Solving the absence of opposition<\/p>\n
By Paige Johnson<\/p>\n
WASHINGTON (JP): Since the formation of President Abdurrahman
\nWahid's National Unity Cabinet, many informed Indonesians have
\nlamented the absence of an organized opposition, considering this
\ndangerous for democracy's consolidation.<\/p>\n
The Cabinet seemingly leaves no parties of any size or the
\nmilitary outside of the government. Observers question whether
\ndemocracy can take hold without the institutionalization of
\nchecks on executive authority. Given the past weakness of
\nIndonesia's legislative and judicial institutions as well as the
\ncapacity of civil society to serve as a check on government, this
\nis a valid concern.<\/p>\n
While much hard thinking needs to go into the issue of the
\nbest means for consolidating democracy in Indonesia, this article
\nwill attempt to add to the debate by suggesting that party
\ninstitutionalization and growth in intra-party democracy will
\nlead to better representation of societal interests and
\neventually to the creation of an opposition by parties seeking to
\noffer not only \"opposition\" for the sake of opposition but
\nopposition with a view to creating an alternative government.<\/p>\n
Grand coalition governments such as Indonesia's National Unity
\nCabinet are relatively common after periods of prolonged
\nauthoritarian rule or other national \"trauma,\" such as war. The
\nfirst post-Communist governments in many Eastern European nations
\nwere national movements turned into governing parties.<\/p>\n
In short order, though, the unity of the early transition
\nperiod was broken. Absent from the overwhelming enemy of the
\nformer regime, the press of massive political and economic change
\nled parties to form and re-form, creating in many countries
\ncompetitive (though still volatile) party systems along the way.<\/p>\n
Given other nations' experiences in democratic transitions,
\nthen, the grand coalition in Indonesia is not an insurmountable
\nproblem for the consolidation of democracy.<\/p>\n
In fact, because of the magnitude of tasks Indonesia faces:
\novercoming the economic crisis, addressing separatist demands,
\nconfronting the authoritarian past and crafting a democratic
\nfuture, one might argue that a broadly inclusive government can
\nbe helpful in encouraging all parties to sign on to difficult
\nsolutions to difficult problems.<\/p>\n
This brings us to the nature of Indonesia's political parties
\nthemselves. Thus far, the evidence suggests that party decision-
\nmaking is tightly controlled at the center. Of course, to some
\ndegree, parties must develop strategies and tactics without
\nmaking these publicly known.<\/p>\n
But, a fine line appears. Are the strategies and tactics that
\nare being developed at odds with the interests of party activists
\nwho worked for the party during the campaign and the voters who
\nsupported the party on election day?<\/p>\n
Is the party collaborating in a collusive manner with other
\nparties in order for party elites to share in the perquisites of
\npower?<\/p>\n
Also problematic for the consolidation of democracy in
\nIndonesia is the personalistic nature of many of the parties.
\nTop vote winner Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI
\nPerjuangan) draws votes and tremendous loyalty because of party
\nchairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri.<\/p>\n
Similarly, the National Awakening Party (PKB), while in large
\npart based on the organizational strength of Nahdlatul Ulama,
\nrelies heavily on the personal pull of Abdurrahman Wahid.<\/p>\n
The tension between organization and personality in PKB showed
\nin the presidential election, as PKB was pulled from its
\norganizational commitment to support Megawati to the charismatic
\nnecessity of supporting Abdurrahman Wahid.<\/p>\n
As vehicles for the promotion of certain political figures,
\ncharismatic parties rarely outlast their founders. Those that do
\nhave staying power are the ones that begin to organize an
\ninstitutional basis for the continuation of the party beyond the
\noriginal meaning given to the party by the founders' parties that
\n\"are\" something (institutionally) or parties that \"stand\" for
\nsomething (programmatically).<\/p>\n
Institutionalization of the parties' creation of stable rules
\nand structures, rooting of the party in durable social groups,
\npresentation of ideologically consistent programs and the
\nfostering of intraparty democracy are the tasks at hand.<\/p>\n
Particularly important in Indonesia's case and in order to get
\naround the problem of a lack of opposition is the
\ninstitutionalization of democratic decision-making within the
\nparties.<\/p>\n
Writing in The Jakarta Post Nov. 10, PDI Perjuangan's Mochtar
\nBuchori suggested as much when he said that he hoped that PDI
\nPerjuangan in parliament could serve as a \"corrective force\" on
\nthe government. Dubious about \"party discipline,\" Mochtar wrote
\nthat disciplining party members for representing the wishes of
\nthe people smacked of the practices of the New Order.<\/p>\n
How party discipline will play out in the Indonesian context
\nis not yet certain, though it is not an enemy of democracy in and
\nof itself. It can be useful to make parties effective political
\nactors. The safeguard on party discipline is the internal
\nmechanism of decision-making within the parties and the degree to
\nwhich parties represent the interests of their members and
\nsupporters. It is from the grassroots that the party can hear
\nsociety's demands. If only it will listen.<\/p>\n
Importantly, parties have an incentive to listen. While there
\nis advantage to be gained from participating in the National
\nUnity Cabinet, there is declining utility over time for all
\nparties to be jointly responsible for governance. How can a party
\ndistinguish its participation from all the others? Who can the
\nelectorate hold responsible for successes and failures?<\/p>\n
In time, parties will need to distinguish themselves from
\nothers in order to attract support. Elites that are unconnected
\nfrom the Indonesian people may be able to continue to parcel out
\nshares in political power over the short-term. But, parties that
\nlisten, truly listen, to the ground will more accurately
\nrepresent the interests of members and supporters.<\/p>\n
Over the longer-term, I would argue that this strategy would
\nbe the more successful one, electorally for the parties concerned
\nas well as institutionally for the overall health of Indonesia's
\ndemocratic consolidation.<\/p>\n
Improved intra-party democracy, consciously fostered by party
\nleaders now in order to take root over the long-term as part of a
\nstrategy of institutionalization would serve as a check on many
\nof the concerns raised above: lack of an opposition, overly
\ncentralized decision-making, and personality-based parties.<\/p>\n
While elite accommodations might be needed to overcome
\nsticking points in the transition, compromise without voice might
\nlead to the new systems' ignoring of the wishes of large segments
\nof the Indonesian population with all the prospects for anti-
\nsystem action which that entails.<\/p>\n
This article has argued that the existence of a government of
\nnational unity is not an imminent threat to the successful
\nconsolidation of democracy in Indonesia. A greater threat can be
\nseen in the nature of political party decision-making and the
\nexistence of personality-based parties.<\/p>\n
With popular input into party decision-making and party
\ninstitutionalization, opposition will eventually take root. The
\npress of government and the need of parties to present
\nalternative visions to voters will lead some parties to go into
\nopposition, to represent the interests of their members, to
\ndistinguish themselves from the field and to serve as a potential
\nalternative government.<\/p>\n
The author is a Ph.D. Candidate in Foreign Affairs at the
\nUniversity of Virginia in the United States. She recently
\nreturned from a one year stint as a visiting fellow at the
\nNational University of Singapore. She is currently working on her
\ndissertation entitled Indonesia's Tentative Transition: The Role
\nof Political Parties.<\/p>",
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