Sukarno and the Sept. 30 movement<\/p>\n
Harry Bhaskara
\nThe Jakarta Post
\nJakarta
\nhbkc@centrin.net.id<\/p>\n
A lot has been said openly about the 1965 \"Sept. 30 Movement\"
\n-- the attempted putcsh and assassination of seven top military
\nleaders which led to then president Sukarno's demise -- in the
\nlast four years, due to the reform movement and the downfall of
\nformer dictator Soeharto.<\/p>\n
Unlike before, foreign scholars' perspectives such as those of
\nDonald Hindley, Bernhard Dahm, Ruth T. McVey and those in the
\nCornell paper, are now readily available.<\/p>\n
Public discussion has also been enriched by numerous locally
\nproduced books on the topic.<\/p>\n
The above scholars generally believe that former president
\nSukarno was left uninformed about what would happen on the night
\nof Sept. 30 and in the early morning hours of Oct. 1, 1965 as
\nopposed to other scholars like Arnold C. Brackman and Justus M.
\nVan der Kroef who believe that he had a hand in the
\nassassinations.<\/p>\n
A newly published book by local publisher Aksara Karunia
\nentitled In the Spirit of the Red Banteng by Dutch political
\nanalyst Antonie C.A. Dake fell into the second camp of scholars.<\/p>\n
Sukarno was the driving force behind the movement and was the
\ndeciding factor behind the Communist Party of Indonesia's (PKI)
\nleadership spasm to link their fate to the movement, Dake told
\nThe Jakarta Post in an interview during his brief visit here
\nrecently.<\/p>\n
\"That was the conclusion in 1973 and it still is the
\nconclusion in 2002,\" he said.<\/p>\n
Dake was referring to the year when the book was first
\npublished in 1973. The book was immediately banned in Indonesia
\nbut part of it appeared in a series in the Pedoman daily in 1974.<\/p>\n
\"As a foreigner I found it interesting that this kind of thing
\ncould happen,\" he said with a chuckle.<\/p>\n
In the time elapsed between 1973 and now, there had been no
\nnew findings that could prove the thesis wrong, he said.<\/p>\n
Apart from the role Sukarno played in the incident, the book
\nattempts to answer other questions including, the reasons for the
\nattempted putsch and reasons for the ensuing communal enmity,
\nespecially in Central and East Java, and how that could evolve
\ninto such dizzying intensity that hundreds of thousands of people
\nwere killed.<\/p>\n
One may ask why such a thesis, which portrays Sukarno in a
\nnegative light, did not seem to gain much adherence in the
\ncountry despite the interest of Soeharto's government to reduce
\nhis predecessor's legendary stature?<\/p>\n
Dr. Richard Lowenthal of the Free University of West Berlin
\nsaid in the preface of the book that it was a conscious
\nrepression by Soeharto's New Order government.<\/p>\n
They had no interest in revealing that Sukarno had become the
\ndeadly enemy of the army leadership, because this would have
\nundermined their own legitimacy as his successors, he claimed
\nreferring to Soeharto's government.<\/p>\n
\"They were satisfied to know the truth but on balance saw no
\nreason to publish it,\" he wrote.<\/p>\n
Dake dismissed as \"myths\" other stories or hypotheses about
\nthe attempted putsch including those put forth by the council of
\ngenerals, a theory that Sukarno was tricked by the army or top
\nlevel politicians with substantial involvement from the American
\nCIA.<\/p>\n
The bone of contention that preceded the attempted coup was a
\nconflict between Sukarno and his anti-communist generals over the
\nformer's plan to arm the citizens, he said.<\/p>\n
There was a heated debate on July 28, 1965 in a meeting
\nbetween the generals and Sukarno in Senayan, Dake said, and
\nSukarno had given the nod to his Palace Guard Col. Untung who
\nlater organized the coup, to take action against his disloyal
\ngenerals.<\/p>\n
It is not very likely that Sukarno gave an order to kill the
\ngenerals, but he was certainly in a position to \"call it on or
\noff\", Dake said.<\/p>\n
\"If you don't stop a unit of a crack army troops to kidnap a
\ngeneral, then you know that the unit did not go for a picnic,\" he
\nadded.<\/p>\n
\"Of course he did not say, 'kill them', but he had allowed the
\nclimate and the organization to go forward and it had some
\nresults. I think he was responsible for that,\" he said, adding
\nthat it was an \"unspecified action\" order.<\/p>\n
PKI leaders Aidit and Njoto learned about this conversation on
\nAug. 4, 1965 and they appeared to have not been able to resist
\nthe temptation to take part in the action, thus violating
\nVladimir I. Lenin's maxim: One must not play at insurrection;
\nonce one has begun it, one must go through with it to the end.<\/p>\n
Why had the experienced communist leaders chosen such a
\ndisastrous and amateurish course?<\/p>\n
In their eyes, a simple purge had to be arranged and carried
\nout with the aim of getting rid of a couple of anti-communist
\ngenerals, Dake wrote in the book.<\/p>\n
And support for this could be counted on from president
\nSukarno. The involvement of the PKI would remain limited in the
\nfirst phase, and only if the first phase had been completed would
\nthe cadres and members of the party be informed.<\/p>\n
Asked about the role of then Maj. Gen. Soeharto, Dake said he
\nwas in a lucky position but he did not like that position in the
\nbeginning.<\/p>\n
He was an experienced officer but not in politics, Dake said.<\/p>\n
Only when Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution appeared reluctant to take
\nthings in his own hands did Soeharto come forward.<\/p>\n
And he surprised the world when he turned out to be an able
\nand cunning politician as well, Dake said.<\/p>\n
The fact that he later became a dictator and a corrupt one at
\nthat, was a different story just like Sukarno who was good when
\nhe first emerged as the leader of the country, he said.<\/p>\n
Asked about the prolonged crisis the country is now in, Dake
\nwho received his doctoral degree in political science at the Free
\nUniversity of Berlin for his study of the Indonesian Communist
\nParty, said that he remained optimistic about Indonesia's future.<\/p>",
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