Social violence in Indonesia is localized<\/p>\n
Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Research Associate, United Nations
\nSupport Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR), Jakarta,
\nzulfan.unsfir@un.or.id<\/p>\n
Indonesia is often characterized as a troubled country ridden
\nwith conflict and violence in every region. Is this
\ncharacterization correct? To answer this question, we need to
\nexamine carefully data relating to violent social conflict. In
\nthis context, violent social conflict is defined as conflict
\nbetween two distinct social groups that cannot be
\ninstitutionalized and which turns into violent actions.<\/p>\n
The preliminary results of a recently developed social
\nconflict database for Indonesia compiled by the UN Support
\nFacility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR), a join project of the
\nGovernment of Indonesia and UNDP, show that social conflicts and
\nviolence in Indonesia are locally concentrated in only a few
\nprovinces and districts, although their social, political and
\neconomic impacts are nationally felt.<\/p>\n
A preliminary analysis of this database reveals two
\ninteresting features. First, communal violence is the most severe
\ncategory of social violence, followed by separatist violence.
\nBetween 1990 and 2001, the data show that communal and separatist
\nviolence caused maximum fatalities, accounting for 77 percent and
\n22 percent of total deaths in social violence, respectively.
\nHere, communal violence is defined as social violence between two
\ngroups of the community, or one group being attacked by the
\nother. Communal groups can be based on ethnicity, religion,
\nsocial class, political affiliation or simple village differences
\nand so on.<\/p>\n
Second, social violence in Indonesia is primarily locally
\nconcentrated. While separatist violence only occurred in Aceh and
\nPapua, communal violence was concentrated in several districts or
\ncities. Based on the conditions before the formation of new
\nadministrative regions by the ongoing decentralization, only
\neight regions (7 districts and 1 city) account for an enormously
\ndisproportionate distribution of communal violence in the
\ncountry; approximately 65 percent of total deaths in communal
\nviolence. Based on the 1995 Inter-Population Census (SUPAS),
\nhowever, these eight regions represent a mere 1.9 percent of
\nIndonesia's population. The eight regions are four districts and
\none city in Maluku (the districts of North Maluku, Central
\nMaluku, Southeast Maluku and Central Halmahera, and the city of
\nAmbon), plus three other districts; namely Poso of Sulawesi, and
\nEast Kotawaringin and Sambas of Kalimantan. More than ninety-
\neight percent of Indonesia's population has not been "communal
\nriot-prone".<\/p>\n
The local concentration of social conflicts in a large country
\nis not a phenomenon unique to Indonesia. India, the world's
\nsecond largest country after China in terms of total population,
\nalso shows a local concentration of communal conflicts -- in this
\ncase Hindu-Muslim violence. The local concentration of communal
\nviolence in India is one of the most interesting findings in the
\nresearch done by Prof. Ashutosh Varshney, a political scientist
\nat the University of Michigan. The study was published by Yale
\nUniversity Press, 2002, under the title of Ethnic Conflict and
\nCivic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India.<\/p>\n
Professor Varshney concludes that, first, the share of
\nvillages in communal rioting turned out to be remarkably small.
\nBetween 1950 and 1995, rural India, where two-thirds of Indians
\nstill live, accounted for about 4 percent of the deaths in
\ncommunal violence. Hindu-Muslim violence is primarily an urban
\nphenomenon. Secondly, within urban India too, Hindu-Muslim riots
\nare highly locally concentrated. Only eight cities account for a
\nhugely disproportionate share of communal violence in the
\ncountry; approximately 46 percent of all deaths in Hindu-Muslim
\nviolence. As a group, however, these eight cities represent a
\nmere 18 percent of India's urban population, and about 5 percent
\nof the country's total population, both urban and rural. Eighty-
\ntwo percent of India's urban population has not been "riot-
\nprone".<\/p>\n
In contrast to India, however, communal violence in Indonesia
\ntends to be less concentrated in urban areas. Even though the
\ndata needs some refinement, the incidents of social violence
\nmainly occurred in districts and small towns. Communal conflicts
\nin Maluku, Poso, Sambas and East Kotawaringin (Sampit) are more a
\nbattle between communities in rural areas.<\/p>\n
Understanding of such facts -- that social violence in
\nIndonesia, like in India, is locally concentrated -- should
\nbring significant implications in analyzing conflicts and
\nexploring Indonesia's policy choices.<\/p>\n
Although characterized by high local concentration, social
\nconflicts (mainly communal conflicts) in Indonesia have resulted
\nin nationally distributed impacts. This can be seen from the
\nfollowing indicators: internally displaced persons (IDPs), budget
\npressure, the destroyed image of the country and the exhausted
\nnational energy to overcome this problem.<\/p>\n
There are now approximately 1.3 million IDPs spread across 21
\nprovinces, largely victims of highly location-specific social
\nviolence. Their existence will certainly put pressure on local
\ngovernments economically, politically and socially. IDPs from
\nAceh are mainly spread in North Sumatra, and partly in Riau,
\nJambi, South Sumatra, and up to West, Central and East Java. East
\nJava and especially Madura are the main destinations of IDPs from
\nSambas and Sampit. Poso IDPs flood its neighboring regions.
\nMaluku IDPs spread in all Sulawesi, Papua and up to Java.
\nFurthermore, the remaining East Timorese IDPs are still left in
\nEast Nusa Tenggara. All of them need housing, jobs, social
\ninfrastructure and other economic, social and cultural rights
\nthat have disappeared because of conflicts.<\/p>\n
The required intervention for humanitarian aid and post-
\nconflict recovery has caused severe budgetary problems for both
\nnational and regional governments. It adds to the current budget
\npressure due to the economic crisis and the mountain of public
\ndebt.<\/p>\n
Violent conflicts in Indonesia have destroyed the image of the
\ncountry in international eyes with adverse consequences for
\ntourism and investments. Even though Indonesia has a large
\ndomestic market, the perception of an unsafe country, a brutal
\nsociety and an inefficient police and military unable to control
\nlaw and order is driving away investors and tourists.<\/p>\n
In general, conflicts have exhausted national energy for
\nreconciliation and rehabilitation efforts, humanitarian aid, as
\nwell as efforts to prevent conflicts erupting into violence in
\nother regions. The recovery, rehabilitation and reconciliation in
\nconflict prone areas are becoming more complicated due to the
\nreality that sometimes, local conflicts cannot be isolated from
\npolitics at the national level.<\/p>\n
The knowledge that social conflict in Indonesia has a high
\ndegree of local concentration should improve the common
\nunderstanding of conflict in this country. Even though locally
\nconcentrated, conflicts have produced nation wide economic,
\npolitical and social impacts. Therefore, national efforts are
\nneeded to overcome those conflicts. As part of such efforts,
\nUNSFIR, in collaboration with several other institutions, is now
\npioneering the establishment of social conflict database for
\nIndonesia to be used by a number of users.<\/p>\n
The views expressed herein are entirely personal.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/social-violence-in-indonesia-is-localized-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }