Stopping terrorism no easy task<\/p>\n
By Gabriel Koch<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): With whispered plots it begins. In carnage the
\nschemes are laid. With cries of swift and effective retribution
\ndoes the West respond. In murmurs of apathy and forgetfulness
\ndoes the hue and action fade away. Thus the cycle of terrorism
\ncontinues through the times. It usually starts with a warning as
\nit began in the land of sand and oil.<\/p>\n
In November of last year U.S. army offices were bombed in
\nRiyadh. In May, the culprits, Islamic militants, were beheaded
\nfor the attack. Immediately following the not-so-swift but
\ncertainly effective retribution, the threats began. And, though
\nU.S. servicemen were told to upgrade their security, the threats
\nand security were largely ignored.<\/p>\n
Said USAF Staff Sergeant Alfredo Guerrero there had been a lot
\nof "strange things" going on near the base. "We felt that we were
\nbeing watched." Certainly that were being watched. Terrorist
\ngenerally do not go about their work blindly. They think, they
\nobserve, they plot and plan. And in their observation they can be
\ncaught.<\/p>\n
Why people were allowed to stake out the military compound and
\nwhy -- when feeling that they were being watched - U.S. forces
\nfailed to implement increased security measures are questions few
\npeople want to ask. But we need to ask them. We need to because
\nthere are 19 people who cannot ask them. We need to ask them
\nbecause therein lies the real question. Why did these men die?<\/p>\n
The answers are, unfortunately, general. They died because
\nwinning the war on terrorism means not preventing terrorist
\nattacks, but catching them after the fact. They died because of a
\nmisunderstanding of the terrorists' motives. They did because
\nthey were too arrogant to believe they could die. But,
\nultimately, they died because those who should have been
\nresponsible for securing the base both on site and in the
\nPentagon failed to learn from history.<\/p>\n
The Saudi bombing has drawn the inevitable comparison with the
\nLebanon bombings of the U.S. Marine barracks and the French
\nparatroopers. Usually the comparison is used to ask the question,
\nwill this force the U.S. out of Saudi Arabia? But that is not the
\nreal issue. What is, is how could the same thing happen twice?<\/p>\n
Back in Lebanon, before the bombs that claimed so many lives,
\nthere were warnings. There were rumors. And there were some very
\nbelievable sources telling the Pentagon just what was going to
\nhappen. Unfortunately nothing was done. And the U.S. did pull out
\nof Lebanon in embarrassment as a result.<\/p>\n
Now it is the 1990s. Threats were made. Warnings were
\nreceived. Observers were noticed. And still no serious
\nprecautions were taken to prevent the bombing. History repeating
\nitself. But why, specifically, nothing was done to prevent the
\nattack we do not and may never know.<\/p>\n
We do know why they were killed: Terrorism stripped of
\nidealistic frills and political-religious mumbo-jumbo is in the
\nend about greed and power. Its motivations lie in the desire to
\nhave or keep and the notion that no act is too horrendous if it
\nbrings the terrorists closer to their goal. In the case of the
\nSaudi bombing the desire is simple: The Islamic militants want
\ncontrol of Saudi Arabia. To do so, they feel they need to get the
\nAmericans out of Dodge.<\/p>\n
It's a simple formula really. The terrorists' plan is to
\nfoster ties with a power-mad leader who wants greater control
\nover the world than they already have. Leaders in countries such
\nas Libya, Iran, Iraq and Syria.<\/p>\n
Next is its attack on whatever protective, restraining Western
\nforce is about, which usually means bombing Americans. This is a
\nsmart step on two counts. 1) It garners support from anti-West
\ncountries and 2) it attracts supporters from the populace who
\nwould not directly support a charge against the ruling power.<\/p>\n
Eventually, foreign businesses are scared away. A compromise
\nfor control is forced from the ruling house. Finally, full
\ncontrol is taken and repression is implemented according to the
\ntwisted interpretation of whatever doctrine is espoused to keep
\ncontrol.<\/p>\n
But the five-path plan to success which works so well in self-
\nhelp groups is generally illusory for terrorists. Where there is
\nmoney to be made (like in Saudi Arabia) or there is a strategic
\npoint to dig into the odds, the Westerners are not going to stay
\naway, nor will they stop giving support to the ruling house.<\/p>\n
While Lebanon, where the West did leave, may stand out in
\npeoples' minds, the comparison is apples to oranges. There was no
\nmoney to be made in Lebanon. It was not a strategic point. There
\nwas no way to really influence the Arab countries from there. It
\nwas an unfriendly, hostile climate. It was following the French,
\nwhich is almost always a bad idea. In short, it was a dead-end
\ntrap that the U.S. would have loved to have pulled out of if they
\nhadn't gotten themselves in such a Vietnam-like quagmire there.<\/p>\n
Saudi Arabia is different. First, the French didn't go in
\nthere which is at least a sign that being there is not a huge
\nmistake. It has a friendly climate. It has money. And it's a
\npoint of major strategic importance. As such, the U.S. is not
\nabout to pull out of the area. And because of that, the bombing
\nin June, the bombings that will happen in subsequent months,
\nwill, in the end, be pointless.<\/p>\n
But so to will be the Western response.<\/p>\n
The culprits may be caught. Considering Saudi justice someone
\nwill undoubtedly lose their head. "International cooperation" and
\n"The War Against Terrorism" and other media-oriented phrases will
\nbe bandied about for public consumption. And though voices will
\nbe loud and many and just maybe some "swift and effective" action
\nwill occur, ultimately it will be as a shout followed by a
\nmurmur.<\/p>\n
Terrorism and its response works in waves of death and
\nindignation. A terrorist does something and the West cries out in
\nwhite-hot rage. Time goes by and that rage becomes a forgotten
\nember in history's ashtray.<\/p>\n
While it is possible that something may be done in response to
\nthis latest act of terrorism, it is doubtful that any real,
\ncontinuous, pro-active efforts will come out of it. If this was a
\npossibility then it should have occurred 15 years ago and just
\nmaybe 19 servicemen would still be alive.<\/p>\n
Stopping a terrorist hell-bent on destruction is no easy task.
\nIf a terrorist is smart, is careful and patient, and is willing
\nto die, they will have some successes. But these terrorists
\nweren't that smart. They made threats instead of keeping quiet.
\nThey were observed making their observations. As such, they
\nshould have been stopped.<\/p>\n
But the loud rhetoric that followed Lebanon and the measures
\nthat went along with it had died to a murmur by the time Saudi
\nArabia occurred. And though there are shouts now, they too will
\nultimately fall to whispers. And in the murmurs the cycle of
\nterrorism continues. And in the whispers lives are lost.<\/p>",
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