{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1457974,
        "msgid": "susilos-last-stand-big-win-or-slim-defeat-1447893297",
        "date": "2004-09-04 00:00:00",
        "title": "Susilo's last stand, big win or slim defeat",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Susilo's last stand, big win or slim defeat Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta If the presidential election had been held in mid-April, few would have bet against Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sweeping toward victory. In fact, in recent times even, his chances of winning over the incumbent were still high. But, since the highs of April, Susilo's popularity has sunk faster than a man in quicksand.",
        "content": "<p>Susilo's last stand, big win or slim defeat<\/p>\n<p>Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta<\/p>\n<p>If the presidential election had been held in mid-April, few <br>\nwould have bet against Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sweeping toward <br>\nvictory. In fact, in recent times even, his chances of winning <br>\nover the incumbent were still high. But, since the highs of <br>\nApril, Susilo's popularity has sunk faster than a man in <br>\nquicksand.<\/p>\n<p>Two separate surveys from the Indonesian Survey Institute <br>\n(LSI) and the International Foundation for Election Systems <br>\n(IFES), for example, found, in early-mid August, 60 percent of <br>\nrespondents opted for the challenger. However, the most <br>\nnoteworthy finding is not Susilo's lead over Megawati -- who's <br>\nsupport level is only half of Susilo's -- but the fact that the <br>\nmargin between the two is steadily narrowing.<\/p>\n<p>It is, therefore, perplexing to see the lackluster performance <br>\nand seeming aloofness of the Susilo-Jusuf Kalla campaign team in <br>\ninfluencing public perception in this critical period. Their <br>\ncounterparts in the Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi camp are making all <br>\nthe right moves. A public-relations blitz has progressively <br>\nimproved Megawati's image, while at the same time, political <br>\nempathy for Susilo has petered off. The formation of a coalition <br>\nalso guarantees Megawati greater support.<\/p>\n<p>Data from opinion polls supports the trend: the incumbent is <br>\ngetting stronger, while the challenger gets weaker. A comparison <br>\nof data from surveys conducted a month earlier show the gap <br>\nnarrowing to between 8 to 14 percent. If the trend continues, by <br>\nnext week Susilo would have lost between 16 to 28 percentage <br>\npoints in the last two months.<\/p>\n<p>The first round of the election showed us that voter behavior <br>\nis extremely malleable. There were sizable shifts in the final <br>\nweek before the election, with late deciders playing a crucial <br>\nrole. This tells us that public-relations campaigns, whether <br>\novert or veiled, have the capacity to sway voters in an election <br>\nwhere platforms don't really matter.<\/p>\n<p>In an attempt to make sense of the progress -- or lack thereof <br>\n-- of the Susilo camp, we can deduce that they may suffer the <br>\nsame syndrome that affected the Indonesian Democratic Party of <br>\nStruggle (PDI-P) prior to the April 5 legislative election: Over <br>\nconfidence.<\/p>\n<p>But the significant \"defeat\" the PDI-P endured was probably <br>\nthe best thing that could have happened, in terms of Megawati's <br>\npresidential bid. It opened their eyes and forced them to <br>\nreexamine their campaign approach. As someone who has built a <br>\nreputation, over the last two years, of being a woman of little <br>\naction, Megawati is now out to grab voters' attention with all <br>\nmeans at her disposal. Susilo's camp, on the other hand, seems <br>\nlulled by a false sense of security generated by the palpable <br>\nmargin as they depart from a higher political vantage point.<\/p>\n<p>There is also a question mark hanging over the talents of <br>\nSusilo's camp in exploiting the opportunities available to them. <br>\nIn the past three months, they have not acquitted themselves <br>\nwell. Their organizational performance has been below par, with <br>\nlittle initiative or political shrewdness to consistently keep <br>\nSusilo's bid in the radar of mainstream voters. They have <br>\nprobably lost votes, rather than won them in the last three <br>\nmonths.<\/p>\n<p>Such is the restricted reach of Susilo's campaign network that <br>\nthey are unlikely to be able to organize enough volunteers to <br>\noversee the some 500,000 voting stations across the country.<\/p>\n<p>The Democratic Party -- of which Susilo is the leader -- is, <br>\nby and large, detached from any real grassroots network. Its <br>\nsenior members are comprised primarily of elderly former People's <br>\nConsultative Assembly (MPR) members, who are passim in terms of <br>\npolitical cunning. Susilo himself has been coy in delegating <br>\nauthority to initiate campaign strategies. The situation is only <br>\naggravated further by news from sources within Susilo's camp that <br>\ndepleting campaign coffers have increasingly restricted their <br>\nmovements.<\/p>\n<p>One aspect, which could be a decisive factor in the next two <br>\nweeks, is the power of the Indonesian Military (TNI). The TNI <br>\ncould, once again, call on members of its greater family, that <br>\nexpansive \"unofficial\" network, to solicit support for the <br>\nchallenger. The TNI's \"greater family\" is not an official <br>\nendorsement of the active TNI structure, but comprises retired <br>\nofficers, dependents, associates and the kith and kin of military <br>\npersonnel spread across the archipelago.<\/p>\n<p>They were a major force behind the Democratic Party's success <br>\nin the April election. Less so in the first round of the <br>\npresidential election, because more than one former military man <br>\nwas nominated. The runoff can be regarded as a case of the <br>\nmilitary vs the police, with the latter firmly on Megawati's <br>\nside. It is this \"underground\" network that Susilo's camp will be <br>\ncounting on to offset the door-to-door campaigning of the PDI-<br>\nP\/Golkar.<\/p>\n<p>This combination of sheer popularity and the informal TNI <br>\nnetwork are pillars of Susilo's bid come Sept. 20. It is <br>\ncertainly sufficient backing for a big victory, if the electorate <br>\ndoes not shift significantly in the next fortnight. But it bodes <br>\nominously if, as the trend indicates, the margin between the <br>\nincumbent and challenger closes by another 8 to 14 percentage <br>\npoints by mid-September.<\/p>\n<p>A close race would be favorable for the incumbent, given the <br>\nPDI-P's and Golkar's control of regional infrastructure. It is <br>\nnot impossible, given this situation, that a close tally could <br>\nend up swaying in the incumbent's favor.<\/p>\n<p>That is why, if a large margin of victory is not assured, it <br>\nis imperative for the Susilo-Kalla camp to ensure the swift <br>\ncounting of votes, immediate verification and the announcement of <br>\nexit polls within 24 hours of the polls closing. Failure to do <br>\nso, and over-dependence on the existing election infrastructure, <br>\ncould ultimately result in a slim defeat.<\/p>\n<p>The author is a staff writer of The Jakarta Post.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/susilos-last-stand-big-win-or-slim-defeat-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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