Sutiyoso's strategic plan, a product of bureaucrats<\/p>\n
Marco Kusumawijaya, Consultant, Urban Development, Jakarta,
\nmarcokw@centrin.net.id<\/p>\n
The editorial of The Jakarta Post on Nov. 15 criticized
\nGovernor Sutiyoso and his strategic plan presented on Nov. 12 to
\nthe City Council. While most of the critique is reasonable, it
\nmight not be very revealing to focus on Sutiyoso alone.<\/p>\n
He created the strategic plan, not necessarily in the sense
\nnormally understood in schools of management as, for example,
\ndiscussed in the Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning by Henry
\nMintzberg (1994), but in the format as dictated by government
\nregulation 108\/2000. This requires that a governor present his
\n\"strategic plan\" within a month after he has been elected to
\noffice. We could even offer our sympathy to the governor. Worse,
\nsince the governor supposedly controls and is supported by a
\nbureaucracy that has served him before, the \"strategic plan\" is
\nseen as no less than a product of the whole bureaucratic
\nmachinery of the city.<\/p>\n
Most mayors I work with in cities throughout Indonesia readily
\nexcuse themselves by saying that they submitted such \"strategic
\nplans\" simply to fulfill the requirement of the law, knowing full
\nwell that they are unable to contribute much valid, or
\nlegitimate, substance into the plan. Ironically, the plans must
\nbe sufficiently vague too, as the mayors' accountability will be
\nchecked against their performance at the end of their terms.<\/p>\n
Usually I have suggested a compromise, that they simply
\ninclude the \"formulation of a real strategic plan\" as part of the
\nplan outlining the mayor's strategic tasks. I did not at all mean
\nto be cynical, either.<\/p>\n
A real strategic plan would mean a committed and prioritized
\nconcerted plan of action aimed at achieving a long-term vision. A
\nvision is not a dream as it must be based on valid facts
\n(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats; or SWOT), and
\nlegitimate the aspirations and the commitment of its multiple
\nstakeholders. It can be analyzed, and actions can be designed to
\nachieve its goals. It must be specific, measurable, acceptable,
\nrealistic, and time-bound (SMART). As Mintzberg wrote, the plan
\nmust be \"not to our fantasies -- may they mostly fall as fast as
\nthey rise -- but to the wonders of reality.\"<\/p>\n
No doubt Jakarta needs such a strategic plan.The longer we
\nwait to solve its problems -- such as environmental
\nsustainability, transportation, land use and poverty, few, the
\nmore impossible they will become.<\/p>\n
They are indeed strategic issues by excellence: They are long-
\nterm, requires concerted (or synthesized) efforts from many
\ninterrelated sectors, and commitment from different stakeholders
\nand levels of government and, most importantly, is that what is
\ndone about them will fundamentally determine the basic long-term
\nappearance and appeal of Jakarta.<\/p>\n
Jakarta, despite its seemingly impossible situation, must have
\na long-term committed plan in order to be competitive at all in
\nthe future.<\/p>\n
The vision spelled out in the Governor's \"strategic plan\" is
\nto \"realize Jakarta as Indonesia's capital city that is humane,
\nefficient, and globally competitive, inhabited by a
\nparticipatory, moral, prosperous and civilized society living in
\na safe and sustainable milieu\".<\/p>\n
The strategic matrixes missed three important columns:
\nSpecific actions for each program, indicated resources and time
\nframe for each action. These three columns are important to
\nsupport one basic proposition of strategic management; a close
\nlink between planning and implementation.<\/p>\n
These columns must be seen as integrated parts of a strategy
\nand not to be detailed only later, because their contents will
\ndetermine the likelihood of achieving the strategic goals. Two
\nother problems with the plan are about ownership and time-frame.<\/p>\n
The Jakarta administration's annual budget is merely 5 percent
\nof the city's Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP). Of course,
\nthe administration's annual budget has a lot of impact, as it
\nshould, if used wisely and with clear objectives in mind. The
\nrest of the city, however, including its economic power as
\nrepresented by the GRDP, has a lot more impact on the city's
\nlong-term future.<\/p>\n
A strategic plan, therefore, must also include action plans
\noutside the city's administration annual budget. This is a city
\ndevelopment strategy must be comprehensive and inclusive of
\nparticipation of all the city's stakeholders. A city strategic
\nplan should begin with, and belong to, the population and the
\nstakeholders of the city, not to the government. This latter
\nmight be mandated to initiate it, but instead must make it to the
\npoint that the population and the stakeholders feel obliged and
\ncommitted to the plan.<\/p>\n
On the question of time frame, a five-year period is hardly
\nstrategic, as it is only medium- instead of long-term. Exactly
\nhow long is long term? In the past, a 50-year period had once or
\ntwice been perceived as being appropriately long-term, especially
\nby authoritarian regimes that assume the complete responsibility
\nover the destiny of their subjects and lands, and think that they
\ncan monopolize the market.<\/p>\n
Nowadays, a period of 10-20 years is considered reasonable.
\nThis number correlates to the time-frame required to solve most
\nstrategic issues at hand and to implementing infrastructural
\ninvestment, which requires 10-15 years. More importantly, a
\ncity's strategic plan requires trans-generational commitment
\nbeyond short-term political exigency.<\/p>\n
Otherwise, the plan can easily be corrupted, as in the case of
\nthe New Order's use of Repelita as a tool to create projects,
\nretain power, and justify a single majority and its re-election
\n-- to \"finish the job\". A \"strategic plan\" that is framed within
\na political term of office contradicts the concept of the
\nstrategic plan itself.<\/p>\n
Short-term (1-3 years) and medium-term (3-5 years) action
\nplans are meaningful and strategic only when they are logically
\nlinked to a long-term plan and clearly show how they will
\ncontribute towards achieving a long-term vision. This means a
\nstrategic plan must go beyond the mandate of any political term
\nof office, and requires that whoever is in office ensures the
\npopular support necessary to make the strategy work both during
\nand beyond his or her term.<\/p>\n
Yet can Jakarta be strategically planned?<\/p>\n
We know that she (Jakarta) deserves a strategic plan. The
\ntechnology and instruments are there, and funding will come when
\nthere is good will. The matter rests with leadership.<\/p>\n
Experience from participatory City Development Strategy
\nprograms around the world shows that leadership is an absolute
\nfactor. In Indonesia, where the program is still ongoing, the
\nleadership factor already indicates the likelihood of success.<\/p>\n
Leadership not only refers to the capacity to consolidate
\nshared vision, to lead concerted multi-stakeholder efforts
\ntowards common goals, and to be committed in delivering -- but
\nalso to have a conciliatory outlook towards all, especially the
\nmarginalized people.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/sutiyosos-strategic-plan-a-product-of-bureaucrats-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}