromoted secular societies which subjugated Islam.<\/p>\n
One fascinating aspect is the unintended consequences of
\nearlier actions. United States support for the mujahideen who
\nopposed Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s led to the
\ncreation of a multinational network of Afghan veterans who
\nreturned to their home countries desiring to replicate their
\nsuccessful jihad.<\/p>\n
The late Abdullah Sungkar laid the groundwork for future
\ncooperation between JI and al-Qaeda when he went to Afghanistan
\nto participate in the resistance. The decision by the U.S. to
\nwithdraw from Afghanistan after the end of the Cold War allowed
\nal-Qaeda to use this failed state as a sanctuary and training
\nground for a global jihad.<\/p>\n
The networks created in Afghanistan formed the building blocks
\nfor al-Qaeda's global reach, as local concerns were fused with
\nits global agenda.<\/p>\n
To appreciate al-Qaeda's global as well as regional impact,
\none should look at the organization as a venture capitalist
\nacting as a revolutionary catalyst. It provides training and
\nfunding while allowing for local initiative and a sense of
\nempowerment.<\/p>\n
Instead of a hierarchical transnational organization, al-Qaeda
\nis a hydra-headed network linking operatives with shared beliefs.
\nAlthough al-Qaeda has provided logistics support and financial
\nassistance to JI, its most significant role lay in the creation
\nof a shared identity and a global vision.<\/p>\n
It is frequently argued that the rage within Muslim
\ncommunities arises from the conflicts in the Middle East -- the
\nIsrael-Palestine conflict and now the American occupation of
\nIraq. We should not ignore the radicalizing impact of these
\ndevelopments.<\/p>\n
However, a closer reading of Osama's pronouncements and of
\njihadist literature suggests that even if these conflicts were
\nresolved, a host of new issues would arise, such as Chechnya,
\nKashmir, the southern Philippines and domestic governance in
\nAlgeria.<\/p>\n
The aborted Singapore JI plan in 2002 to hijack an Aeroflot
\naircraft after its stopover in Bangkok and crash it into the
\nChangi Airport control tower illustrates this new dimension. A
\nRussian aircraft was chosen to demonstrate Singapore JI's
\nsolidarity with the struggle in Chechnya.<\/p>\n
While attention has been focused on the globalising impact of
\nMNCs, even terrorist movements have become globalised. The CNN
\neffect has magnified the impact of the Middle East and other
\nconflicts.<\/p>\n
In meeting the threat of terrorism, a critical aspect will be
\nthe use of soft power, the use of non-military strategies to
\nrespond to this threat, which go beyond military, law enforcement
\nand intelligence collection responses. It is a battle for hearts
\nand minds.<\/p>\n
The important role of strengthening cooperative networks tends
\nto be underestimated.<\/p>\n
In Southeast Asia, counter-terrorism cooperation is at the
\nbilateral and trilateral levels. ASEAN agreements are primarily
\ndeclaratory in intent. ASEAN has been most useful in establishing
\nnorms and in capacity building through the sharing of expertise.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, the current level of intra-ASEAN cooperation is
\nconsiderably improved today compared to the mutual recriminations
\nwhen the first evidence of the JI network emerged in December
\n2001.<\/p>\n
The writer is director of the Institute of Defense and
\nStrategic Studies.<\/p>",
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