Taiwan's search for stable security setting<\/p>\n
Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly',
\nCentre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta,
\nbandoro@csis.or.id<\/p>\n
Taiwan, represented by the President of Academica Sinica, the
\nNobel prize-winner Lee Yuan-tsen, took part in the recent Mexico
\nAPEC meeting. But Taiwan was frustrated over its exclusion from a
\nmeeting of foreign minister to discuss counterterrorism efforts.
\nThe international community has, in fact, acted discriminatively
\nin its efforts at building international coalition against
\nterrorism. The snub occurred because Taiwan's foreign minister
\nwas not allowed to attend the summit. The argument was that
\nTaiwan had signed a \"memorandum of understanding\" before APEC
\nthat excluded it from ministerial meetings.<\/p>\n
The adherence to the One-China principle by most of APEC's
\nmembers has prevented Taiwan from becoming a full part of the
\nforum's activities. But, the problem is, perhaps, not about a
\nmemorandum. It is about the fact that Taiwan is situated in a
\nvery critical position in the Asia Pacific region. This region,
\nas all other parts of the world, is not free of terrorist
\nattacks. Every country in the region needs to shoulder the
\nresponsibility of countering terrorism. Taiwan, therefore, should
\nnot be excluded from any discussion on antiterrorist strategies.
\nIt was reported that some leaders at the meeting reacted with
\nsurprise upon hearing of Taiwan's absence. Taiwan's enthusiasm in
\njoining the antiterror campaign must be seen as part of Taiwan's
\nattempt at securing its strategic environment.<\/p>\n
Taiwan's challenge is not only about joining the global
\ncoalition against terrorism, but to gain more international
\nrespect from international society for its political existence.
\nTaiwan is also out to build a more stable security environment
\nwhich would guarantee the continuation of its process of
\ndemocratization.<\/p>\n
A recent meeting on the Strategic Assessment of Taiwan 2003
\nrevealed that Taiwan's strategic environment would be shaped by,
\namong others, the following factors: (a) stability in U.S.
\nrelations with China; (b) China's military modernization and its
\nresponse to its immediate environment; (c) Taiwan's own political
\nbehavior; (d) developments on the Korean Peninsula; and (e)
\nregional conflicts. Taiwan's international and national policy
\nwould have to be built on the basis of the functioning of these
\nfactors.<\/p>\n
Taiwan is used to living under threat. The antagonist it faces
\nacross the Taiwan Straits is far larger, better armed and in
\nevery way more formidable perhaps than North Korea. But Taiwan
\nhas survived all the political and security turbulence. Over the
\npast two years, Taiwan has been overcome by euphoria following
\ncertain \"diplomatic victories\" . Following Japan's granting of a
\nvisa to former president Lee Teng-hui, international opinion
\ndeclared a victory for Chen Sui-bian's administration . Then,
\nGeorge W. Bush's U.S. administration announced details of its
\narms sale to Taiwan. The \"surprise\" visit to Indonesia of
\nTaiwanese Vice President Annette Lu has added more weight to
\nTaiwan's diplomatic maneuvers.<\/p>\n
Each of those events is significant in its own right,
\nrepresenting a breakthrough in Taiwan's relationships with the
\ncountries in the region, particularly the U.S. and Japan. For the
\nChen administration, unable to get things going on the domestic
\nfront nearly a year after taking office, these events have
\noffered some kind of redemption in the form of diplomatic
\nsuccesses.<\/p>\n
However, the global situation remains fickle. China's
\nsuccesses regarding high-tech weaponry, the unpredictability of
\nU.S. behavior toward China and the seemingly decreasing level of
\ninternational economic transactions due to the threat of terror,
\nall have serious repercussions for the security environment of
\nTaiwan. Facing the probability of turbulence in respect of its
\nsecurity and its position in the international order, Taiwan must
\ndevelop its own long-term strategic plan. Thus, while the events
\nof the past years are worth celebrating, it is nevertheless
\nimportant for Taiwan to adopt a prudent approach in evaluating
\nthe impact of those events on Taiwan's strategic planing and
\nenvironment.<\/p>\n
Cross-Strait relations are one of the salient political and
\nsecurity issues facing Taiwan. China's adherence to the One-China
\nprinciple might be the basis for action against Taiwan if Taiwan
\nwere to go against the said principle, meaning that an
\nindependent Taiwan could risk a major war in the Straits of
\nTaiwan. If Taiwan behaves the way a good boy would behave, it is
\nunlikely that China would initiate destructive action against
\nTaiwan. Thus, stability in cross-Strait relations is also
\ninfluenced by the way Taiwan handles its internal and external
\nbehavior.<\/p>\n
There is a strong debate over whether China would initiate a
\nnuclear attack against Taiwan if Taiwan were to declare itself
\nindependent. One side argues that it is very unlikely that China
\nwould do so as it would provoke the U.S. to initiate a
\ncounteraction against China based on the Taiwan Relations Act.
\nThe other side argues that such an option should not be ruled out
\ngiven China's uncompromising stand on the One-China principle.
\nBoth arguments may be right, but both also may be wrong. Whether
\nsuch an attack would materialize or not depends largely on the
\ndegree of sensitivity China and Taiwan have toward each other.
\nThus, it is important that China and Taiwan manage their
\nsensitivities in such a way as not to provoke the other.<\/p>\n
The differences between China and Taiwan are fundamentally
\npolitical and cannot be solved by military means. Whether China
\nchooses peace or coercion to resolve its differences with Taiwan
\nwill tell the world a great deal about the kind of relationship
\nChina seeks with its neighbors.<\/p>\n
Taiwan's strategic environment assessment must not be
\nundertaken in isolation from other structural factors, be they
\nUS-Japan security relations, China-U.S. relations, Taiwan's own
\nrelations with the U.S and Southeast Asia, or developments on the
\nKorean Peninsula. Those structural factors will not only
\ndetermine Taiwan's threat perception, but also its future defense
\nposture and the degree of Taiwan's participation in the
\ninternational arena.<\/p>\n
Taiwan's political progress in recent years has won attention
\nworldwide, but Taiwan must reflect deeply upon its status and
\nposition within the overall context of East Asia. Since turning
\nto pragmatic diplomacy, Taiwan has often made strategic moves
\nresulting in transitory satisfaction, enough to boost its
\ninternational status. But such political progress will serve
\nnothing once Taiwan is faced with a crisis-type situation in the
\nStraits of Taiwan. Taiwan will certainly look to the United
\nStates for a kind of security assistance, indicated by, among
\nother things, Taiwan's recent eagerness to acquire a Kidd class
\ndestroyer from the U.S.<\/p>\n
But the reality of the global order and its characteristic
\nfickleness demands that Taiwan avoid excessive reliance on allies
\nor believing that it can always play the \"American card\" or
\n\"Japan card\" against Beijing. Such maneuvers within cracks to
\nachieve temporary victories keep Taiwan vulnerable to the control
\nof others. Taiwan cannot avoid tying itself up in a knot in
\nreacting to changes in its external environment. At this time and
\nin the future, Taiwan's chief concern should be to make choices
\ninformed by self-awareness and autonomy.<\/p>\n
The writer was invited to a five-day workshop on the Taiwan
\nStrategic Assessment 2003, organized by the National Defense
\nUniversity and held in Taipei, Oct. 27-Nov. 1.<\/p>",
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