Strategies to contain terrorism<\/p>\n
Hermawan Sulistyo
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
After the Bali bombings on Oct. 12, 2002, the National Police
\nstrengthened their antiterror unit, Special Detachment 88 Anti-
\nTerror. To be accepted as a member of this unit is indeed
\nprestigious. And yet the unit is one of the least rewarding in
\nterms of position, rank and material benefits, compared with
\nother police units.<\/p>\n
Despite the funds the National Police received from their
\nsuccess in the investigation of the first Bali bombings, many
\ninvestigators found that they never received any special rewards.
\nThey did not receive promotions, and some investigators even lost
\nthe strategic positions they had held before the investigation.
\nThis was also true for personnel from other supporting units,
\nsuch as forensics and intelligence. As a result, they now only
\nhalf-heartedly share information with their new investigation
\ncounterparts.<\/p>\n
Similar situations may be found among local police forces. If
\nthey succeed in locating or apprehending a terrorist suspect, the
\ncredit usually goes to someone else. Thus, refining the merit
\nsystem within the police would clearly increase the effectiveness
\nof counterterrorism efforts. Assignment to counterterror units
\nshould be an important, if not extraordinary, step in the
\ncareers of officers, and these assignments must be rewarding.<\/p>\n
Strengthening the police's capacity could also include the
\nadoption and implementation of community policing. This is indeed
\na new philosophy that the National Police are now gradually
\nadopting and integrating into their system and operations.
\nEffective community policing means a strong early warning system,
\nsimilar to the socio-security function of the newly revived
\nmilitary territorial commands.<\/p>\n
Community policing activities related directly to
\ncounterterrorism measures could include special campaigns
\ndesigned for opinion makers as well as the general public. The
\ncommunity police should be proactive in providing proper
\ninformation to the community concerning the devastating impacts
\nof terrorism. The police could ask for the cooperation of
\nreligious leaders in approaching some communities that
\ntraditionally are the sources of new terror recruits.<\/p>\n
Among the best ways to shift the focus of the public discourse
\non the perpetrators and\/or their motives -- expressed in
\nstatements like \"America is the real terrorist\" -- is to espouse
\nthe perspective of the victims. Survivors of a bombing may tell
\nof their traumatic experience. Graphic pictures of the victims
\nand survivors would be a big help in explaining why we all must
\nperceive terrorism from the victims' perspective.<\/p>\n
No bombings would occur without the availability of
\nexplosives, whether low or high explosives. This means that tight
\ncontrols over the sale of explosives is a must. High explosives
\nare mostly organic and belong to the military, police and other
\ngovernment offices authorized to use explosives. Most of the
\ncomponents of low explosives are available in the retail market.<\/p>\n
The military could contribute significantly to
\ncounterterrorism measures by tightening controls over the
\n(mis)use of explosives, or more specifically \"organic\" high
\nexplosives. In addition to formal controls over the official
\nproduction of explosives, including production by PT Pindad, the
\nmilitary also has to reach into the black market. For the past
\ncouple of years, undisclosed records have contained reports of
\nstolen munitions from military warehouses.<\/p>\n
Although there is no proof yet that the stolen munitions have
\nbeen used in bombings, the potential for this is great. Korean
\ngrenades (nicknamed \"pineapple grenades\", commonly used in
\nmilitary training) contains a high percentage of RDX, a high
\nexplosive element also used in C-4 types of bombs. But God knows
\nwhat the stolen munitions have been used for.<\/p>\n
Explosives are not necessarily from domestic stocks. The
\ndetonators found at many blast sites were made in India, the
\ncheapest detonators that can be found on the black market. TNT,
\nPETN and other high explosives used in some large blasts,
\nincluding the first Bali bombings, were also quite possibly from
\nthe foreign black market.<\/p>\n
Students of terrorism studies can easily trace the
\n\"traditional lines\" of smuggled explosives from the southern
\nPhilippines to North Sulawesi, before the explosives are
\ntransported to Maluku, the hinterlands of Sulawesi and other
\nparts of Indonesia. This fact alone should be enough to support
\nthe decision on the part of the military to increase its
\nsurveillance and operations along the country's northern borders.<\/p>\n
If the goal of government policy in strengthening the military
\nis to increase its counterterrorism capacity, its budget is
\ncertainly sufficient. Selected areas of operations -- in this
\ncase, along the northern border -- will require less of a budget
\nthan reviving the socio-security function of the military
\nterritorial commands. The policy will in turn provide a benefit
\nas the first step toward incrementally strengthening the military
\nin its external defense role.<\/p>\n
Thus, the capsule strategy contains efforts to:<\/p>\n
Increase the capacity of the National Police by implementing a
\nproper reward system for personnel in antiterror units and
\nsupporting units;<\/p>\n
Assign the police to effectively control the trade of
\nexplosive substances in the free market; for example, shopkeepers
\nmust report to the police if someone buys two kilograms or more
\nof explosive substances like KClO3;<\/p>\n
Establish a more effective community policing system as an
\nearly detection and warning system;<\/p>\n
Assign the military to control the use of official explosives;<\/p>\n
Assign the military to patrol certain borders traditionally
\nused as smuggling corridors;<\/p>\n
Intensify campaigns among potential new terror recruits in
\ncertain areas, giving them a religious as well as the victims'
\nperspective of terrorism.<\/p>\n
The writer is a historian specializing in political killings,
\nterrorism and violence. He is also the CEO of Bukafe (bookstore &
\ncafe) and can be reached at kikiek@centrin.net.id.<\/p>",
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