Spratlys spat unfolds naivety<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles by our correspondent Harvey
\nStockwin on the mounting tension in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n
HONG KONG (JP): The Chinese annexation, on paper, in 1992, of
\nthe South China Sea should have been taken much more seriously
\nright from the start. China had ended its period of creeping
\nassertiveness on maps. It was entirely to be expected that
\nChina's physical aggression -- furtively taking on land what had
\nalready been taken on paper -- would now be added to the
\ncartographic aggression. Otherwise, why would the Chinese have
\nbothered to pass the law? Too few Southeast Asians asked
\nthemselves this basic question.<\/p>\n
It is only now that the phrase \"creeping assertiveness\" is
\nentering into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN)
\nvocabulary, when the Chinese have already moved on from a
\npassive, to a more active stance.<\/p>\n
There were -- and are -- other reasons for concern. First,
\nthere are the rumors -- disputed by some experts -- that huge oil
\nand gas deposits lie under the Spratlys. So far the only huge
\nfinds have been found under Indonesia's Natunas -- but that only
\nencourages the hopes of the Spratly claimants. China has not had
\nany significant finds as a result of offshore exploration near
\nits southern coast. As it moves towards becoming a heavy
\nimporter of oil and gas, it is understandable that it looks
\nfurther afield.<\/p>\n
Second, four years before the 1992 law, in 1988, the Chinese
\nhad already shown their seriousness by fighting with Vietnam to
\nestablish their own foothold in the Spratly archipelago.<\/p>\n
Third, Beijing's maps had included the Nansha islands (the
\nChinese name for the Spratlys) ever since the People's Republic
\nof China was formed. At one stage, over 20 years ago, China's
\nSouth China Sea \"border\" even bent eastwards to also include the
\nPhilippines' Sulu Islands, largely, it is said, because the
\nSultan of Sulu, in the dim and distant past, had paid tribute to
\nthe Chinese Emperor.<\/p>\n
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the Chinese have never
\ndisguised the fact that they claim sovereignty over the whole of
\nthe South China Sea, not just the Spratlys, not just the
\nParacels. Overemphasis on the Spratly dispute misses this crucial
\npoint. The Middle Kingdom is claiming a whole ocean. The 1992 law
\nannexing the South China Sea was passed without any reference to
\nthe littoral states - and without any sign of Chinese concern for
\nSoutheast Asian sensitivities. It was also passed, legal experts
\nsay, without any reference to the Law of the Sea.<\/p>\n
So, while the 1992 law may have been born out of political
\nexpediency arising from communist weakness in the wake of the
\nBeijing Massacre, it nonetheless expressed an aim with which most
\nChinese would naturally agree -- the \"restoration\" of China's
\ndominance in the region, after two centuries of weakness.<\/p>\n
Faced with the law, and the Chinese assertiveness which lay
\nbehind it, the ASEAN countries fell back on words and naive hope.
\nThe ASEAN \"Declaration on the South China Sea\", issued by the
\nASEAN Foreign Ministers on July 22, 1992 in Manila, stressed \"the
\nnecessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues
\npertaining to the South China sea by peaceful means, without
\nresort to force\".<\/p>\n
The Declaration stressed principles, and urged tolerance and
\nrestraint - the very qualities which China had ignored in passing
\nits law.<\/p>\n
Crucially, the ASEAN Declaration had no teeth. The ASEAN
\ncountries have continued to act over the intervening three years
\nmore out of a concern not to offend Beijing, rather than with a
\ndetermination to defend their interests - which the Chinese
\ncommunists are quite willing to attack, verbally and physically.<\/p>\n
ASEAN has behaved according to the tenets of international
\ndiplomacy. China, as usual, has conducted itself according to the
\ncanons of power politics.<\/p>\n
ASEAN has argued for a collective negotiation and agreement on
\nhow borders should be drawn in the South China Sea. China is not
\nyet willing to give nations which it still regards as tributary
\nstates the collective right to stand on an equal footing with the
\nMiddle Kingdom.<\/p>\n
So Beijing insists that the South China Sea is a purely
\nbilateral matter. Translation: each ASEAN nation must discuss the
\nissue of Chinese sovereignty separately with Beijing.<\/p>\n
Similarly, when Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen recently
\ntried to pour oil on the troubled waters, he talked airily of
\njoint management of the South China Sea. He did not explain that
\nthis, almost certainly, means joint management under Chinese
\nsovereignty.<\/p>\n
Perhaps the Mischief Reef Incident will have helped remove the
\nblinkers from ASEAN eyes. The fairly forceful exchange between
\nASEAN officials and the Chinese in Hangzhou recently gives
\ngrounds for hoping that this is so. There it was firmly
\nreasserted that the South China Sea dispute must be settled
\ncollectively not bilaterally, as China still insists. Precisely
\nhow far ASEAN went in defining its opposition to creeping
\naggression is not yet clear.<\/p>\n
ASEAN must persist with this more assertive line - and not be
\nafraid to cool ASEAN-China relations if Beijing still remains
\nintransigent.<\/p>\n
True to the calculations of power politics the Chinese sought
\nto probe the Philippines, where ASEAN looked to be at its
\nweakest, only to discover that the relatively weak also have
\ntheir pride.<\/p>\n
President Fidel Ramos has drawn a line in the shallow South
\nChina Sea waters while leaving Beijing, for now, still in
\npossession of its buildings on Mischief Reef.<\/p>\n
China has also probed to see if the world's only superpower
\ncares any longer about its longtime Philippine ally. President
\nBill Clinton has not drawn any lines in the sea but U.S. concern
\nis manifest, as is that of New Delhi and Tokyo.<\/p>\n
An agreed border demarcation throughout the South China Sea
\nbetween all claimants of sovereignty, is the only possible
\nsolution. Since it is not in sight, the South China Sea remains a
\nsea of contention.<\/p>\n
At the heart of the threatening conflict lies an even more
\ncrucial and arduous task: how to get China, the looming giant
\nwith so many mythical memories, to fit into the real modern world
\nof equal sovereign states.<\/p>",
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