Spratly Islands<\/p>\n
If the reported agreement between China and the Philippines
\nfor the "common exploration and development" of the disputed
\nSpratly Islands solidifies, it could have positive implications
\nfor China's relations with the rest of Asia.<\/p>\n
In fact, the agreement's significance lies more in the example
\nit might set -- especially for Vietnam, China's main rival over
\nthe mineral-rich string of atolls and islands commanding vital
\nshipping lines -- than in its immediate physical application.<\/p>\n
This is not to minimize the threat that may have been averted.
\nBut the Philippines was never a major player.<\/p>\n
Though they agreed last October to shun the use of force in
\nborder disputes on land and at sea -- in keeping with Beijing's
\ncurrent policy of freezing contentious issues while improving
\nbilateral ties -- China and Vietnam have been pressing competing
\nclaims recently in a manner that recalls the 1988 clash.<\/p>\n
Neither country has paid much heed to exhortations to show
\nrestraint and seek a peaceful settlement, as recommended by the
\n1992 Manila Declaration, or to ASEAN's proposals for joint
\ndevelopment of the disputed islands.<\/p>\n
The ball is now in ASEAN's court. This is an opportunity to
\nremove lingering reservations by engaging China more firmly in
\nthe Asia-Pacific region's economic and strategic planning. Deft
\ndiplomacy nearer to home may yet produce a time-bound formula for
\nthe exploration and development of the islands, at the same time
\nproviding for a reduction in forces leading to eventual
\ndemilitarization.<\/p>\n
While Asia does not need a war over the Spratlys, the world
\nmay one day need the oil and gas known to lie beneath them.<\/p>\n
-- The Straits Times, Singapore<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/spratly-islands-1447899208", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }