'Sukhoigate' and its effects<\/p>\n
Imanuddin Razak, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta<\/p>\n
While the House of Representatives' investigating committee
\nhad yet to complete its inquiry into the controversial purchase
\nof four Russian Sukhoi jet fighters, the Indonesian Military
\n(TNI) Headquarters announced on Aug. 27 that it planned to
\npurchase another 10 such jet fighters next year to build a
\ncomplete squadron of Sukhoi warplanes.<\/p>\n
One week later, the inquiry reached an anticlimax when the
\ncommittee, which was initially optimistic about successfully
\ninvestigating the scandal, made an equally controversial move in
\nannouncing that it had failed to reveal any irregularities in the
\nUS$192.6 million countertrade deal, and instead reaped criticism
\nover the way it carried out its investigation.<\/p>\n
Apart from the alleged irregularities in both the initial
\npurchase of the four Sukhois and the subsequent legislative
\nproceedings, the TNI headquarters' decision to purchase an
\nadditional 10 Russian warplanes added to the controversy
\nconsidering that such a plan was made at a time when the country
\nis financially unhealthy and that the plan itself carries heavy
\nrisks.<\/p>\n
Senior economist Rizal Ramli once said that the patchwork
\ncountertrade proposal could result in huge losses to the state
\nbecause all of the price risks associated with the purchase of
\nthe commodities involved, and their evaluation at the time of
\nsale, would be borne by the state budget.<\/p>\n
It remains unclear how the government (or the TNI) will pay
\nfor the purchase of the additional 10 warplanes, since they were
\nnot part of planned acquisitions of the Ministry of Defense.<\/p>\n
Even the allocation of import credit totaling $241.71 million
\nto the TNI in the 2003 budget drawn up by the National
\nDevelopment Planning Board (Bappenas) does not include the
\npurchase of the Russian plans. Nor does the purchase appear in
\nthe Air Force's plans for 2004, which totals Rp 5 trillion.<\/p>\n
Controversy aside, it is indeed understandable that the
\ngovernment wants to upgrade its military equipment as some of it
\nwas made in 1942, a few years before the country's independence.
\nPlus the TNI has been suffering from the arms embargo by the
\nUnited States, its major source of weapons over the past three
\ndecades.<\/p>\n
The U.S. Senate recently rejected a proposal to lift the
\nembargo, citing last year's lethal ambush of American citizens in
\nTimika, Papua province, in which some have accused the TNI of
\ncomplicity.<\/p>\n
Military analysts and arms experts have praised the Russian
\nwarplanes, especially the Su-30-MK fighters, calling them
\nmultirole air-superiority fighters that can also hit ground and
\nnaval targets with their guided missiles and free-flight rockets.
\nThe fighters can also engage the enemy independently or together
\nwith other warplanes.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, a different version of the Su-30-MK reportedly has
\nstate-of-the-art surveillance capability that will help Indonesia
\ndeal with reportedly rampant cases of foreign warplanes intruding
\ninto the country's air space. As recent as July 3, two of
\nIndonesia's American-made F-16s intercepted U.S. Navy F-18
\nHornets above Bawean island over the Java Sea.<\/p>\n
Purchasing from Russia is especially attractive because,
\nunlike other countries that develop and sell state-of-the-art
\nfighters and ground-attack planes, Russia does not attach any
\npolitical or economic preconditions, such as in Indonesia's bid
\nto procure the jet fighters. Nor has Russia displayed any
\nintention to interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs or to
\nimpose any sanctions in connection with any specific government
\ndecision.<\/p>\n
President Megawati Soekarnoputri has said repeatedly that the
\ndecision to purchase from Russia was made because Indonesia
\nadheres to a "free and active" foreign policy, adding that
\nIndonesia can purchase arms and military equipment from any
\ncountry in the world.<\/p>\n
Still, the decision to procure the Russian warplanes is not
\nfree of risk, especially if it means "challenging" the U.S.<\/p>\n
People may still remember that Megawati's father, founding
\npresident Sukarno, had to endure hard times with the U.S. when he
\ndecided to procure quite a large supply of arms and military
\nequipment from the then Soviet Union in the early 1960s,
\nincluding MIG-21 jet fighters, then considered to be among the
\nbest of their kind. The decision to procure the MIG-21s was made
\nafter his request to procure American warplanes -- to use in his
\ncampaign to claim West Irian as Indonesian territory -- was
\nrejected by the U.S. government.<\/p>\n
Some analysts attribute Sukarno's downfall at least in part to
\nhis political leanings toward the Soviet Union.<\/p>\n
If it's true that history repeats itself, Megawati should
\ncarefully calculate her government's decision to turn to Russian
\njet fighters. True, Indonesia is free to buy arms from anywhere
\nit likes, yet the President should seriously consider the
\npossible impacts.<\/p>\n
Especially if she wants to run for president again next year,
\nshe would need to take into account the financial burden to the
\ncountry given the price of the Sukhois.<\/p>\n
She should recall that her father's decision to procure arms
\nand military equipment from the Soviet Union in the 1960s led
\nIndonesia to a huge debt of $1 billion to the Soviet Union and
\nits eastern European allies, as Indonesia was considered too poor
\nto purchase such sophisticated weaponry in the 1960s.<\/p>\n
She should also carefully consider the after-sales service and
\nthe availability of spare parts for the jet fighters, so as not
\nto repeat her father's failure to properly maintain the Russian
\nwarplanes, no matter how sophisticated they are.<\/p>",
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