Strengthening security community<\/p>\n
Andi Widjajanto, Center for International Relations Studies,
\nUniversity of Indonesia, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
\n(ASEAN) share the common recognition that the multilateral
\nsecurity arrangement should be an essential feature of the
\nregional landscape. The establishment of security multilateralism
\nis needed to address the increasingly uncertain geo-strategic
\nlandscape and to expand on regional integration derived from
\neconomic interdependence.<\/p>\n
However, ASEAN states were not in complete agreement in
\nselecting what kind of security cooperation should be
\nimplemented. There are two main proposals on the issue. The first
\nproposal focused on the development of a defense community
\nsimilar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the
\nformer Warsaw Pact. Another proposal was forwarded recently by
\nPresident Megawati Soekarnoputri on the occasion of the ASEAN
\n36th anniversary, which called on ASEAN states to form a security
\ncommunity.<\/p>\n
The idea of a security community was generated to address the
\nemerging challenges of transnational issues. Realism's
\nconcentrations on a state-centric and power-deterministic world
\nallow limited scope for considering the new salience of non-state
\nactors and the multi-dimensional nature of security. Today, the
\nstate-centric world is no longer predominant. A complex multi-
\ncentric world has emerged.<\/p>\n
Complex, interconnected and multidimensional transnational
\nissues are moving from the periphery to the center of the
\nsecurity concerns of states. This multi-centric world consists of
\nvarious non-state actors such as multinational corporations,
\nethnic minorities, sub national governments, professional
\nsocieties, social movements, non-governmental organizations,
\npolitical parties, and individual actors. The proliferation of
\nactors in world politics has not pushed states to the edge of the
\nglobal arena; they are simply no longer the only key actors.<\/p>\n
However, ASEAN had made a significant step to develop an ASEAN
\nsecurity community by creating the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an
\ninitiative made by the regional grouping to move beyond its
\nlimited experience of security cooperation.<\/p>\n
The formation of the ARF suggests although ASEAN remains
\nreluctant to implement a more rigid European security mechanism,
\nthe ARF is the vehicle through which ASEAN hopes to have ability
\nto shape its own security environment. For ASEAN, the ARF can be
\nused to foster habits of cooperation and provide the catalyst for
\nencouraging regional cooperation in the wider Asia Pacific
\nregion.<\/p>\n
Thus, instead of developing a new institution the best policy
\nto address security predicaments in Southeast Asia is by
\nstrengthening the ARF mechanism. It would be easier to utilize
\nARF than to build a new security arrangement. Moreover, the ARF
\nhas a much better chance of getting all great powers in the
\nregion in their security cooperation than any new security
\ninstitution.<\/p>\n
In the security realm, Indonesia can increase its strategic
\nreliability by developing and publishing a strategic initiative
\nthat describes three underlying principles. The first is that
\nIndonesia should give increased support to strengthening ASEAN's
\nmultilateral effort in resolving intra-ASEAN disputes.<\/p>\n
This support should manifest itself in encouraging ASEAN to
\nspeed up the ARF institutional development. This is based on the
\nnecessity to establish three pillars of the ARF: Confidence
\nbuilding measures, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution.
\nIndonesia should seek to enhance its regional roles by initiating
\npreventive diplomacy and peacekeeping regime in the ARF. The ARF
\nmechanisms also will foster greater security cooperation in the
\nregion since most of the security challenges in the region have a
\ntransnational character.<\/p>\n
This new character tells us that the emerging transnational
\nthreat has elicited more interest than ever before in the idea of
\ncreating a preventive regime that tries to provide a peaceful
\nsolution as well as to anticipate future issues.<\/p>\n
An ARF preventive regime can be strengthened by developing
\nspecific preventive procedures. These procedures consist of
\ngovernmental and non-governmental actions, policies, and
\ninstitutions that are taken to keep particular states or
\norganized groups within them from threatening or using organized
\nviolence, armed force, or related forms of coercion such as
\nrepression to settle interstate or national political disputes,
\nespecially in situations where the existing means cannot
\npeacefully manage the destabilizing effects of economic, social,
\npolitical, and international change.<\/p>\n
Indonesia could take the initiative by proposing the
\ninstitutionalization of an ARF preventive regime. This regime
\nmust have a multi-layered structure consisting of the (1) ASEAN
\nmechanism; (2) bilateral cooperation among states, and (3) Non-
\ngovernmental Preventive Network.<\/p>\n
But Indonesia should first seek to gain support for the
\ninitiative from other major powers. Indonesia should also
\nexercise its leadership by proposing long-term mechanisms to
\nprovide resources to inter-agency cooperation and NGOs on the
\nfront lines of prevention, providing diplomatic support behind
\nparticular preventive efforts, and providing experienced
\nindividual representatives to mediate incipient disputes under
\nmultilateral auspices.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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