Soerjadi, Megawati and PDI: Facing the realities<\/p>\n
The following is an interview by The Jakarta Post's Yogyakarta
\ncorrespondent, Asip Agus H, with Gadjah Mada University political
\nscience lecturer, Cornelis Lay. The interview was conducted on
\nMonday, July 21, at the East Nusa Tenggara student dormitory, in
\nYogyakarta.<\/p>\n
Question (Q): How do you explain the existence of Megawati
\nsupporters in the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)? The past
\ngeneral election proved that Megawati masses greatly influenced
\nthe votes collected by the PDI in Soerjadi's camp. However, they
\ndo not seem solid enough to make up a political organization.<\/p>\n
Answer (A): In general, Megawati supporters began as a
\nspontaneously formed mass. They are loyal to Megawati as an
\nindividual. In the past year there have been no organizational
\nsteps which enable them -- being spontaneously formed and
\npledging loyalty to an individual -- to shift their loyalty to an
\norganization. It is a political risk if loyalty rests on the
\ncharisma of an individual. In a situation like this, an
\norganization usually occupies the lowest place on the scale of
\npriorities and can be ignored. This is the situation that has
\nbeen evolving.<\/p>\n
Afterwards, Megawati followers experienced systematic pressure
\nfrom the government. Their room for action became very limited.
\nAnd they had to spend extra energy to counter the action taken by
\nthe Soerjadi and Fatimah group, particularly during the election
\ncampaign. Therefore, nothing was done about organizational
\nconsolidation and concept, ideology and material basis --
\nelements needed by a large political organization.<\/p>\n
The organization which emerged was simply a mob and their
\nactivities are sporadic and reactive. So the ideology is not
\nvisible, nor is there a material base. The activities are
\nspontaneous in nature and take the form of only small splashes.<\/p>\n
Q: What about the party elite?<\/p>\n
A: The elite circles around Megawati do not seem to have enough
\nresources with enough attention and proper capacity to undertake
\nthe consolidation. The elite have spent most of their energy
\ntaking legal action.<\/p>\n
One observation in the last few months is that the activities
\nof the party bureaucracy in Megawati's camp are politically less
\nsignificant than those carried out by her lawyers, the Team to
\nDefend Indonesian Democracy (TPDI). In my opinion, TPDI is more
\nideological in character than the central governing board (DPP)
\nin Megawati's camp. And indeed they (the DPP) do not have many
\nopportunities.<\/p>\n
Q: But during the past election campaign Megawati's supporters
\nwere quite prominent...<\/p>\n
A: During the election, Soerjadi and his camp could still be
\nused as a common frame of reference for the formation of a crowd
\nand to forge internal solidarity among Megawati supporters or to
\ndesign political activities. Now Soerjadi and his followers are
\nno longer there and politically and morally they are now crushed,
\nthere are no longer any external incentives which can be used to
\nforge internal solidarity.<\/p>\n
Q: What are the external incentives?<\/p>\n
A: The presence of Soerjadi's camp during the campaign was a
\nfavorable political incentive for Megawati's supporters to
\nmobilize funds. This happened in the framework of a response to a
\nparticular event. It could never occur through crowd-forming.<\/p>\n
A group called \"Loyal Supporters of Mrs. Megawati\" (PSIM) was
\nformed in Yogyakarta. Elsewhere there are other groups
\n(supporting Megawati outside the organization\/bureaucracy of PDI-
\nMegawati - Ed.), but in substance they are crowds not
\norganizations, and certainly not political organizations. At the
\nlevel of the crowd itself, though, the participants already feel
\npart of a movement and enjoy the political experience.<\/p>\n
Many complaints have been lodged about instructions being
\nissued from the top but never reaching the masses. This has made
\nit more difficult for those in the regions to make a move.<\/p>\n
Q: How do you assess the steps taken by the PDI Megawati camp in
\nsuing the PDI Soerjadi camp? Do the Megawati supporters have
\nconsolidation in view?<\/p>\n
A: I think the action is for now rather than the future. This
\nstep can be used as a political incentive to maintain morale, to
\nguard gatherings. But seriously, will it last and until when, if
\nfrom region to region it is rejected by the courts. On the one
\nhand it is proof of the basic thesis that Megawati's camp put
\nforward: the law does not function neutrally, the law is biased
\nin favor of power and the law treats Megawati supporters
\nunfairly. It may foster unity among Megawati supporters who see
\nthemselves as victims of systematic injustice and pressure from
\nthe authorities. On the other hand, it could demoralize and
\ndiscourage them.<\/p>\n
Q: Why doesn't the Megawati camp put order into their
\norganization?<\/p>\n
A: I do not know. But I do know for certain that the Megawati
\ncamp must now transform the loyalty it has built on individual
\ncharisma into a loyalty for the organization. It is inevitable
\nthat to reach that objective they must seriously think of
\ndeveloping the organization. I do not know why it has not been
\ndone. Maybe their attention is focused on the legal aspects of
\nthe political process. Or perhaps the human resources at higher
\nlevels are very limited.<\/p>\n
It is not easy to find a person with high managerial skills to
\nconduct such political consolidation. And there may be financial
\nlimitations. This is an internal matter.<\/p>\n
It may also be a model of politics being developed around
\nMegawati and reflects the opinion that an organization is not a
\nmatter of principle. What is considered important is safeguarding
\nMegawati as a symbol.<\/p>\n
Q: Are there any external factors?<\/p>\n
A: I think an external determining factor is the very limited
\npolitical space available for Megawati and her supporters.
