S'pore's basic political system unchanged<\/p>\n
Today is Singapore's national day. Political scientist Bilveer
\nSingh reflects on both the achievements and the shortcomings of
\nthe tiny island republic which became an autonomous Commonwealth
\nstate in 1959.<\/p>\n
SINGAPORE (JP): Singapore's success in providing a material
\nbase for society is unquestionable. It has succeeded in
\ntransforming an underdeveloped island into a model state as far
\nas housing, transportation, economic development, medical care
\nand internal security is concerned.<\/p>\n
Singapore is one of the few models of achievement where,
\nthrough its leadership's foresight and single-mindedness, a
\nresource barren state was able to mobilize its meager resources
\nand mix them with the right policies to achieve stability and
\ndevelopment, with all its citizens given a direct stake in the
\nmaintenance of the system.<\/p>\n
With much justice, the system has been described as a golden
\ngoose which lays golden eggs.<\/p>\n
While no one would challenge the republic on its economic
\nfundamentals, its political fundamentals is another question
\naltogether. As Singapore prepares to face the post-Cold War era
\nand the coming century, will the fundamentals pass the test of
\nchanging times?<\/p>\n
If there is any single hardcore political realist state in the
\nworld, it must be Singapore. Political realism dominates the
\nworld view of the republic affecting its state craft and soul
\ncraft.<\/p>\n
This political philosophy has driven Singapore to be primarily
\nconcerned with security and the competition for power. Politics
\nis seen as nothing more than the struggle for power. Survival
\noriented behavior is the bottom line and modus operandi of a
\nstate pursuing this political philosophy.<\/p>\n
Morality, legalism and ideologies are seen as luxuries that
\ncan be pursued only if they do not endanger the viability and
\nvital interests of the state or the government that speaks for
\nthe state.<\/p>\n
Despite much progress since 1965, the political leadership
\ncontinues to be haunted by the problem of security and survival.
\nAll other concerns and issues are subordinated to this single
\noverriding goal. In a system of this nature, the fundamentals
\ncannot change and are unlikely to change as long as political
\nrealism remains the driving force.<\/p>\n
While the realities of geography, demography, economy,
\nstrategic environment and the leadership's experience have
\nconditioned a particular sense of vulnerability and an obsession
\nwith survival, there appears to be no signs that they will relent
\nor that there will be any change in the state's goal as these
\nwould be interpreted as distractions or, worse, as undermining
\nthe basic goal of survival.<\/p>\n
The twin goals that have guided Singapore have been the quest
\nfor political stability and the strength to achieve internal and
\nexternal security as well as economic prosperity to provide for
\nthe basic needs of society thereby strengthening its internal
\nresilience; which is also an important foundation for its
\nexternal security.<\/p>\n
There is much ado about nothing when people argue that
\nSingapore has seen changes in its political goals. This has been
\nspurred by political reforms undertaken since 1984 when the
\nsecond generation of the People Action Party's leaders became
\nnumerically dominant in cabinet.<\/p>\n
This saw a number of seemingly liberal and people oriented
\npolicies. Examples of these are the attempt to become more
\nconsultative through the television broadcasts of parliamentary
\nproceedings, the National Agenda exercise, greater resort to
\nSelect Committee Hearings, the establishment of the PAP Youth and
\nWomen wings, the establishment of town councils, the
\nestablishment of the Government Parliamentary Committees, the
\ninauguration of the Feedback Unit, the reversal of unpopular
\npolicies as well as attempts to moderate the growth of a powerful
\nbureaucracy.<\/p>\n
However, these measures were more apparent than real. This was
\nbecause the leadership has remained convinced that what it is
\ndoing is right, as proven by its track record since 1959 as well
\nas the fact that it thought long term while most of the
\npopulace's grievances tended to be immediate and short term in
\nnature.<\/p>\n
Old and new PAP leaders continue to believe that the focus
\nshould remains on building economic prosperity as only real
\nwealth can buy real strength. A country that is prosperous and
\nthat uses its wealth prudently and wisely, unlike the Kuwaitis,
\nwill be able to overcome the challenges to its survival.<\/p>\n
