Sukarno, Nixon and Gus Dur<\/p>\n
By Susanto Pudjomartono<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): It was mid February 1967. Five four-star
\ngenerals paid a visit to president Sukarno in his official
\nresidence in Merdeka Palace, Jakarta. The generals, the chiefs of
\nstaff of the Army, Navy, Air Force and National Police plus the
\nminister of defense were on a special mission.<\/p>\n
They were sent by Gen. Soeharto, then the real power holder of
\nthe new regime, to persuade Sukarno to officially transfer
\npresidential power to Soeharto.<\/p>\n
The meeting was reportedly a deeply emotional event. Sukarno
\nhad by then practically lost all of his official power. He had
\nbeen censured by the legislature, which on Feb. 9 called for a
\nspecial session of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly
\nto remove him from the presidency.<\/p>\n
Sukarno's refusal to blame the Indonesian Communist Party as
\nthe main actor behind the abortive Sept. 30 Movement drew strong
\ncriticism and raised speculation that he was somehow involved in
\nthe coup attempt.<\/p>\n
Yet, although he had been stripped of power, Sukarno still
\ncommandeered millions of loyal supporters, especially from his
\npolitical strongholds of Central and East Java as well as from
\nthe marines and the Air Force. If he wanted to, Sukarno could
\nhave easily mustered support from them to defend him.<\/p>\n
Soeharto clearly understood the situation and that is the very
\nreason why he sent the five generals to meet Sukarno.<\/p>\n
Reportedly there were a lot of tears shed in the meeting.
\nBeing the only non-Javanese in the meeting, minister of defense
\nGen. M. Panggabean could not follow the whole conversation, which
\nwas conducted mostly in Javanese. But, he later revealed that
\nafter Soeharto's message was conveyed, Sukarno repeatedly said
\n\"Kowe kok mentala\" (How could you do that to me?), and each time
\neveryone shed tears.<\/p>\n
To make the story short, Sukarno finally agreed to hand over
\nhis presidential power to Soeharto, leave Merdeka Palace and move
\nto the Bogor Palace with his second wife Hartini. While his
\nchildren -- including the current Vice President Megawati who was
\nthen 20 -- were hastily sent to join their mother, Fatmawati,
\nSukarno's first wife, who lived in Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta.<\/p>\n
History later recorded that Sukarno did not call on his loyal
\nsupporters to defend him. Obviously he knew that if he had done
\nso, blood would have spilled and Indonesia would have plunged
\ninto civil war. Being a man whose obsession was the unity of
\nIndonesia, apparently Sukarno preferred to lose his power rather
\nthan see shattered the country he helped found.<\/p>\n
On Feb. 20, Sukarno issued a statement stipulating that \"to
\nend the current political conflict and for the safety of the
\npeople, the nation and the country\" he agreed to transfer his
\nauthority to Gen. Soeharto. On March 7 to March 11, the Assembly
\nconvened and elected Soeharto as the acting president of the
\nRepublic of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Years later, on Aug. 7, 1974, the patriarch of the Republican
\nParty, Senator Barry Goldwater, together with Senator Hugh Scott
\nand the House Minority leader John Rhodes, were ushered into the
\nOval Office of the White House. They were also on a mission, an
\n\"unpleasant duty to perform\", as Goldwater later was quoted as
\nsaying.<\/p>\n
It was an unpleasant duty indeed. The three Republican
\nsenators were sent by the Republican Party to inform president
\nNixon of the grave situation that out of 100 Senate members,
\npossibly only four would vote against the move to impeach Nixon
\nfor his involvement in the Watergate scandal.<\/p>\n
The word resignation was never spoken. But Nixon reportedly
\nresponded, \"I don't have many alternatives, do I?\" It was later
\nknown that even before the Goldwater visit, Nixon had actually
\ndecided to quit. He announced his resignation the following
\nevening, and left the White House the following day, Aug. 9, at
\nnoon, while his vice president, Gerald Ford, was being sworn in.<\/p>\n
The morale of the two stories is that a leader should have a
\nsense of rationality and a sense of reality. In the case of
\nSukarno, when he had to choose between civil war and removal from
\noffice, he chose the latter.<\/p>\n
By not even trying to cling to power, when he was still
\ncapable of doing so, Sukarno showed his statesmanship, and chose
\nhis destiny. After stepping down to live in \"political
\nquarantine\", his health deteriorated for lack of proper care. He
\ndied a lonely man on June 20, 1970.<\/p>\n
President Nixon was also a rational man. When he saw that
\nthere was no other way to go, he decided to quit the presidency.
\nHistory later reviewed his presidential years, and he even
\nregained some of his popularity in the 1980s.<\/p>\n
Indonesia now has Abdurrahman \"Gus Dur\" Wahid as president,
\nwho has been censured twice by the legislature (DPR) and is
\nfacing possible impeachment in the upcoming special session of
\nthe People Consultative Assembly (MPR) scheduled for Aug. 1.
\nInstead of trying to accommodate the censures, Gus Dur has vowed
\nto fight to the end to hold onto his presidency.<\/p>\n
He has called the DPR's move to oust him unconstitutional. He
\nclaims he still has the support of the people and the armed
\nforces. He has threatened to unleash his millions of diehard
\nsupporters in East Java and call them to the capital city of
\nJakarta to take over the DPR building to stop the Assembly from
\nconvening its special session.<\/p>\n
He also has repeatedly threatened to impose a state of civil
\nemergency to give him extraordinary power to dissolve the
\nAssembly and the DPR, to arrest his political foes and call for a
\nsnap election. In the event that the Assembly issues a decree to
\nremove him from office, he has vowed he will stay in Merdeka
\nPalace.<\/p>\n
When asked who would execute his order, for the military has
\nto date defiantly resisted his plan to impose a state of
\nemergency, Gus Dur reportedly said that if needed, his millions
\nof supporters would execute his order.<\/p>\n
It is a great pity for us to see a leader like Gus Dur, who
\nwas elected for his democratic ticket, to resort to such
\nundemocratic tactics. Judging from his erratic moves in the past
\nmonths, all indications show that somehow he has not only lost
\nhis sense of reality, but he is trying to deny reality.<\/p>\n
The country has suffered enough in the last four years.
\nAnother crisis caused by a -- God forbid, bloody -- showdown
\nbetween Gus Dur and the DPR (and the Assembly) would certainly
\ncripple the country.<\/p>\n
Sukarno and Nixon displayed their statesmanship by taking
\nreality into consideration, and at the end of the day their
\ndecision showed good and rational judgment. Could we expect this
\nkind of thing from Gus Dur? It is unlikely that a group of
\nrespected people would try to persuade Gus Dur to give up, since
\na similar mission failed in the past. Everything now depends on
\nhim.<\/p>\n
Is it possible to hope that, if somehow something has really
\nclouded Gus Dur's mind, then for one fleeting moment in the next
\nfew days, a sense of reality will flash into his mind? Something
\nthat will move him to make the best decision when the time comes,
\nsomething that starts and ends with: \"For the sake of the nation,
\nI hereby decide to step down\"?<\/p>\n
A leader is judged by history. What kind of track record he
\nleaves, how history records him or her, depends on his or her
\ndeeds. History shows that a leader without a sense of
\nrationality, without a sense of reality, can only create
\nnightmares.<\/p>\n
Most would likely want to remember Gus Dur as the nation's
\nteacher and leader, the guru bangsa.<\/p>\n
The writer is a journalist at The Jakarta Post.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/sukarno-nixon-and-gus-dur-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }