Stagnancy looms over political reform process<\/p>\n
The government seems to have lost its momentum in introducing
\npolicies for political reform, including efforts to hold a
\ngeneral election in the near future. Arief Budiman, an Indonesian
\nprofessor at the University of Melbourne's Department of Language
\nStudies, looks into reasons for the slow progress.<\/p>\n
Question: Why has political reform been so slow to develop?<\/p>\n
Arief: Various factors have come into play, including efforts
\nfrom the counter-reform camp to obscure the real meaning of
\nreform sought by university students and other proreform
\nactivists. Proreform leaders have not been coordinating their
\nefforts and there has been an absence of priorities in the reform
\nagenda, causing a loss of focus in the reform process.<\/p>\n
Some government officials are apparently trying to obscure the
\nmeaning of \"total reform\" proposed by university students (who
\ntoppled Soeharto on May 21). The students actually wanted both
\nSoeharto and then vice president B.J. Habibie to step down as
\nwell as other officials involved in corrupt, collusive and
\nnepotistic practices. They wanted new leaders with high
\ncredibility.<\/p>\n
The current government, which is indeed against political
\nreform, has responded by introducing \"constitutional reform\",
\nmeaning that Soeharto must be replaced by his vice president and
\nthat any political changes must be made through the People's
\nConsultative Assembly (MPR) and be based on existing regulations
\n-- though the reform of these regulations were a main target of
\nthe students. This means the government is actually resisting the
\nreform process in the name of reform. This government stance has
\nreceived support since it frequently argues that unconstitutional
\nreform would merely cause chaos.<\/p>\n
A group of reformists has introduced a \"peaceful reform\"
\nconcept, in which reform should be carried out peacefully and
\norderly but not necessarily constitutionally.<\/p>\n
Proreform leaders seem to be too busy with their own interests
\nat present to think of consolidating with other reform-minded
\ngroups. They have not unified to take a common stance on reform.<\/p>\n
This has caused the reform process to come to a standstill.
\nReform activists are crying out reform proposals, while the
\nHabibie government doles out promises to satisfy a complaining
\npublic and the Armed Forces is keeping silent without proposing
\nanything. As a result, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has
\nbeen doubting whether it should disburse its next tranche of aid
\nto help Indonesia's ailing economy.<\/p>\n
Q: What may come as a result of the lack of progress?<\/p>\n
A: Since the country is facing a leadership crisis, the economy
\nwill continue to deteriorate. I suggest a coalition be formed to
\nlead the nation. One possible coalition could be between ABRI and
\nHabibie, while another could be between ABRI and proreform
\nleaders.<\/p>\n
ABRI itself is now the only strong element of Indonesian
\nsociety but it would not be able to lead the country alone since
\nit has yet to forward a vision for reform.<\/p>\n
If Habibie succeeds in obtaining the next tranche of IMF aid,
\nhe will have a good chance to form a coalition with ABRI. But
\nsuch a coalition would find it difficult to attract investment,
\nparticularly from Chinese-Indonesians because Habibie would most
\nlikely depend on the Association of Indonesian Moslem
\nIntellectuals (ICMI) as his power base. ICMI is known to be
\nsectarian, and has not been sympathetic to the ethnic Chinese or
\nto Christians.<\/p>\n
A coalition between the military and reformist figures,
\nincluding economists like Emil Salim and Kwik Kian Gie, as well
\nas the popular Moslem leaders of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul
\nUlama, would be more promising to overcome the country's
\nproblems.<\/p>\n
Q: Then, what is the fate of the country's reform programs?<\/p>\n
A: The Habibie government, which is now under pressure, might
\ncarry them out. The problem for Habibie is that because he is not
\npopular, he might be edged out as soon as the political system
\nbecomes more democratized.<\/p>\n
Proreform students actually have a vision that the reform
\nprocess could be accelerated if their leaders unite and
\ncoordinate a show of force, demanding Habibie step down and
\nassign a presidium, comprising military personnel, economists and
\ngrassroots leaders, to coordinate the reform programs.<\/p>\n
Q: Will Indonesians become polarized from the establishment of
\nnew political parties?<\/p>\n
A: They will most likely divide into groups based on religion,
\nnationalism and the interests of the middle class and lower-
\nincome groups.<\/p>\n
Indonesians have been living under an oppressive government
\nfor more than 30 years. They will now have to learn how to live
\nin a democracy. We should go ahead and allow a lot of new parties
\nto emerge. Some will survive and others will not through fair
\npolitical competition and they will learn to settle disputes
\nthrough dialog. So, a capability to manage conflict will be very
\nimportant for our new leaders.<\/p>\n
My concern, however, is whether the new parties established by
\nproreform leaders will be able to compete with Golkar, which is
\nno longer popular but is still a strong political machine.<\/p>\n
Q: What kind of government do you expect will lead the country
\nafter the reform process?<\/p>\n
A: If the economy improves, the new government will be more
\ndemocratic than the New Order regime. The president will not act
\nlike a king who is not to be criticized like when Soeharto was in
\npower. The cabinet will represent all political forces in
\nsociety. If Kwik Kian Gie has a senior governmental position,
\nChinese-Indonesians now staying overseas would most likely return
\nand reinvest their money in Indonesia. (riz)<\/p>",
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