Southeast Asian nations' nuclear treaty faces last hurdles<\/p>\n
By Agus Tarmidzi<\/p>\n
This is the first of two articles on the Southeast Asia Nucle
\nar Weapons Free Zone treaty.<\/p>\n
GENEVA (JP): Despite generally sharing the same customs,
\nnorms and traditional values, the countries in the Southeast Asia
\nregion have not been able to totally avoid strife. The region has
\nlong been known to host endemic conflicts. The bipolar structure
\nof global politics in the cold-war era, during which the super
\nstates tried actively to spread their respective spheres of
\ninfluence, aggravated the situation. Hence, the states belonging
\nto the region were forced to adapt to, if not align with, one or
\ntwo of the superpowers which exerted their political influence in
\nthe region.<\/p>\n
Only after the change of government in Indonesia in 1965 did
\nthe idea to create a region free from aggression, domination and
\nexternal interference slowly emerge, nurtured by the desire to
\ncreate a conducive climate for national and regional development and
\ncooperation. Fortunately Indonesian concerns over regional
\ninstability were equally shared by all countries in the region,
\nespecially by Malaysia with which Indonesia in the past had a long
\nand unnecessary conflict. With perseverance and determination and
\nafter many painstaking efforts, the leaders from Indonesia,
\nMalaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand decided, through
\nthe Bangkok Declaration, to establish the Association of Southeast
\nAsia Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.<\/p>\n
The political sensitivities and suspicions which shadowed
\nthe establishment of ASEAN prevented, however, the founding
\nfathers of the organization from identifying political coopera
\ntion as one of the fundamental goals to be achieved by the Asso
\nciation. Instead, they explicitly agreed to focus their coopera
\ntion on cultural and economic fields, which to date have cata
\npulted the region into the category of \"most rapidly developing
\nregion in the world\" in terms of economic progress, with an ap
\nproximately 8 percent growth rate per year.<\/p>\n
Through mutual understanding, intensive dialogs and full
\ncooperation, political sensitivities and suspicions gradually
\ndiminished and finally disappeared, boosting a sense of confi
\ndence among ASEAN members. In the 1970's, the bonds among the
\nASEAN members started to solidify. It was therefore understand
\nable, that during that period, the ASEAN countries took the risk
\nof getting involved in some political moves.<\/p>\n
The ASEAN countries then openly declared their intention to
\nestablish a zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), a
\nconcept which was endorsed by the ASEAN foreign ministers in
\nKuala Lumpur, on November 1971. They also agreed that the estab
\nlishment of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEA-
\nNWFZ) would be critical to materializing such a lofty objective.
\nIn conformity with the Kuala Lumpur political decision, which was
\na point of no return, the ASEAN countries have worked relentless
\nly to draft the a nuclear-free-zone treaty.<\/p>\n
Thus at multilateral forums, the ASEAN countries have
\nconsistently introduced the concept and jointly presented many
\nresolutions in the United Nations General Assembly, calling for
\nall UN members to consider and approve the establishment of such
\na zone in the region. It was not surprising to see that during
\nthe First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly
\ndevoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I) in 1978, the ASEAN countries
\njustifiably demanded the inclusion of a clear reference to these
\nregional efforts in the Final Document of this UNGA Special
\nSession.<\/p>\n
A crystal-clear reference was hence formulated and duly
\nreflected in Paragraph 64 (a) of the document. Since this time,
\nthe Final Document of SSOD-I has become a driving force behind
\nASEAN's goal of establishing the SEA-NWFZ. Paragraph 60 also
\nacknowledges that the establishment of such a zone on the basis
\nof arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region
\nconcerned constitutes an important disarmament move, and of
\ncourse, a non-proliferation measure.<\/p>\n
Likewise, similar attitudes have always been shown by the
\nASEAN countries in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
\n(NPT). As may be recalled, Article VII of the NPT also recognizes
\nthe right of any group of states to conclude treaties in order to
\nassure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
\nterritories. As a result, all final consensus documents of the
\nNPT Review Conference contained references to the SEA-NWFZ and
\nwere recognized as having significant potential contributions to
\nthe preservation and promotion of regional as well as interna
