{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1402042,
        "msgid": "spain-could-become-a-model-for-indonesia-1447893297",
        "date": "1998-08-12 00:00:00",
        "title": "Spain could become a model for Indonesia",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Spain could become a model for Indonesia By Percival Manglano JAKARTA (JP): As Indonesian politics lurch into uncharted territory, it may seem advisable for parallels to be sought that may shed light on things to come. Looking around for countries with historical circumstances parallel to those of Indonesia now, one obvious example comes to mind: Thailand. Just like Indonesia's, Thailand's military has traditionally played a central role in its politics.",
        "content": "<p>Spain could become a model for Indonesia<\/p>\n<p>By Percival Manglano<\/p>\n<p>JAKARTA (JP): As Indonesian politics lurch into uncharted<br>\nterritory, it may seem advisable for parallels to be sought that<br>\nmay shed light on things to come.<\/p>\n<p>Looking around for countries with historical circumstances<br>\nparallel to those of Indonesia now, one obvious example comes to<br>\nmind: Thailand. Just like Indonesia&apos;s, Thailand&apos;s military has<br>\ntraditionally played a central role in its politics.<\/p>\n<p>Thailand, especially those events that occurred in 1973 and<br>\n1992, has found itself in situations similar to that Indonesia is<br>\ngoing through now.<\/p>\n<p>In 1973 student demonstrations toppled a military government.<br>\nSubsequently, a democratic regime was installed but failed to<br>\nimplement order and was itself brought down by a military coup<br>\nthree years later.<\/p>\n<p>In 1992, massive street demonstrations were staged against<br>\nGen. Suchinda&apos;s decision to stay on as prime minister despite his<br>\npromises to the contrary. The ensuing massacre of demonstrators<br>\nby the army resulted in the resignation of Suchinda and a common<br>\nwisdom that the army was dealt a terrible blow that might keep it<br>\naway from politics for good.<\/p>\n<p>This parallel may seem adequate if only because of Thailand&apos;s<br>\nproximity to Indonesia. Yet, geographic proximity is not<br>\nnecessarily directly correlated to general relevance.<\/p>\n<p>In fact, Spain is a geographically distant country whose<br>\nrecent experience of transition from an authoritarian to a<br>\ndemocratic regime is directly relevant to Indonesia&apos;s present<br>\nsituation.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia may be becoming a democratic country and, in doing<br>\nso, it should learn from the experiences of other countries. It<br>\ncould do worse than to look at the Spanish transition example.<\/p>\n<p>In November 1975, Spain&apos;s long-standing dictator, Gen. Franco,<br>\ndied. His appointed successor was Prince Juan Carlos. Spain&apos;s<br>\nlack of a democratic tradition and the weakness of Juan Carlos&apos;<br>\npublic support did not bode well for the future. Indeed, Juan<br>\nCarlos was commonly nicknamed El Breve (the Short-Lived).<\/p>\n<p>And yet, more than 20 years later, King Juan Carlos is the<br>\npopular head of state of a flourishing democracy that no one in<br>\nhis right mind would dream of putting into question. Could<br>\nsomething similar happen in Indonesia?<\/p>\n<p>The long list of parallels between Soeharto&apos;s Indonesia and<br>\nFranco&apos;s Spain are surprising.<\/p>\n<p>Both men were conservative ex-generals; both came to power<br>\nfollowing traumatic bloody events involving communist and<br>\nmilitary forces (the massacres of 1965 and 1966 in Indonesia, the<br>\n1936 through 1939 Spanish Civil War); both remained in power for<br>\nmore than 30 years (31 in Soeharto&apos;s case, 36 for Franco; both<br>\nwere extremely reluctant to appoint a successor; (Franco ignored<br>\nhis ministers&apos; appeals for an appointment until 1969, when, at<br>\nage 77, he decided in favor of Prince Juan Carlos); both<br>\nappointed economic technocrats as ministers who were successful<br>\nin achieving extraordinary rates of economic growth for their<br>\ncountries.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia now and Spain at the time of Franco&apos;s death in 1975<br>\nalso shared two important political characteristics. The first is<br>\ntheir unsuccessful experiments with democracy. President<br>\nSukarno&apos;s attempts at democracy building were short-lived and<br>\ngave way in 1956 to the period of &quot;Guided Democracy&quot;.<\/p>\n<p>In Spain, the republic, created in 1931, lasted only five<br>\nyears until a number of generals, including Franco, launched a<br>\ncoup against the republican government.<\/p>\n<p>The second characteristic is a lack of national cohesiveness:<br>\nthe hostility provoked in certain regions by Java&apos;s dominance<br>\nwithin Indonesia is paralleled by (mainly) Catalan and Basque<br>\nnationalist backlashes against Castillian predominance in Spain.<\/p>\n<p>Despite these parallels, important differences do exist<br>\nbetween the two political systems.<\/p>\n<p>Three differences stand out. The first is the role of the<br>\nArmed Forces. Franco, after having used the army to rise to<br>\npower, gradually diminished its political power during his rule.<br>\nThis clearly cannot be said about Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>The second is the existence in Spain of an institutional<br>\nalternative to Franco&apos;s rule in the form of the monarchy. Spain<br>\nbenefited from the existence of a historical political<br>\ninstitution that represented an alternative to the Franco regime.<br>\nAgain, Indonesia has no such alternative.<\/p>\n<p>The third concerns the economic situation of the two<br>\ncountries. Although the effects of the first oil crisis affected<br>\nSpain in 1975, its growth rate and general economic development<br>\nremained well above Indonesia&apos;s miserable present situation.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesian developments over the past two months have produced<br>\na situation not dissimilar to those in Spain following Franco&apos;s<br>\ndeath. In both cases, the past rulers&apos; appointed successors have<br>\nbeen installed in power. Prospects for democracy for both<br>\ncountries seemed and seem extremely dim, particularly considering<br>\nthe precariousness regarding the heads of state. Uncertainty<br>\nruled.<\/p>\n<p>We can only speculate on what will happen in Indonesia in the<br>\nfuture. But we do know what happened in Spain. Aware of the<br>\nweakness of his position, particularly given that he had been<br>\nappointed by the previous ruler, King Juan Carlos decided to<br>\nappeal to the support of the largest political group in Spain,<br>\nthe Spanish people. By giving the people the chance to act as an<br>\nagent of change, he laid the foundations for a bloodless<br>\ntransition to democracy and, at the same time, ensured the<br>\nsurvival of the institution at the source of his legitimacy, the<br>\nmonarchy.<\/p>\n<p>Perhaps President B.J. Habibie is not a democrat at heart, but<br>\nthis should not prevent him from ensuring a rapid transition to<br>\ndemocracy in Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>If he cares about peace in Indonesia, as the Spanish example<br>\nshows, the best option available is for the Indonesian people to<br>\nbe involved in the process of political change. This will happen<br>\nby holding elections as quickly as they can be safely organized.<\/p>\n<p>Nothing guaranteed that the Spanish transition would be<br>\npeaceful. Precedents were discouraging but it was ultimately<br>\nsuccessful.<\/p>\n<p>The same can happen in Indonesia. By ensuring such a legacy,<br>\nPresident Habibie, like King Juan Carlos, would ensure for<br>\nhimself a prominent position in his country&apos;s history.<\/p>\n<p>Percival Manglano received his M.A. from the Paul H. Nitze<br>\nSchool of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins<br>\nUniversity.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/spain-could-become-a-model-for-indonesia-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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