Taiwan conquest could be counterproductive<\/p>\n
This is the second of several articles on the deteriorating
\nsecurity situation in East Asia, The Jakarta Post's Asia
\ncorrespondent Harvey Stockwin examines the implications of the
\nhints coming from Beijing that it may take military action
\nagainst Taiwan's offshore islands.<\/p>\n
HONG KONG (JP): As China threatens the use of military force
\nagainst Taiwan, its limited capability suggests undertaking one
\nrelatively easy operation, but China's political convictions and
\ndiplomatic ideology should act as a major deterrent to any such
\ncampaign.<\/p>\n
It is very clear, and military sources are generally agreed,
\nthat one possible Chinese option -- an amphibious operation
\nmounting an invasion of Taiwan itself -- is simply out of the
\nquestion. China simply does not possess the vast military
\nresources to mount the large-scale operation that such an
\ninvasion would require if it was to have any chance of success.<\/p>\n
But in the last six weeks since Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui
\nupset China by pointing out that he led a legitimate government,
\nnot a renegade province, there have been numerous hints, once
\nagain nearly always on the basis of \"unnamed Beijing sources\",
\nthat China might show its displeasure by capturing
\none or more of Taiwan's off-shore islands.<\/p>\n
Taiwan island itself lies one hundred miles from China's coast
\nat the narrowest point. Invasion would require a massive D-Day-
\nstyle operation which is beyond China's present capability. But
\nthe offshore islands are those which the Republic of China (ROC)
\non Taiwan still holds on the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s
\nside of the Taiwan Straits, often within sight of the China
\ncoast.<\/p>\n
Two of these islands are well known since they were the issue
\nin earlier Taiwan Straits crises in 1954-1955, 1958 and 1962.
\nThey were also a major dispute in the 1960 presidential campaign
\nand debates between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon, when
\nKennedy started out by dismissing the islands as indefensible,
\nwhile Nixon insisted they must remain part of the free world.<\/p>\n
One of those islands was Quemoy, now often referred to as
\nKinmen, within sight of the Chinese city of Xiamen. The other is
\nMatsu, much further north but also very close to the coast of
\nChina's Fujian province.<\/p>\n
During the 1950s there were several times when a PRC invasion
\nof these two ROC islands threatened. On one occasion the U.S.
\nNavy intervened to ensure that Quemoy and Matsu were kept
\nsupplied. For nearly twenty years, the artillery of both sides
\ncontinued to shell the other, latterly in a ritualistic manner,
\nas one side did the shelling on even days and the other on the
\nodd days.<\/p>\n
As it happened, last Monday Aug. 23, the Taiwan Minister of
\nNational Defense Tang Fei burned incense and placed wreaths at
\nthe Tawu Mountain Cemetery on Quemoy. He, plus other dignitaries
\nand relatives of those killed, were commemorating the 41st
\nanniversary of a day in the 1958 Straits crisis when the barrage
\nwas very real and China's artillery rained no less than
\n57,000 shells on the Quemoy islands in one two-hour period.<\/p>\n
In little-noticed remarks, at the ceremony Tang hoped that the
\ntwo sides of the Taiwan Strait would never again engage in
\nshelling and hoped that future cross-Strait differences would be
\nresolved with patience and wisdom.<\/p>\n
Quemoy and Matsu became well known, but there are evidently
\nmany more islands and islets held by the ROC on the PRC side of
\nthe Straits, with some sources saying as many as 80. (That figure
\nmay, however, include the Penghu Islands much nearer to the coast
\nof Taiwan).<\/p>\n
Some of these offshore islands are uninhabited and so could
\nprobably be repossessed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) at
\nvirtually no military cost.<\/p>\n
Quemoy and Matsu, with their well-trained garrisons, would be
\nanother matter altogether. While they may not be as heavily
\ndefended as in times past, they would almost certainly put up a
\nstout defense unless there was a preemptive Taiwan decision to
\nwithdraw.<\/p>\n
Such a defense could prove politically as well as militarily
\ncostly for China's PLA, especially if such operations could not
\nbe brought to a quick conclusion.<\/p>\n
It is not generally known that, in mid-October 1949, a
\nsubstantial number of PLA troops (Taiwan claims 10,000) did land
\non Quemoy but were defeated by the defenders.<\/p>\n
Yet even if China was now successful in capturing one or
\nseveral of these offshore islands, it can be questioned whether
\nthat is the kind of victory that China really needs or even
\nwants. The islands of Matsu, Big Quemoy, Little Quemoy and all
\nthe others -- these are the islands which link Taiwan to \"One
\nChina\" (caps oo cc), whatever the official formulations being
\nmade in Taipei.<\/p>\n
It has been precisely President Lee's unwillingness to
\ncontinue with the fiction of One China, of which Taiwan is
\nalready a subordinate part, that has led to the current row. So
\nif China goes ahead and grabs an offshore island or two, then it
\nwould severely undercut China's own One China argument.<\/p>\n
Conversely, if Taiwan lost some of those offshore islands,
\nmany Taiwanese, in and outside the opposition Democratic
\nProgressive Party, which ultimately seeks Taiwan independence,
\nwould have increased grounds for pressuring for the realization
\nof that goal. Like candidate Kennedy in 1960, they would call for
\nretreat from the rest of the offshore islands and the creation,
\nin effect, of Two Chinas.<\/p>\n
Put another way, if China grabbed those offshore islands
\nbecause it wanted to \"punish\" Taiwan for abandoning the
\ndiplomatic theory of One China -- then that very punishment would
\nhelp to bring about the end of the One China ideology. So even a
\nquick military victory for China would probably mean a certain
\npolitical defeat.<\/p>\n
Additionally, the distinct possibility exists that once Taiwan
\nterritorially detached itself from the mainland as a result of
\nChina's military aggression, then some foreign nations would look
\nagain at the question of recognizing Taiwan as a separate entity.<\/p>\n
Ironically, those unnamed communist sources who today hint at
\ntaking some offshore islands by force are forgetting the thoughts
\nof Mao Zedong. Mao, it appears, clearly saw that if the United
\nStates succeeded in pressuring Taiwan to abandon the offshore
\nislands, then the last link to One China would be broken, and Two
\nChinas would be the inevitable result.<\/p>\n
As historian Nancy Bernkopf Tucker points out \"Mao therefore
\nconcluded that the recovery of the small (offshore) islands
\nshould await the return of Taiwan itself to Beijing's control and
\nin his Oct. 6, 1958 'Message to Our Taiwan Compatriots' made this
\nposition clear.\"<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, in a separate development, on Aug. 20, the
\nadministrative head of Quemoy county Chen Shui-tzai suggested
\nthat the island could be neutralized and made into a peace zone.
\nThis is not an original idea -- even former U.S. Secretary of
\nState John Foster Dulles briefly advocated it in the 1950s.<\/p>\n
What Chen appeared to have had in mind was that Quemoy should
\nbecome a bridge linking Taiwan and China, once direct exchanges
\nbetween the two were officially permitted.<\/p>\n
As of now, Hong Kong still profits greatly from the fact that
\nTaiwanese going to China, and Chinese going to Taiwan, have to
\ntransit through the territory or through Macau. Obviously, county
\nchief Chen, so near but still so far from the China coast, would
\nlike to repatriate that trade.<\/p>\n
But in the current crisis atmosphere aroused by China it is
\nmost unlikely that this will happen anytime soon.<\/p>",
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