Squeeze out JI by denying political space<\/p>\n
Kumar Ramakrishna, Head of Studies
\nInstitute of Defense and Strategic Studies
\nThe Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore<\/p>\n
It is increasingly probable that the bombing of the American-
\nowned JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta last Tuesday was executed by
\nthe shadowy terrorist network, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI).<\/p>\n
The callous targeting of civilians, a car bomb made of the
\nsame chemicals, the apparent involvement of a suicide bomber, and
\nthe timing of the attack soon after the generalized warning by
\nal-Qaeda of more attacks on United States interests worldwide --
\na similar concatenation of factors occurred during the JI bombing
\nin Bali last October.<\/p>\n
In the last few months, until the Marriott blast, Jakarta
\nseemed to have been on a winning streak in its war against the
\nJI. Scores of terrorists had been detained and JI appeared
\nseriously weakened. What has gone wrong?<\/p>\n
Part of the answer is that JI, despite its setbacks, still
\nretains considerable functional space: The circulation of skilled
\nmilitants, money and materials throughout Southeast Asia remains.<\/p>\n
This is not surprising given the archipelagic configuration of
\nthe region. Policing effectively the long maritime borders has
\nproven very difficult.<\/p>\n
JI's functional space has been enhanced in other ways.
\nCorruption and uneven professional standards among immigration,
\npolice and military personnel throughout the region, incomplete
\ncomputerization and networking of immigration and police
\ndatabases, passport and document fraud, the availability of arms
\nand explosives from Southeast Asia, and the dearth of indigenous
\nanti-money-laundering expertise have combined to erode the
\nability of regional governments to harden their borders against
\nthe flow of militants, money and materials.<\/p>\n
But functional space only partially explains JI's apparent
\nresilience. More importantly, the network enjoys political space
\nwithin Southeast Asian Muslim communities as well.<\/p>\n
It would appear that JI elicits a degree of sympathy from
\nscattered Muslim communities, for example in southern Thailand,
\nnorthern Malaysia, Indonesia and the southern Philippines. Such
\nsympathy would explain why the network has been able to generate
\nfunds, arrange safe houses for militants, receive tip-offs on
\nimpending police raids, and secure recruits, including suicide
\nbombers.<\/p>\n
JI's political space complements and empowers its functional
\nspace. Factors that contribute to JI's political space include,
\namong others, a dearth of educational and employment
\nopportunities for young Muslim men in Indonesia, the southern
\nPhilippines and southern Thailand, political repression in the
\ncase of the Rohingyas in the Arakan region of Myanmar, and skewed
\nreligious-ideological indoctrination in certain Muslim circles in
\nIndonesia and in economically better-off Malaysia.<\/p>\n
It is important to remember two facts. First, only about 30
\npeople were involved in the Bali operation, out of an estimated
\n1,000 JI militants in the region. Second, the cost of the Bali
\nattack ran into tens of thousands of dollars rather than millions
\nof dollars.<\/p>\n
It is likely that similar statistics underlie the Jakarta
\nattack. The reality is that only a relative handful of militants
\nwith a moderate amount of funding is needed to inflict
\ncatastrophic damage.<\/p>\n
Given that JI requires relatively minimal functional space to
\ninflict a devastating terror strike, it is all the more critical
\nto destroy its ability to attract adherents in the form of
\nmilitants and sympathizers.<\/p>\n
In short, one should seek to shut down JI's political space,
\nand not just its functional space.<\/p>\n
Much has already been done to try to close down JI's
\nfunctional space: Intensified intelligence exchange and
\ncooperation, intensified maritime patrols, and international
\npolice support and training assistance to the Indonesian and
\nPhilippine police forces.<\/p>\n
These short-term efforts are very important but they are not
\nenough. JI's critical strength -- and potential critical
\nvulnerability -- remains in its ability to carve out political
\nspace.<\/p>\n
This must be closed down aggressively and systematically
\nthrough the implementation of medium- to long-term measures.
\nThese include adequately funded international programs to study
\nand help resolve political and socioeconomic grievances that
\nrender young Muslims in the region vulnerable to JI appeals,
\nregional specialist advice to the U.S. on strategies to nuance
\nits public diplomacy within Southeast Asia, and gentle diplomatic
\npressure on Washington to ensure that it modulates its foreign
\npolicy towards the wider Muslim world.<\/p>\n
In addition, progressive Southeast Asian Muslims must continue
\nto promote modern, dynamic interpretations of the faith that
\nrepudiate the binary "us-versus-them" world views favored by JI
\nand indeed certain regional arch-fundamentalist Muslim political
\nparties and mass organizations.<\/p>\n
A much more aggressive "psywar" campaign must be waged against
\nJI. The fact that scores of innocent Muslims as well as non-
\nMuslims have been victims of JI attacks, and the fact that JI
\ndetainees in Singapore and Malaysia were unceremoniously
\n"abandoned" by alleged JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir during his
\ntrial, can and should be exploited to expose the JI leaders for
\nwhat they are: Cold-blooded sociopaths who have arrogated to
\nthemselves the mantle of "defenders" of the Muslim faith.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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