{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1055873,
        "msgid": "sticky-business-1447899208",
        "date": "1996-05-10 00:00:00",
        "title": "Sticky business",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Sticky business It seems to be the National Logistics Agency's (Bulog) turn now to get its hands sticky helping the state-owned IPTN aerospace company. The agency has agreed to buy about 110,000 tons of glutinous rice while Thailand is in turn to procure two CN-235 airplanes from IPTN. That means Bulog will have to spend a large part of the subsidized loan it is getting annually from the central bank to pay for the counter-trade deal.",
        "content": "<p>Sticky business<\/p>\n<p>It seems to be the National Logistics Agency's (Bulog) turn<br>\nnow to get its hands sticky helping the state-owned IPTN<br>\naerospace company. The agency has agreed to buy about 110,000<br>\ntons of glutinous rice while Thailand is in turn to procure two<br>\nCN-235 airplanes from IPTN. That means Bulog will have to spend a<br>\nlarge part of the subsidized loan it is getting annually from the<br>\ncentral bank to pay for the counter-trade deal.<\/p>\n<p>The counter-trade deal currently being hammered out between<br>\nBulog and IPTN and Thailand reminds us of the counter-purchase<br>\npolicy Indonesia introduced in 1982. The policy was launched when<br>\nthe country's balance of payments was under severe pressure. It<br>\nrequired foreign suppliers to buy Indonesian commodities<br>\nequivalent in value to the goods they were selling to government<br>\nand state company-funded projects. The external balance in the<br>\nearly 1980s had reached such a critical state that the policy was<br>\nfollowed in 1983 by the shelving of billions of dollars worth of<br>\nprojects and the devaluation of the rupiah. All these measures<br>\nwere designed to curb import growth and, at the same time, boost<br>\nexports.<\/p>\n<p>The counter-purchase policy was administered by the counter-<br>\npurchase section at the export directorate of the trade ministry<br>\nwhich regularly announced the export commodities available for<br>\npurchase by foreign bidders of government projects. Obviously,<br>\nthe policy angered foreign companies because most foreign bidders<br>\nfor government contracts had no experience in selling items such<br>\nas rubber, coffee, or plywood. No wonder the policy failed to<br>\nincrease exports much. Since the late 1980s we have heard<br>\nvirtually no more of counter-trade transactions.<\/p>\n<p>Counter-trade takes several forms: Pure counter-trades,<br>\ncounter-purchases, offsets, barters, switch-trading and buy-<br>\nbacks. But all these transactions are very complex processes<br>\nbecause they require arduous negotiations and involve more than<br>\ntwo parties. Therefore such a deal is generally struck as a last<br>\nresort. That is why, for example, we would not be able, even if<br>\nwe tried very hard, to trade in our CN-235 planes for soybean<br>\nfrom the United States of which we need more than 500,000 tons<br>\nevery year. Only countries extremely short of foreign exchange<br>\nwill contemplate such trades. In the 1980s, for example, counter-<br>\ntrades were made mostly by countries in eastern Europe.<\/p>\n<p>Counter-trade deal also requires sellers to offer generous<br>\nprice discounts to offset the additional costs of transactions.<br>\nhigh insurance premiums, brokerage fees etc. In view of its<br>\ncomplexity and high transaction costs, a counter-trade deal very<br>\nrarely generates repeat orders.<\/p>\n<p>Most manufacturers avoid selling their products through<br>\ncounter-trade not only because of the complexity and the costly,<br>\ntime-consuming negotiations involved but also due to the<br>\nunfavorable impression made about the merchandise involved. Goods<br>\nsold under such a barter-like deal are tainted with the stigma of<br>\nbeing unable to compete in the open market.<\/p>\n<p>Having pointed out the disadvantages of counter-trades, we<br>\nwouldn't want to suggest that the counter-trade deal which will<br>\ninvolve Indonesia's purchase of 110,000 tons of glutinous rice<br>\nfrom Thailand in return for the sales of two CN-235 planes is<br>\nentirely negative. But we do feel that the transaction will carry<br>\nadditional costs.<\/p>\n<p>The deal will force Bulog to order a huge amount of glutinous<br>\nrice -- equivalent to more than 18 months of consumption. It is<br>\nimportant to note that it is not glutinous rice, but ordinary<br>\nrice, that is the national staple and heavily weighs in the<br>\nconsumer price index. Glutinous rice is used mainly for cakes.<br>\nThough the delivery of the glutinous rice can be scheduled<br>\naccording to need, Bulog will eventually have to swallow all of<br>\nthe imported sticky rice. It doesn't have the option, for<br>\nexample, to replace the glutinous rice with ordinary rice in case<br>\nof poor harvests, for example.<\/p>\n<p>Yet while Bulog gets its hands sticky with glutinous rice of<br>\ndoubtful use, the state IPTN aerospace company is making the<br>\nsales it is desperate for. It is a pity that IPTN has failed to<br>\nlobby for export credit financing which is crucial for promoting<br>\nairplane sales. Hopefully, the two CN-235s will perform well<br>\nenough in Thailand to generate new orders; this time, hopefully<br>\nplaced as normal business transactions.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/sticky-business-1447899208",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}