{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1131827,
        "msgid": "states-sovereignty-over-aceh-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-09-07 00:00:00",
        "title": "State's sovereignty over Aceh",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "State's sovereignty over Aceh Aleksius Jemadu, Bandung Since the establishment of the Westphalian state system in 1648, the notion of state sovereignty has been a contentious issue. The question of who has sovereignty over which territories, and how much of it can be accepted by the concerned subjects, continues to create controversies and even bloodshed.",
        "content": "<p>State&apos;s sovereignty over Aceh<\/p>\n<p>Aleksius Jemadu, Bandung<\/p>\n<p>Since the establishment of the Westphalian state system in<br>\n1648, the notion of state sovereignty has been a contentious<br>\nissue. The question of who has sovereignty over which<br>\nterritories, and how much of it can be accepted by the concerned<br>\nsubjects, continues to create controversies and even bloodshed.<\/p>\n<p>The progress of democratization and globalization, which gives<br>\nhigh priority to individual rights through free elections and the<br>\nprimacy of human security confronts us with an intriguing<br>\nquestion. Does it still make sense to hold a view that the state<br>\nshould have an absolute sovereignty over its subjects when in<br>\nfact globalization has tremendously reduced its real power? Do we<br>\nneed to develop the concept of reasonable sovereignty as the<br>\nstate continues to be forced to compromise its sovereignty with<br>\nglobal political and economic forces?<\/p>\n<p>The main objective of the Helsinki peace agreement signed by<br>\nthe Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on<br>\nAug. 15, 2005, was to settle permanently the traditional issue of<br>\nsovereignty in terms that are acceptable to both sides.<br>\nNotwithstanding the good intentions of both sides, the full<br>\nimplementation of the agreement can never be easy as it<br>\ndoes not take place in a vacuum.<\/p>\n<p>We need to take into account the existing configuration of<br>\npolitical and economic interests both within the Indonesian<br>\ngovernment and GAM.<\/p>\n<p>On the Indonesian side, there are at least three different<br>\npolitical groups with their respective perception about the<br>\ncontent of the peace deal.<\/p>\n<p>The first political group is the government, which<br>\nenthusiastically convinces the public that the peace deal should<br>\nbe seen as a success in putting an end to three decades of human<br>\ntragedy.<\/p>\n<p>Both President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President<br>\nJusuf Kalla do not deny that some important concessions have been<br>\ngenerously given to GAM. For instance, GAM may transform itself<br>\ninto a local political party and together with other political<br>\nparties contest for power in a local election under the universal<br>\nprinciples of democratic rules.<\/p>\n<p>The second political group consists of a coalition between the<br>\nnationalists and the conservative military figures. Former<br>\npresident Megawati Soekarnoputri is the prominent leader of this<br>\ngroup. Megawati and other nationalists cannot accept the fact<br>\nthat the peace deal has introduced some elements of the federal<br>\nstate in the relations between Jakarta and Aceh. Megawati seems<br>\nto stick to the strict sense of the unitary state, which requires<br>\na total submission of all the regions under the authority of the<br>\ncentral government.<\/p>\n<p>The third political group is the silent public. It can be said<br>\nthat the majority of Indonesian people are willing to accept the<br>\ncompromise between the Indonesian government and GAM as long as<br>\nthe resolving of the Aceh conflict does not lead to the<br>\ninstability of the nation.<\/p>\n<p>It follows that as far as the Indonesian side is concerned the<br>\nfuture success of the peace accord will very much depend on how<br>\nthe nationalists and the conservative military leaders are going<br>\nto use their political influence so that their aspirations might<br>\nbe accommodated in the implementation of the agreement.<\/p>\n<p>It should be noted that the implementation of the agreement is<br>\nstill in its early stage. It remains to be seen how such an<br>\nimplementation will survive the tests stemming from the<br>\nunfaithfulness of both sides. The two parties need a recurrent<br>\nshared experience of cooperative behavior in order to build<br>\nmutual trust.<\/p>\n<p>The implementation of point 1.1.1 of the agreement is of<br>\nparticular importance if we want to see how the nationalists in<br>\nthe legislature will push their agenda into the formulation of<br>\nthe new law on the governing of Aceh. According to the peace<br>\nagreement the law will have to be promulgated and enter into<br>\nforce no later than March 2006.<\/p>\n<p>If the nationalists in the legislature continue to force the<br>\nnotion of central government&apos;s absolute sovereignty over Aceh,<br>\nthen the peace agreement will be in jeopardy. For the sake of<br>\npeace and the well-being of the Acehnese and learning from the<br>\nnegative impact of the notion of absolute sovereignty in the<br>\npast, let us hope that the lawmakers are realistic enough to put<br>\nhuman worth above the de facto predatory notion of the state&apos;s<br>\nsovereignty.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is head of the department of international<br>\nrelations, Parahyangan University, Bandung. He can be reached at<br>\naleks@home.unpar.ac.id.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/states-sovereignty-over-aceh-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}