\ntional peace and security.<\/p>\n
Internal problems, however, posed formidable hurdles to the
\nspeedy conclusion of the SEA-NWFZ. Political maturity, which indeed
\nvaried from one country to another, made it difficult to move
\nahead. It took years for the governments of Singapore, Thailand
\nand the Philippines to accept that the conclusion of the treaty
\nwould constitute a significant contribution to the regional
\nstability, which in turn, would also facilitate the achievement
\nof the goals set out by the founding fathers of ASEAN.<\/p>\n
Again, after negotiating so painstakingly and avoiding
\nwestern-style multilateral negotiations -- which later was la
\nbeled by outsiders as the ASEAN-style quiet diplomacy -- the
\nexperts from ASEAN countries managed to conclude the draft treaty
\nand present it for signature by the heads of states or govern
\nments of the Southeast Asia countries at the Fifth ASEAN Summit
\nin Bangkok, on December 1995. Article 1 (a) of the treaty stipu
\nlates that the SEA-NWFZ will cover an area comprising the terri
\ntories of all states in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussa
\nlam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philip
\npines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The countries involved in
\nits formulation agreed to jointly sign and hence the SEA-NWFZ has
\nformally come into being. The ratification of the treaty by the
\nseven Southeast Asia countries will allow the treaty to enter
\ninto force.<\/p>\n
It is, however, to be noted that in order to render it
\neffective there is a need for all nuclear-weapons states, namely
\nthe U.S., UK, France, Russia and China to accede to the protocol.
\nTheir commitments to fully abide by the provisions of the proto
\ncol are required in order to render the treaty effectively capa
\nble of implementation.<\/p>\n
The long journey therefore has yet to finish and the full
\nimplementation of the SEA-NWFZ is still far away. The ASEAN
\ncountries will not stop until the SEA-NWFZ is really implemented
\nand adhered to by all nuclear-weapons states. For the ASEAN
\ncountries firmly believe that this will help contribute to the
\nachievement of a nuclear-weapons free world.<\/p>\n
Failure to materialize it would be an unforgivable mistake
\non the part of all countries, especially the nuclear-weapons
\nstates. The immense destructive power of these abhorrent weapons,
\nas the international community has witnessed in the cases of
\nHiroshima and Nagasaki, cannot be tolerated. The existence of
\nthese appalling weapons will continue to pose a serious threat to
\nall human beings and, indeed, to the whole world. Once implement
\ned, the SEA-NWFZ would prevent the Southeast Asia region from
\nfalling victim to these inhumane weapons.<\/p>\n
By signing the treaty, the states have tested its viability
\nin terms of securing the ratifications of the protocol by all
\nnuclear-weapons states to render the treaty operational. Hence,
\nthe countries in the region have entered the second phase of the
\nnegotiations, intensively consulting and negotiating with the
\nnuclear-weapons states over specific concerns expressed by them.
\nThese relate to the following issues:<\/p>\n
1. The area to be covered by the treaty is considered by the
\nnuclear-weapons states to be far too over-arching. For clarity's
\nsake, there is a need to quote Article 1 (a) which deals the area
\nof coverage. It stipulates: \"Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free
\nZone, hereinafter referred to as the \"zone\", means the area com
\nprising the territories of all states in Southeast Asia, namely,
\nBrunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
\nPhilippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and their respec
\ntive continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)\".
\nSub-paragraph (b) of Article 1 continues to state that: \"territo
\nry means the land territory, internal waters, territorial sea,
\narchipelagic waters, the seabed and sub-soil thereof and the
\nairspace above them\".<\/p>\n
2. The legal interpretations of the contents of Article 2 of
\nthe protocol are considered to jeopardize the right of the nucle
\nar-weapons states to use nuclear weapons. Again, for the sake of
\nclarity, there is a need to quote Article 2 of the Protocol. It
\nstipulates: \"Each state party undertakes not to use or threaten
\nto use nuclear weapons against any state party to the treaty. It
\nfurther undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
\nwithin the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone\" (negative
\nsecurity assurances).<\/p>\n
Window: Thus at multilateral forums, the ASEAN countries have
\nconsistently introduced the concept and jointly presented many
\nresolutions in the United Nations General Assembly.<\/p>",
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