Structural impediments facing the new president<\/p>\n
Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta<\/p>\n
After more than six years of disorder in the post-Soeharto
\nera, many are once again erroneously looking at institutional
\nchanges and the introduction of a more democratic electoral
\nsystem as a quick fix to Indonesia's chaotic transformation.<\/p>\n
Instead of positioning this process as a means to a more
\njustifiable end, the elections are being perceived as ends in
\nthemselves. That the final product -- a democratically elected
\npresident -- is the cure for all that has gone amiss since the
\nstart of the reform movement.<\/p>\n
Javanese folklore is seeped in the myth of a benevolent savior
\n(Ratu Adil): A leader of divine character sent by providence to
\nconfer justice and glory on the nation. Many cling to this
\nillusion, giving rise to personality cults that eventually lead
\nto demagogy and authoritarianism.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's history has twice, in the form of the Sukarno and
\nSoeharto regimes, provided ample evidence that the birth of a new
\n(self-) righteous regime\/leader is more of a placebo than a
\npanacea for democracy's ills.<\/p>\n
People ignore the reality that the political process is also
\ndefined by innate circumstances beyond the control of one person
\n(the president). The idealism and benevolence of a president
\nalone are insufficient to ensure the shaping of a better society
\nif structural obstacles are not addressed.<\/p>\n
Despite the new system that has been installed, Indonesia is
\nbrimming with forces that work to negate the expedition of a
\nsmooth democratic transition. Consequently, our expectations that
\nthe new president can induce seismic changes should be tempered
\nproportionally to the gravity of the obstacles that lie before
\nus.<\/p>\n
Paramount among the forces at work in a country undergoing
\ntransition is the level of economic growth. Transformation toward
\ndemocracy, by its very nature, implies fundamental social and
\neconomic change. Economic growth is the decisive factor in not
\nonly determining whether a nation succeeds in crossing the
\nsystemic divide to become a democratic state, but how well the
\ntransition permeates down through society.<\/p>\n
More often than not, societal changes are propelled by an
\nestablished middle class. This is why sound economic growth is
\nvital, since only under conditions of relative economic
\nprosperity will a society have a politically aware middle class
\nthat seeks to influence the political dynamics. Under these
\nconditions, transitions tend to be more meaningful since they are
\nbuilt upon fundamental socio-economic change rather than short-
\nterm political gains.<\/p>\n
Under situations where economic growth is less encouraging,
\nthe democratic transition tends to be shallower as many changes
\ntend to be essentially cosmetic in nature. There is little
\nunderlying change as transformations are driven more by seasonal
\ndiscontent toward a decaying regime rather than a new equation in
\nthe national polity.<\/p>\n
It is too early to tell if Indonesia will undergo a deep or
\nshallow democratic transition. But the recent annual average of
\nthree to four percent growth, driven by consumer spending, is
\nsimply not enough. If the depressed economic outlook persists,
\nthe fallout could be disastrous for democratic consolidation.<\/p>\n
\"Democracy\" itself could eventually be blamed for the economic
\ndownturn. Transition fatigue would quickly set in as the public
\nbecomes apprehensive about further change.<\/p>\n
In such a situation, the growing sense of apathy would be
\ncompounded by a perception that democracy has become irrelevant
\nto the public. The politicking of the elites, which has little if
\nanything to do with improving public welfare, would then create a
\ndisconnection between democratic politics and public policy.
\nEventually, democracy would become a mere slogan and come to be
\nseen as ineffective as regards furthering the aspirations of the
\npublic.<\/p>\n
Another significant obstacle hindering democratic
\nconsolidation is the continued practice of political patronage.
\nIn a true democracy, power is regulated, distributed and
\ntransferred via established institutional means, e.g., democratic
\nelections. But not so in Indonesia where the patronage system
\nperpetuates an asymmetrical generation of power in which
\nauthority is not acquired through formal processes.<\/p>\n
Abdurrahman Wahid's tenure as president amply demonstrated
\nthis inherent frailty in the Indonesian political system. Despite
\nbeing handed the presidency by the People's Consultative
\nAssembly, he was denied the intrinsic powers associated with the
\noffice. In the end, he was forced to compromise in order to build
\na new power base within the confines of the Presidential Palace.<\/p>\n
The key driver in this predicament is the innate strength of
\n\"embedded elites\" vis-a-vis the \"free floating elites\". The
\nlevers of change remain in the hands of those from the former
\ncategory.<\/p>\n
Embedded elites are individuals and organizations who are
\nconnected to the previous regime. While they may have been
\ndisgraced and dealt political blows during the preliminary phase
\nof regime change, their networks and resources allow them to
\nweather the initial storm and quickly regain their privileged
\nroles in high politics. The Golkar Party, Gen. (ret.) Wiranto and
\nother individuals linked to the New Order are examples of how
\nembedded elites continue to shine in the political firmament.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, pro-democracy advocates, like Amien Rais,
\nNurcholish Madjid and Sjahrir, while churning out attractive
\nrhetoric really have little impact when it comes to real politik.
\nThese free-floating elites neither have the savvy nor the
\nconstituencies to hold sway in the practical world.<\/p>\n
In the end, they resort to jargonistic platforms and abstract
\nslogans about democracy that are unappealing to the public.<\/p>\n
While the role of the free-floating elites is symbolically
\nsignificant, it is the embedded ones that we ultimately have to
\nturn to in order to induce true change. Given the sluggish rate
\nof economic growth, we cannot expect change to emerge from the
\nmiddle class.<\/p>\n
Profound democratic change in Indonesia will ultimately be
\nachieved only by acquiring the support and commitment of the
\nembedded elites to the slow process of reestablishing the link
\nbetween democratic politics and policy-making.<\/p>\n
In many respects, this process has already begun via
\nconstitutional changes and the introduction of a new electoral
\nsystem.<\/p>\n
However, the price that has had to be paid is that in present
\nday Indonesian politics, the vanguard of the new process still
\nconsists of organizations and individuals whose histories can be
\ntraced back to the past regime. But at the very least, they now
\nhave to pay some heed to the voice of the people.<\/p>\n
Meidyatama Suryodiningrat is a staff writer for The Jakarta
\nPost.<\/p>",
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