Students' role in Soeharto's fall<\/p>\n
By Hermawan Sulistyo<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): While there is no doubt students played an
\nimportant role in toppling the Soeharto regime, the question
\nremains: What was the extent of their influence?<\/p>\n
Different assessments have tried to gauge their role, and all
\nhave reached divergent conclusions.<\/p>\n
Although Ikrar Nusa Bhakti's article Military to win if
\ncivilian fails (The Jakarta Post, May 2) focused on the
\npossibility of the emergence of military rule, he also mentioned
\nthat the success of the student movement was partly because of
\nthe support they received from the middle class.<\/p>\n
There is some truth in Ikrar's argument. But when he pointed
\nout five factors that contributed to Soeharto's downfall, Ikrar
\nseemed to belittle the role of the students.<\/p>\n
It is definitely misleading to say that students would not
\nhave succeeded without the support of the middle class. The
\nresignation of 14 cabinet ministers and other political pressure
\nexerted by various elite groups indeed contributed to the
\npolitical push for Soeharto to step down. But even without this
\n\"support\", the students were already unstoppable. They had
\nreached a point of no return.<\/p>\n
The 1998 student movement actually started rather late in the
\nwake of political movements. Various factors played a role, two
\nclearly important. First, many students, especially those
\nstudying in Jakarta, come from middle-class families. The
\neconomic crisis first hit those students who are from the lower
\nclass. This fact alone explains why cities like Yogyakarta and
\nSurakarta, where many students from the lower class study, were
\nthe first ones to experience the movement. Students from Jakarta
\nwere the latest in joining their friends from smaller cities.<\/p>\n
Second, these students, who were mostly born in the late
\n1970s, grew up in an apolitical and nonpolitical atmosphere.
\nThere were no significant political affairs during their life,
\nexcept when the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) was in conflict
\nin 1996. Yet, this party's dispute was too far from their daily
\nactivities to force them to get involved in politics. Under such
\nan apolitical and nonpolitical situation they ran their student
\norganizations. Thus, many student leaders were \"apolitically\"
\nelected.<\/p>\n
When these student leaders, many of whom were elected through
\nnonpolitical qualities such as high achievement in sports and
\narts, had to face a political crisis, they were disoriented for a
\nwhile. Thus, small groups of student activists formed what they
\ncalled posko, an acronym for pos komando which literally means
\n\"command post\" (technically speaking, it was a \"camping post\").
\nSome became informal leaders of these posts, and they were the
\nones who first moved to the streets.<\/p>\n
But within relatively a short time, formal student leaders
\nlearned fast. They were racing against these \"informal student
\nleaders\", although there is no formal organization for the posko.
\nThus, we saw fragmented student movements. Many joined the formal
\norganizations such as the student senates. Many others joined the
\nposko groups. Still, many others founded various \"action units\"
\n(kesatuan aksi) with their own posko.<\/p>\n
Competition among these groups were not always a fair game. In
\nmany cases, this competition erupted into hostility and violence.
\nBut, the competition was a powerful driving force to exert
\npolitical pressure. They tried to outdo each other in bravery to
\nphysically confront the security forces. Many posko, for
\ninstance, prepared what they called \"death squads\", although they
\nwere totally unarmed.<\/p>\n
Learning from the past, student activists believed that
\nstudent leaders were the ones who would have benefited from the
\nmovement. A consensus reached, then, that there should be no
\nleaders. In most cases, a presidium was to replace a structured
\norganization. Every activist then had an opportunity to lead a
\nsingle action, although in practice still not many students
\nreserved the ability to lead.<\/p>\n
In a snowballing effect, student movements grew rapidly.
\nRumors making the round which gained currency had it that
\nstudents received political and economic support from outside
\ntheir campuses. These had a boomerang effect. Many campuses
\nclosed their \"charity boxes\", and students refused to receive
\nmoney, even from their own university alumni.<\/p>\n
Allegations that outside political powers were using the
\nstudents also had a boomerang effect. Only a handful of \"senior
\ncounterparts\" were accepted into their circles. They were very
\nsuspicious toward people from outside their posko. Only in the
\nlatest stages of their movements did students receive outside
\nsupport openly, especially in terms of food and other supplies.<\/p>\n
Now, where are the student movements heading? This question
\nhas no easy answer. As with other segments of society, they are
\ndisoriented. When Soeharto resigned, some students believed that
\ntheir duty was served. Some decided that Habibie deserved their
\nsupport and that he should have his chance to prove his
\nleadership. Others were determined to continue their movements
\nunder an assumption that Habibie's administration was nothing
\nelse than Soeharto's clone.<\/p>\n
Many expatriates in Jakarta are unsure whether the riots that
\nexploded concurrently with the mounting student movements would
\nnot reoccur in the near future. They use student demonstrations
\nas an indicator of a climate favorable for a riot to explode. If
\nstudent demonstrations can be used as a proper parameter for a
\nriot, then we should not be afraid. Several reasons could be
\ncited here.<\/p>\n
First, student movements have passed their peak with the
\nresignation of Soeharto. It is very unlikely they can gather up
\nto hundred of thousands in number, as in the past. Fragmented
\ntargets of the movements also contributed to a smaller number of
\ndemonstrations. Second, demonstrations would not lead to another
\nmassive riot because the Armed Forces had almost settled their
\ninternal conflicts. Lastly, riots would not have taken place had
\nthe Armed Forces not been hesitant to deploy their forces.<\/p>\n
Third, many segments of the elite have taken the student's
\nrole in channeling various interests. This is a kind of
\n\"political safety net\" for the future. Political struggle is now
\ntaking place among various factions within the elite. At the same
\ntime, most campuses are now having finals, although some are
\nstill sitting their mid-term exams because the semester was so
\ndisrupted.<\/p>\n
The situation in the near future is still difficult to assess.
\nThere are three \"regimes\" moving together in an unsynchronized
\ncomposition. The economic regime is already bankrupt. There is
\nstill not even the slightest hint of economic recovery. Under
\nHabibie's administration, the exchange rate seems to worsen every
\nday. Meanwhile, the social regime is at a junction. If one of the
\nmeasures is public trust in the administration, then it was
\npartly recovered when Soeharto resigned. But now social distrust
\nis increasing.<\/p>\n
With economic and social regimes not working, it is impossible
\nto expect a viable political regime to work even for a short
\nperiod. Habibie's announcement of the time frame to conduct an
\nextraordinary session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)
\nand the general elections is based on an assumption that the
\npolitical regime is still viable. In fact, without two working
\nregimes supporting this political regime, Habibie will not last.<\/p>\n
To some degree, the viability of Habibie's transitional
\nadministration will directly affect the format and scale of
\nstudent movements in the near future. If Habibie fails to
\novercome even part of the economic crisis, students will
\ndefinitely come into action again, this time in a much less
\nmassive scale. However, more and more nonstudent segments of the
\nsociety, especially the workers, will come to the fore to launch
\nrallies.<\/p>\n
The writer is a researcher with the Indonesian Institute of
\nSciences and executive director of the Research Institute for
\nDemocracy and Peace.<\/p>",
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