Strict control on small arms urgent<\/p>\n
Ivan A. Hadar, President, Indonesian Institute for Democracy
\nEducation (IDE), Jakarta<\/p>\n
Over the last few years, Indonesia has been extensively
\nstricken by conflict. All these conflicts, although rooted in
\nsocial-economic-political-cultural injustice, eventually became
\nmultidimensional.<\/p>\n
And in some of the country's conflicts, small arms (firearms,
\nhandguns, light weapons) have played a significant role. Small
\narms spread through society via three main channels: Diversions
\nfrom weapons stocks owned by the government; from homemade
\nfirearms workshops and smuggling.<\/p>\n
Today it is estimated that at least 55 percent of the total
\nnumber of small arms in circulation worldwide (550 million) are
\nprivately licensed firearms (Small Arms Survey, 2001). Each year,
\nsome 500,000 people are killed by small arms; 84 percent of them
\nare civilians, mostly women and children.<\/p>\n
The precise figure of the number of firearms in circulation in
\nIndonesia is difficult to get, although arms proliferation has
\ngone up sharply since the fall of the New Order regime. Various
\nreports from conflict areas show a dramatic increase in the
\nnumber of gun shot victims over the last few years.<\/p>\n
As a consequence of the conflict in Maluku, some 4,000 people
\nwere killed and at least 8,000 were wounded. Eighty percent of
\nthose killed were believed to have died of gun shot wounds. In
\nMaluku, during a few weeks of violence, the number of killed
\nreached 2,083. This was possible only because firearms replaced
\n\"traditional killing tools\": knives, spears and arrows.<\/p>\n
The number of firearms in circulation is estimated to exceed
\nofficial numbers. Beside organic weapons owned by the military
\nand police, there are also many homemade firearms that have
\nimproved in quality over time. Therefore, improving the
\nregulation system has become a must.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has only one domestic small arms manufacturer, PT
\nPindad, which produces small arms, light weapons and ammunition.
\nPindad took over its existing production facilities from the
\nIndonesia Military in 1983. Production falls into two categories,
\nmilitary and nonmilitary.<\/p>\n
All military production is controlled by the Ministry of
\nDefense and all nonmilitary production is controlled by the
\nNational Police. Most of Pindad's production goes toward
\nsupplying Indonesia's military, police and forest patrols,
\nalthough some production is for domestic civilian use as well as
\nfor export. Besides PT Pindad, there are eight other authorized
\nimporters and suppliers.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has a regulation on firearms (No. 12\/1951), which
\nprovides a maximum punishment of death for illicit arms
\ntrafficking. Manufacturing arms without a license is also
\nstrictly prohibited in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The manufacturing of arms falls under the direct control of
\nthe Ministry of Defense and the police, even if the factory is
\nprivately operated. However, various reports have uncovered the
\ninvolvement of \"insiders\" in the illegal firearms and explosives
\ntrade. Consistent law enforcement is still far from people's
\nexpectations. Therefore, stricter regulations and implementation
\nat all levels is necessary.<\/p>\n
First, a stricter regulation governing the licensing of small
\narms for the personal use of individuals residing within the
\ncountry. According to the United Nations International Study on
\nFirearm Regulations (1998), as part of the application process a
\ncountry has to require proof of identity, references, training
\ncertification, the payment of fees, a photograph, a mental health
\nexam and information on proposed storage of the firearm, as well
\nas a background check for a criminal or domestic violence record.<\/p>\n
These requirements could thus be considered the norm for
\ndomestic firearm licensing worldwide.<\/p>\n
Second, the marking of small arms with a unique identifier,
\nsuch as a serial number along with a country and\/or
\nmanufacturer's code, is considered an essential element in
\ncontrolling their proliferation.<\/p>\n
Third, the regulation on the storage and packing of small
\narms, ammunition and explosives is important, not only for safety
\nreasons but also to ensure secure stockpile management.
\nInadequate stockpile management can result in theft, a loss of
\ninventory due to corruption and a lack of baseline data. This
\nissue is frequently overlooked, as reflected in the fact that it
\nis mentioned in the law, but then primarily in relation to
\nnongovernmental holdings.<\/p>\n
In fact, security regulations for governmental holdings of
\nsmall arms and ammunition here are not covered in the regulation.
\nIndonesia regulates, to some degree, the storage of small arms
\nand ammunition (UN, 1999c).<\/p>\n
Forth, without carefully planned postconflict demobilization
\nand reintegration, the risk of small arms remaining in
\ncirculation -- whether in the possession of ex-combatants\/militia
\nor in the black market -- is high. Even though Indonesia is
\nfacing or has faced armed insurgencies, no laws or regulations
\npertaining to the demobilization and reintegration of ex-
\ncombatants are found.<\/p>\n
We could learn from other members of the Association of
\nSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN). There are four countries in the
\nregion (Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) that
\nhave made provisions for the collection and destruction of
\nweapons, with or without compensation.<\/p>\n
For instance, both the Philippines and Cambodia provide
\ncompensation to individuals turning over weapons. A collection
\nprogram conducted in the state of Sarawak in Malaysia compensated
\nowners for licensed arms handed over to the authorities.<\/p>\n
Fifth, to ensure maximum effect and prevent possible
\nloopholes, exemptions to national arms control laws and
\nregulations should be kept to a minimum.<\/p>\n
Exemptions provided for in the country's legislation include:
\nmembers of the armed forces and the police in the performance of
\ntheir duties; licensed dealers, repairers, manufacturers and
\ntraders of arms and ammunition and their employees, in the
\nconduct of business; and the manufacture, possession, use,
\nstorage, sale, transport, import, or export of arms and
\nexplosives by government order.<\/p>\n
The success in fighting small arms proliferation depends more
\nor less on the quality of the cooperation among the related
\nparties at the national level (among various law enforcers and
\nsociety), the regional level (ASEAN, Asia Pacific), including
\ncloser regional cooperation on customs, police, border controls,
\nand the international level (various institutions, e.g. the UN,
\nand also license holder and small arms exporting countries). All
\nthis is a must.<\/p>\n
Although these problems cannot be solved by each individual
\ncountry, or even by regional groups of countries, the
\nresponsibility of controlling the proliferation of small arms
\nlies with the individual countries.<\/p>\n
Prevention is essential, before the next conflict breaks out
\nand small arms are like \"gasoline sprinkled onto the flame\".<\/p>",
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