\nAlthough a certain mobility is allowed, i.e. grassroots groups
\nacross areas meet with each other, there is a very tight
\nsupervision of the state. Small political errors are expected to
\nbe used against them some day.<\/p>\n
In the process of consolidation there are very high political
\nrisks. This may cause Megawati, and the political elite
\nsurrounding her, to make continuous \"recalculations\" to avoid
\nsteps becoming a boomerang, to prevent capture or being declared
\nsubversive. These activities demand a lot of time and leave
\nlittle space for organizing.<\/p>\n
Q: Is it dangerous for the Megawati camp to lack unity and
\ncontrol?<\/p>\n
A: Yes. There is a point of tolerance at the mass level. If the
\npoint of despair is reached there may be serious consequences for
\nthe community. And the problem may originate from \"the unclear
\nstate of things\". Who should be responsible for what and at what
\nlevel? The next risk concerns the slowing down of activities
\naimed at supporting Megawati and continuing the struggle against
\nSoerjadi and the symbols of repression.<\/p>\n
Once again, the choice poses a dilemma. The power of an
\nindividual's charisma is usually quite conspicuous under heavy
\npressure. It result from heightened political tension or
\nmobilization like the period of the general election. Or, after
\nthe July 27 incident, it was clear that charisma became the key
\nto all political happenings. There were expectations of
\nMegawati's words, movements, actions and attitude. But in
\n\"normal\" situations the limits of an individual's charisma is
\nrevealed. Therefore, charisma must be substituted with or
\nsupported by an organization's charisma.<\/p>\n
I have often argued that it is essential for a transformation,
\nso that in a \"normal\" situation the mechanism of the organization
\nand of the politics of Megawati does not stop. With an
\nindividual's charisma, if the person stops, everything will stop.
\nAnd the politics based on the individual's charisma are tiring
\nfor the prominent figure because the person must have
\nextraordinary energy, both physically and mentally. At the same
\ntime the person must have an exceptional imagination. The demands
\nat a mass level are very high, while at the state level Megawati
\nis systematically waylaid. It is not easy to face all sides at
\nthe same time.<\/p>\n
Q: Does PDI Megawati have the same characteristics as the former
\nPDI which was dynamic, had friction and easily broke up? If
\nMegawati restructures the organization is it feared that
\nfrictions will recur?<\/p>\n
A: Yes, from the aspect of PDI's tradition, yes indeed if we
\nwant to say there was never loyalty to the organization or there
\nwas never a culture to be loyal to the organization. Moreover,
\nthere is the addition of key figures who recently appeared and
\nhave become Megawati's main supporters whose characteristics are
\nabout the same. They resemble, more or less, those of the former
\nIndonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) so it is not the PDI but the
\nformer PNI. Yes, it was very fluid as an organization and its
\nidentity was very personal, its forms of expression were very
\nsymbolical. That perhaps has been inherited by the PDI Megawati
\nat present. But at the same time we cannot ignore that the
\ntendency is gaining strength at a time when nearly all people are
\nloyal because of Megawati. I think not too many people consider
\nMangara or the others.<\/p>\n
Q: So, the positions with the PDI Megawati are mainly filled by
\nPNI people?<\/p>\n
A: I am not saying it is PNI because PNI itself represents many
\nsides. Ideologically speaking,it means they have a high sense of
\nromanticism about the great ideas left by Bung Karno and
\ncontinued by PNI. I think they have been responsible for forming
\nmany of the Megawati supporters' centers.<\/p>\n
Q: But the support for Megawati does not come from PDI circles
\nonly?.<\/p>\n
A: Indeed. There are many groups in the community who support
\nMegawati who are motivated, not by ideological fanaticism but
\nhate and anger towards the political regime. They do not see
\nanother alternative and consider Megawati as a person who could
\nbring about change.<\/p>\n
NGOs do not care who Megawati is, what her thoughts are or
\nwhat people steeped in PNI tradition think. What counts is that
\npeople obey Megawati and she has charisma.<\/p>\n
