Sukhoigate: Politicization of weapons procurement<\/p>\n
Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, The Indonesian Quarterly,
\nCentre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta,
\nbandoro@csis.or.id<\/p>\n
Is it wrong for a country with a vast geographical area, a
\nhigh degree of vulnerability to internal threats and a strategic
\nlocation in the Asia-Pacific region, like Indonesia, to acquire
\nmore sophisticated weapons and use them in defending its
\nterritorial integrity? The government's decision to defend the
\nhomeland, by using high-tech weaponry, will no doubt be supported
\nby the majority population. But when it comes to the buying of
\nnew military equipment, everybody can express an opinion, for or
\nagainst such an idea.<\/p>\n
The process of Indonesia's military modernization has recently
\nbeen the subject of heated discussions here. It is not only
\nbecause of the plan to procure more reliable and considerably
\ncheap Russian jetfighters and helicopters, but it also because of
\nthe way the decision to buy them was made.<\/p>\n
The government signed last month the purchased agreement for
\nRussian Sukhoi jetfighters and helicopters worth US$192.6
\nmillion. The agreement marked a significant leap in the country's
\nmilitary modernization process as well as a new era in the
\nIndonesia-Russian military relationship. President Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri brought the deal home hoping to inspire the Air
\nForce to improve its air defense system and performance.<\/p>\n
When she returned home, President Megawati seemed to have no
\nproblem with the deal until very recently when a few members of
\nthe House of Representatives (DPR) and other interested parties
\nbrought up some possible irregularities, arguing that it did not
\nfollow the right laws and regulations. The arms deal,
\nunintentionally, had drawn part of the government bureaucracy and
\nlegislative body into a fight.<\/p>\n
It was reported that the purchase of the arms equipment from
\nRussia involved only the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the
\nState Logistics Agency (Bulog). The Ministry of Defense, where
\nthe authority should have come from, was never involved in the
\ndiscussion to buy the Russian aircraft.<\/p>\n
Here we can identify at least seven actors involved or related
\nto the defense deal, namely: Bank Bukopin, the Ministry of
\nFinance, the Air Force, the President, Bulog, the Ministry of
\nIndustry and Trade, the House of Representatives (DPR) and the
\nMinistry of Defense. These bureaucracies have their own interests
\nthat may be different from the uniform national interests. In the
\nSukhoi deal, Megawati is acting as a principal who wants
\nsomething done and whose policy is not supposed to be questioned
\nby people below her.<\/p>\n
As the case has shown, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and
\nBulog, as instructed by the President, executed the policy on the
\nassumption that the deal would go smoothly without any resistance
\nfrom other branches of government or agencies. Bulog, upon a
\nrequest from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, asked Bank
\nBukopin to pay US$26 million to Russian Rosoboronexport as a
\ndownpayment. The House, however, argues that the deal violates
\nimportant laws on defense and budgetary spending, as well as
\nbanking procedures and regulations.<\/p>\n
The President defended the Sukhoi deal, arguing that her
\nadministration did not violate any laws whatsoever. Here the
\npower politics come into play, meaning that the decision has been
\ntaken unilaterally by the President and bypassed other related
\nagencies such as the Ministry of Defense, the House and perhaps
\nthe Air Force.<\/p>\n
What seems strange is, however, the position expressed by the
\nMinistry of Defense and the Air Force. It is true that according
\nto Article 16 of the Defense Law, the defense minister has the
\nauthority over budgets and recruitment as well as procuring
\ndefense and military equipment for the Indonesian Military (TNI).
\nBut this legal authority was proven meaningless when faced with
\nthe "urgency" created by the President's decision. We have hardly
\nheard anything from the Ministry of Defense on the Sukhoi deal.<\/p>\n
In their hearing with the Commission I of the House, Minister
\nof Defense Matori Abdul Djalil and TNI Chief Gen. Endriartono
\nSutarto reportedly claimed that they were never involved in the
\nplanning or the purchase for the aircraft. Such confessions
\nreflect the fact that her subordinates may not know what the
\nPresident actually wants. Her own bureaucracy and top aides may
\nnot know the president's priorities. Or it may be assumed that
\nthey cannot do anything because the decision has already been
\nmade. The unilateral decision by Megawati, if this is truly the
\ncase, can mean she may not be very interested in the opinions of
\nher own Cabinet members.<\/p>\n
The position of the Air Force, at least as reported by the
\nmedia, was not at all clear. The view seems to be divided.
\nOfficial sources within the Air Force expressed objection to the
\ndeal. Many of them said it was far more urgent for the Air Force
\nto procure transport planes, to replace the old Hercules C-130s,
\nrather than jet fighters.<\/p>\n
However, Kusnadi Kardi, Air Force chief of staff's deputy
\nassistant for planning and budgetary affairs, defends the
\ngovernment in the Sukhoi deal, saying that the fighters are
\nsophisticated and have more advantages than U.S. made F-16s. The
\nAir Force therefore should have at least one squadron (12 to 16
\njets) of Sukhoi jets to protect the country's airspace
\nadequately.<\/p>\n
The different views within the Air Force probably may have
\nsomething to do with reluctance, if not resistance, on the part
\nof the Air Force to do what the President wants them to do.
\nFactors at work can be self interest, policy differences and
\nprofessional judgment in and by the Air Force. Assuming that the
\nAir Force has no problem with the President's decision, it may be
\nattributed to the way the Air Force influenced the President that
\nthe interests of the Air Force should be promoted and protected.
\nWhen it comes to the air defense business, the Air Force, after
\nall, has better and more accurate information than the President.<\/p>\n
The jet fighters are scheduled to arrive here in early
\nSeptember and the Air Force hopes to show them off to the public
\non Oct. 5 when the TNI celebrates its 58th anniversary, despite
\nthe move by the House to form a special committee to investigate
\nthe whole procurement process.<\/p>\n
The lessons we can learn from the Sukhoi deal is that every
\npublic policy decision here, on military or non-military affairs,
\ntends to drag players into opposing camps, meaning that policy
\ndecisions are bound to be politicized. The playing of power
\npolitics in our policy formulation process cannot be avoided when
\nit comes to defending one's own political, economic as well as
\nmilitary interests.<\/p>",
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