Thus, the key driving force of the country's policies is
\ndirected towards generating economic growth. Accumulating
\nfinancial surpluses is pursued with such a vengeance because the
\npolitical leadership is convinced that this is its only real
\nasset.<\/p>\n
While traditionally it was believed that Singapore's
\ngeographical location at an international crossroads, its
\ndomestic stability and multiracial characteristic were
\nstrengths, today it is argued that such features are not the
\nmonopoly of Singapore because the Republic's neighbors also
\npossess such advantages.<\/p>\n
Rather, the political leadership believes that with financial
\nsurpluses and safety nets, the republic will be able to guarantee
\nits strength, security and survival. This will allow it to
\nweather any storms and to purchase whatever is needed to ensure
\nits survival.<\/p>\n
Thus, the political system is structured to serve the vital
\ngoal of wealth and surplus generation. The political structures
\nand values obtained in the republic at any one time must ensure
\nthat a fertile political climate exists that guarantees wealth
\ncreation.<\/p>\n
All other concerns and policies are secondary and of lesser
\nconsequence than the overriding goal of enriching the state's
\ncoffers to strengthen the state politically and militarily.<\/p>\n
If there are policies which appear to strengthen other
\ndimensions of society other than political, military and economic
\nstrength, they are no more than efforts to contain growing
\ndissent and opposition to structures that were established in the
\n1950s and 1960s as Singapore has remained, without doubt, one of
\nthe most tightly organized and controlled societies in the world.<\/p>\n
There appears to be much resistance to open up the political
\nsystem to the masses with the leadership preferring to practice
\ncentralism even though this is ostensibly undertaken in the name
\nof democracy. Hence, the tight control over the mass media,
\npolitical organizations as well as its viciousness towards any
\nform of political challenge from any sector of society.<\/p>\n
However, economically it is more akin to the capitalist system
\nin terms of wealth creation even though the guiding hand of the
\nstate is everywhere in the economic system.<\/p>\n
In this context, even if there are policies exhibiting greater
\nliberalism and consultativeness, they always, without exception,
\nemanate from the top: otherwise they would not have been
\nimplemented in the first place.<\/p>\n
In Singapore, the political center controls everything. All
\npolitical reforms have come from the top. All these measures are
\npart of an exercise to serve the existing political system so as
\nto create a political environment for the generation of wealth
\nin a new setting.<\/p>\n
If there are reforms and changes they must, as a rule, be
\ncontrolled by the center. This is a classic top-down system and
\nnothing much can be expected to change as long as this political
\nsystem remains as strong as it is.<\/p>\n
Such a system is in place because Singapore has not been able
\nto overcome its insecurity dilemma. The vulnerability gap remains
\nas wide as ever and there seems to be no confidence that this
\nwill ever be narrowed.<\/p>\n
If anything, the situation appears to be getting worse as the
\nneighbors get their political, economic and military acts
\ntogether. In view of this realization, the pervading sense of
\ninsecurity and vulnerability of a largely Chinese state in a
\nMalay Sea have dominated and driven all political decisions and
\nactions, and a system such as this is unlikely to opt for new
\npolitical goals when the basic issue of security has not been
\novercome.<\/p>\n
Thus, while wealth creation, on the one hand, and control, on
\nthe other, are seen as the keys to internal and external
\nsecurities, the political goals of the republic do not appear to
\nhave changed. Due to the security and survival problems, the
\ncountry is still running the same lap, and not much can be
\nexpected as far as political development is concerned.<\/p>\n
The unchanged political fundamentals will ensure that other
\npolitical goals will also remain unchanged.<\/p>\n
The writer is a senior lecturer in political science at the
\nUniversity of Singapore.<\/p>\n
Window 1: The key driving force of Singapore's policies is directed
\ntowards generating economic growth.<\/p>\n
Window 2: Due to the security and survival problems, Singapore is still
\nrunning the same lap, and not much can be expected as far as
\npolitical development is concerned.<\/p>",
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