So, the political motives behind the support vary and that too
\nwill produce quite different results when political steps are
\ntaken. I think this explains why contradicting political moves
\noccur among Megawati supporters in different regions. I think it
\nis not solely the result of confusion because of the non-
\nexistence of clear instructions at the lower level. But it
\nclarifies the differences in political motives behind the support
\ngiven to Megawati.<\/p>\n
I do not know the end of the story but a political
\norganization is obliged to take sensible steps toward
\nconsolidation. Its function is to transform loyalty for an
\nindividual to loyalty for the organization. That is important,
\nnot solely for Megawati and PDI, but it is also important for
\nthose in the Megawati camp who have placed themselves as figures
\nstruggling for justice, democracy, law, etc.<\/p>\n
If the Megawati camp continues to be characterized by sporadic
\nand reactive action, does not have inter-organization links and
\nloyalty is given only to Megawati, I think if Megawati's image
\ndeclines politically everything will fall apart.<\/p>\n
Q: You said the PDI Megawati now is different from the former
\nPDI. Please explain...<\/p>\n
A: I think the majority, it cannot be denied, are there because
\nof great political disappointment with the authorities and see an
\nopportunity for change in Megawati. Some people denote them
\nroughly as free riders in politics. Things are not like that. But
\npart of the former PDI people have found similarities with the
\nromanticism of the former PNI and the old PDI. Another part of
\nthe new group has found a reason for their disillusion with the
\nregime. They constitute the two big pillars.<\/p>\n
Q: What about the PDI Megawati congress in 1998?<\/p>\n
A: I do not know about that, but it is clear that the Megawati
\nterm will end in December and a congress is being planned.
\nOrganizationally and legally speaking, it is true. Until today
\nthe Megawati chairmanship has remained legal, the moral legality
\nis there, so the congress can take place. But from the aspect of
\npractical politics it is nearly impossible.<\/p>\n
First, because from the beginning the government has indeed
\nprecluded Megawati. Second, although the number of Soerjadi
\nsupporters is limited, they have formal legality in the eyes of
\nthe government. They, the party bureaucracy of the Soerjadi camp,
\nlike the regional and branch chairmen, who were installed with
\nblessings of the state, cannot be completely, politically
\neliminated.<\/p>\n
The Megawati camp cannot neglect them although it is morally
\nvery hard for Megawati to accommodate them.<\/p>\n
Q: Why?<\/p>\n
A: Because of the July 27 incident. I once said: \"What if the
\nSoerjadi camp is brought to court at the national level?\" This is
\nimpracticable because the masses will not be able to
\ndifferentiate. In this case I think Megawati has a big problem.
\nIf there were no July 27 incident the problem might have been
\nsolved. I emphasize this to refute the argument that PDI's
\nchairmanship is of great value and coveted by Megawati.<\/p>\n
What has been emphasized is not the loss of the chair but the
\nviolence committed against their own \"children\". This is
\ndifficult to justify morally. I think that is the substance of
\nthe problem. It is very hard for Megawati to express this.
\nBesides, the media are perhaps not in a position to offer space
\nto her. I think that is also an important explanation why
\nMegawati's actions have diminished drastically. Support by the
\nmedia has understandably also declined as a result of the
\nunequivocal limitations imposed on the media. The media may have
\nlost enthusiasm or their passion to give their support. How many
\nmedia are willing to speak about the PDI?<\/p>\n
Q: What do you really think of the Soerjadi camp?<\/p>\n
A: They are actually supporters of their own interest, they
\nconcur with Soerjadi's ideas because their interests are
\nsafeguarded. Those who are members of DPRD (regional house of
\nrepresentatives) hope to remain in the same position, those who
\nare chairmen of a PDI regional board hope to maintain their
\nposition and those on the PDI central board do not wish to
\nabandon their position. It is in their self-interest. Primarily
\nthey are not Soerjadi supporters but defenders of their own
\ninterests.<\/p>",
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