Sukarno fell victim of his political vision<\/p>\n
A recently launched book written by former ambassador Manai
\nSophiaan has sparked a controversy on the role of former
\npresident Sukarno in the 1965 coup. Noted historian Onghokham
\nlooks into this issue.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Recently there has been a renewed and heated
\ndebate on Sukarno's involvement in the attempted coup of the so-
\ncalled Sept. 30 Movement and the Indonesian Communist Party
\n(PKI).<\/p>\n
From the latest publications, including a book by Manai
\nSophiaan and the government's white book, Sukarno's direct
\ninvolvement in the coup was never proven, nor is there any
\nevidence of his direct involvement in the coup attempt itself. In
\nfact both the White Book as well as Manai's book Kehormatan Bagi
\nYang Berhak (Honor for the One Who Deserves It) showed that
\nSukarno was not involved in the coup itself nor had any knowledge
\nof it beforehand.<\/p>\n
This non-involvement should not be confused with suspicions or
\nprejudgments of Sukarno's involvement in the coup attempt. A
\nprejudgment, probably strengthened by his pro-PKI policies after
\nthe coup, might be interpreted as pro the movement. I believe
\nthis latter part to be undeniable, these are the facts of
\nhistory. Nevertheless Sukarno's different roles in September 1965
\nand after should be kept separate, at least seen from a
\nhistorical and non-political point of view.<\/p>\n
First of all, what was the Sept. 30 Movement of 1965? The coup
\nleader, Lt.Col. Untung commander of the palace guards, usurped
\nthe power of the president and Great Leader of the Revolution, as
\nhe was called at the time. The coup declared the cabinet
\ndissolved and formed a Revolutionary Council. The coup, however,
\nclaimed that it took action in order to save the revolution and
\nits Great Leader Sukarno from a \"Council of Generals\" who planned
\na counter-revolution.<\/p>\n
At the same time the Sept. 30 coup movement captured and
\nkilled six top Army generals including A. Yani, chief of the
\narmy, S. Parman, chief of intelligence, and others, while the
\ndefense minister, Gen. A.H. Nasution barely escaped. His young
\nadjutant, Lt. P. Tendean was killed though and also Nasution's
\nlittle daughter. The coup plot claimed that the action was
\nnecessary in order to clean the army of counter-revolutionaries.<\/p>\n
Although the Sept. 30 Movement was a coup against the Sukarno
\ngovernment by its act of usurpation of power, public suspicions
\nimmediately fell on Sukarno because for months there had been
\ntensions and conflicts between the palace and the army
\nleadership. Since May there had already been the issue of the so-
\ncalled Council of Generals whose existence as a policy making
\nbody was denied by the army. Then there were the rumors and
\ngossip of the so called Gillchrist (British ambassador) letter to
\nthe American Ambassador, discussing \"our local army friends\".<\/p>\n
Up to now there is no evidence that Sukarno had any knowledge
\nor involvement of the Sept. 30 Movement. It is indeed unthinkable
\nthat a president would make a coup against himself, as his
\ninvolvement in the Sept. 30 Movement would have meant. Sukarno
\nwas above all no adventurer, throughout his life he seemed even a
\nbit wary of physical adventurism, as shown by his refusal to join
\nthe guerrilla forces in 1948, among others things, when the Dutch
\noccupied Yogyakarta.<\/p>\n
Sukarno's role in the Sept. 30 Movement became more pronounced
\nwhen he tried to protect the air force high command and the PKI
\nleadership from involvement or from being tainted by the Sept.30
\nMovement. And they certainly were, if not involved, then at least
\ntainted in some way or another. Its historical truths are still
\nheavily debated among scholars. More important as far as
\nimmediate politics were concerned was the army's wrath over
\nSukarno's policy of protecting the guilty and suspects of the
\nSept. 30 coup movement.<\/p>\n
Where the air force was concerned, some compromise solutions
\ncould be found. The air force high command was dismissed and new
\nacceptable commanders found. However, when youth demonstrators
\nand the army demanded the dissolution of the PKI the president
\nrefused to do so, although it would have been politically wise to
\ndo so.<\/p>\n
Since 1926 Sukarno had a vision of a united struggle of
\nIndonesians, consisting of the three political forces of that
\ntime: Nationalists, Religion and Communists, against colonialism.
\nIn short the communists were an essential part of his
\nrevolutionary dreams. In his old age, in bad health and a policy
\nof isolating his country from the west through his anti-
\nimperialist confrontations, Sukarno chose to stand for his
\nvisions rather than being an opportunist. He disappeared in a
\ntragic way from the national and international scene which was
\nprobably his moment of true greatness. Indeed the revolution
\nended without the realization of his vision.<\/p>\n
In the current Cold War and post communist world one should be
\nable to evaluate Sukarno's pro-communist attitudes
\ndispassionately.<\/p>\n
The writer is a former staff lecturer at University of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
White book -- Page 2<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/sukarno-fell-victim-of-his-political-vision-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }