'Syariah' issue is typical of transition era: Ichlasul<\/p>\n
A new group in Yogyakarta have proposed the upholding of
\nIslamic law amid the controversy of including reference to the
\nsyariah in the constitution. The Jakarta Post talked to political
\nobserver Ichlasul Amal of the Gadjah Mada University in
\nYogyakarta:<\/p>\n
Question: There are indications of Islamic aspirations as
\nvoiced by the Mujahidin group who have recently held their
\ncongress and among legislators who have proposed the inclusion of
\nupholding the Islamic law (syariah) among believers. Your
\ncomment?<\/p>\n
Answer: In any country where most people are Muslim there will
\nalways be demands to uphold the syariah or to form an Islamic
\nstate, as reflected in the experience of Malaysia, Pakistan,
\nAlgeria and other countries. These countries always undergo
\nsocial and political divisions, with one side considered secular
\nand the others oriented to the textual content of the Koran as
\nthe only legal reference.<\/p>\n
Politically this phenomenon is virtually only about the issue
\nof who takes the secular side at a certain time and who takes the
\nother side. Years ago, the Muslim Masyumi party saw a split
\nbetween leader M. Natsir who interpreted the Koran in a
\nsociological and contextual manner, and the others who took the
\ntextual interpretation.<\/p>\n
Groups like the Mujahidin and other \"radical\" Islamic
\npolitical parties are the marginalized ones, some because they
\nare small. The United Development Party (PPP) is large but still
\npolitically marginalized. A marginalized position leads to a
\ntendency to choose a simple sectarian political symbol, which is
\ntextual religious teachings.<\/p>\n
Q: You mean political factors led to such movements.<\/p>\n
A: Obviously. To seek public support they use emotional symbols.
\nThey could also be groups using the economic and political
\nuncertainty by raising nostalgic and sectarian symbols.<\/p>\n
I believe many elements of PPP were behind the recent
\nMujahidin congress. They're different from the (Yogyakarta-based)
\nLaskar Jihad. But I don't think they have links with the (crushed
\nmovements of) Darul Islam or the Negara Islam Indonesia although
\nthey might use the NII as their flag.<\/p>\n
Q: How far do you think the demands will go?<\/p>\n
A: Historically such demands usually don't last long. Such
\nmovements always emerge in political transitions, or during
\neconomic and political instability. The rise of the New Order
\nalso saw such movements but they did not gain significant public
\nsupport ...<\/p>\n
And we should question the demands further; what's the
\nelaboration like, how would it be implemented; who would police
\nthe syariah? In Iran, for instance, they had such a police;
\nwhoever was caught not wearing a headscarf jilbab was arrested.
\nBut in time there were so many violators of the syariah that the
\nprisons were full.<\/p>\n
(In Indonesia), will those in the Mujahidin play the role of
\nthe police; conducting raids on (places selling) alcohol drinks
\nand destroying (the venues) just like that? In history such
\nexperiments always fail.<\/p>\n
Such movements are also not popular because they are always
\nlinked to authoritarian regimes. This is very dangerous;
\nupholding textual teachings does indeed require authoritarian
\npower.<\/p>\n
Such movements also tend to involve the military because they
\nhave the most effective repressive power such as in Pakistan, or
\nin Sudan. An exception is Algeria, where the movement to uphold
\nthe syariah has instead become the military's enemy.<\/p>\n
If groups like the Mujahidin have displayed their rigidity in
\ninterpreting the teachings, the political party they may want to
\nestablish will not gain support. The poor would not want
\nrestrictions in daily life such as arresting women without
\njilbab. Just look at Iran. It was Khatami, a moderate figure, who
\nwas elected President. Because in the end people don't want to be
\nwatched forever...<\/p>\n
Q: What about demands among legislators that Pancasila in the
\nlong run be replaced by the Jakarta Charter, an earlier concept
\nof Pancasila with the additional words that the syariah be made
\neffective for Muslims?<\/p>\n
A: That was something in the past (the Charter was finally
\ndropped following debates in 1945 - Ed.) If the syariah was
\nincluded in the Constitution and the Charter made effective would
\nthings get better? Of course not. (Proponents of the issue) also
\nrealize that any government (of a non-Islamic state) would
\naccommodate such demands (of at least applying symbols) -- but
\nnot so far as to (apply) textual teachings.<\/p>\n
For instance it would be difficult to restrict night life
\nhere. It was actually Soeharto who was quite keen on applying
\nreligious teachings in school. It was he who started the reading
\nof \"Bismillah...\" (In the name of Allah...) before beginning his
\naddresses. Even the Masyumi figures of the 1950s did not do that
\n(stress formalities, symbols).<\/p>\n
This movement clearly brings political impacts; the political
\nelite would accommodate such demands by showing symbols to
\nexpress they are not entirely against the \"Islamic\" aspirations.
\nEven with symbolic accommodation (the proponents) will lose their
\ncause.<\/p>\n
Q: Wouldn't such demands in the MPR face the \"nationalist\"
\nparties of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI
\nPerjuangan) and the National Awakening Party (PKB), leading to a
\ndeadlock?<\/p>\n
A: I don't think so. The issue will fade away. Now the issue is
\nof (Abdurrahman Wahid) Gus Dur's position, and he'll be stronger
\nif the groups campaigning for the syariah aim to discredit Gus
\nDur who is known to be against this. If this is a political
\ntactic to discredit Gus Dur it's quite a mistake. Support to Gus
\nDur will instead grow stronger.<\/p>\n
Smaller parties outside Islamic parties will all support Gus
\nDur in the sense that he will be the best \"bumper\" against the
\nfanatics. We know he's the most tolerant figure regarding
\nreligion.<\/p>\n
Q: Why are such movements resisted while most people are Muslims?<\/p>\n
A: Before Islam came here there already was a strong cultural
\nidentity, strong beliefs, which led to cultural adjustments. It
\nmight have been different if Islam entered a really blank
\nsociety. It's therefore quite difficult for people to imagine
\nwhat \"pure\" Islam is like.<\/p>\n
What the Muhammadiyah (second largest Islamic organization) is
\ndoing is purifying Islam but now purification is increasingly
\ndifficult. I think Muhammadiyah needs reorientation because
\nculture constantly changes including the dynamics of local
\nculture and Islamic teachings.<\/p>\n
Q: Is nationalism here so strong that it can effectively check
\nradical religious movements?<\/p>\n
A: There was once a clear differentiation as culturally
\nclassified by (American anthropologist) Clifford Geertz: the
\nabangan, the santri and priyayi. The abangan (less \"purist\"
\nMuslims) were the nationalists while the santri were (identified
\nas devout followers of) Islam. Political figures like Sukarno and
\nMohammad Hatta were (identified as) Muslims but also
\nnationalists. Among Muslim politicians there were M. Natsir and
\nthe others.<\/p>\n
Before independence, Islam and communists were considered as
\nteachings from outside... At that time nationalism became an
\nalternative, and nationalists based their ideology on local
\nvalues.<\/p>\n
But with (involvement in) the market economy people no longer
\nsaw concrete symbols in such ideologies -- whether nationalist or
\nIslam.<\/p>\n
Q: There has been speculation that the Crescent Star party, the
\nUnited Development Party and groups like the Mujahidin know that
\nthe issue of the syariah is not popular, but they continue to
\nraise it in the hopes it will snowball and gain wide support...<\/p>\n
A: I don't think that (wide support) will happen ... the issue of
\nmaking the syariah effective or of establishing an Islamic state
\nis outdated. It was a hot topic until about the 1970s. Not
\nanymore, particularly now with Islamic figures already in the
\ncorridors of power, making such movements or maneuvers unpopular.<\/p>\n
There would be a different impact if the issue was raised
\nbefore 1965 when the Indonesian Communist Party was still around
\nor at the time of repression against political Islam in the
\nbeginning of the 1970s, when the military was rather against
\nIslam.<\/p>\n
But instead of a snowball, raising the issue now would make it
\neven more unpopular. If it's a strategy to gain more support for
\nthe 2004 elections those parties would likely earn much less
\nvotes. (Asip A. Hasani)<\/p>",
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