Sielding Pancasila from inflationary devaluation<\/p>\n
By Franz Magnis-Suseno<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Fifty years of Indonesian independence also
\nmeans 50 years Pancasila.<\/p>\n
On Aug. 18, one day after the Proclamation of Independence,
\nIndonesia's first constitution, the famous 1945 Constitution
\nstill enforced, was ratified by the Commission for the
\nPreparation of the Independence of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The last paragraph of its preamble contained the five
\nprinciples of Pancasila: belief in one God, just and civilized
\nhumanism, the unity of Indonesia, people's power in wisdom
\nthrough common deliberation\/representation, and social justice
\nfor the whole Indonesian people.<\/p>\n
Since then, Pancasila has functioned as the philosophical
\nfoundation of the Republic of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Foreigners are often baffled by the unending reference to
\nPancasila in speeches by Indonesian officials at seminars and on
\nevery occasion. Pancasila's five principles look both dignified
\nand innocent. They contain, in an elegant and well balanced way,
\nthe founding values of the generally recognized fundamental
\nprinciples of political ethics (except environmental ones which,
\nin 1945, were not yet within the horizon of humanity).<\/p>\n
Indonesians are often fed up by talk of Pancasila. Especially
\nthe increasingly skeptical youth. Fifteen years of Pancasila
\ncourses (P4), almost from cradle to the grave, induces immediate
\ndrowsiness upon hearing the word Pancasila.<\/p>\n
The editor of a book I wrote on Pancasila Democracy insisted
\non scrapping the word Pancasila in the title because he was
\nafraid it would negatively affect its sales. Students become
\ncynical when observing how clamp downs on democratic freedoms, on
\nworkers rights, or on critiques by the media are all justified by
\nreferring to Pancasila.<\/p>\n
Therefore it seems to be the time to stress that Pancasila is
\nnot just verbal mumbo-jumbo. The fact is that without Pancasila
\nthis country would not have come into existence and could
\ncontinue to exist if Pancasila was scrapped or replaced by
\nsomething else.<\/p>\n
At the end of May 1945, the Preparatory Assembly for
\nIndonesian Independence had reached a dangerous impasse: should
\nindependent Indonesia become a secular nationalistic state, or
\nshould Islam become its ideological basis?<\/p>\n
In this situation Sukarno proposed five principles of what he
\ncalled \"Pancasila\", in fact similar to those which later became
\nofficial, but in different wording and sequence.<\/p>\n
Sukarno's proposal was enthusiastically received by all sides.
\nIt still took more than two months until Pancasila got into its
\ndefinite form.<\/p>\n
First, a sub-commission put belief in God in first place and,
\nin order to make Pancasila more acceptable to Moslems, added the
\nwords \"with the obligation of its adherents to observe the
\nIslamic syariah (law)\".<\/p>\n
But after Christians from Eastern Indonesia had objected that
\nmentioning the majority religion in the most fundamental document
\nof the state would position non-Moslems as second rate citizens,
\nthese words were unanimously scrapped on Aug. 18 (this
\nelimination proved to be a bone of contention in times to come).
\nThus Pancasila came into existence.<\/p>\n
It is worth noting that Pancasila was later inserted in an
\nidentical form in the two other constitutions Indonesia once had,
\nthe \"Constitution of the United Republic of Indonesia\" in 1949
\nand in the \" Provisional Constitution\" of 1950 (the 1945
\nConstitution of was restored by President Sukarno in 1959).<\/p>\n
Pancasila is, therefore, the result of a \"noble covenant of
\nthe whole nations\". It is the foundational compromise or
\nconsensus of the Indonesian state. Those aspiring to an Islamic
\nstate declared themselves ready to sacrifice this ideal for the
\nunity of the country. Those hoping for a state based exclusively
\non Indonesian nationhood -- almost all of them Moslem too --
\nrenounced a secular model and accepted statehood on the basis of
\nthe belief in one God.<\/p>\n
Pancasila, therefore, refers directly to its five principles,
\nall of them deeply rooted in the traditional values of the
\ndifferent Indonesian cultures.<\/p>\n
But these principles get their relevance from the fact that
\nPancasila means the fundamental consensus on which the
\nwillingness to join the common Indonesian state is based; that
\nthis state belongs to all Indonesians, regardless of their
\nreligious affiliations. Therefore, there shouldn't be any
\ndiscrimination as to basic human and civil rights on terms of
\nmajority versus minority.<\/p>\n
The fundamental importance of Pancasila is obvious. Shaking
\nPancasila would imply shaking the very foundations on which the
\nunity of the Indonesian state is based, the fundamental consensus
\nunderlying the willingness of those hundreds of tribes and
\ncommunities of very different cultural and religious
\norientations, spread over thousands of islands, to unite into one
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
During the first 20 years of independence, Pancasila was used
\nmainly to counter repeated moves to make the Indonesian state
\nmore Islamic. When the new order was established, it undertook
\nfar reaching political and ideological reorientations. Against
\nthe ideological hotchpotch of the later Sukarno years, the new
\norder chose the obvious strategy to legitimize its new direction
\nback to Pancasila.<\/p>\n
Thus, Pancasila is appealed to in order to prove the
\nlegitimacy of the new order policies. Except in cases of pure
\nomong kosong (blabbering), reference to Pancasila has always an
\nexact meaning although, in order to retrieve it, one must be able
\nto read between the lines.<\/p>\n
In this context it is particularly helpful to remember the
\nfour \"ideologies\" rejected by the new order : communism,
\n\"rightist (meaning Islamic) extremism\", western liberalism
\n(originally including everything from human rights to
\nparliamentary democracy); and \"class struggle\" or confrontational
\nlabor relations.<\/p>\n
On the first two points there exist a broad consensus
\nthroughout the political spectrum. Communism, with its
\ntotalitarian understanding of power and its atheism, cannot be
\naccommodated within a Pancasila state seems to be obvious.<\/p>\n
While the option of an \"Islamic state\", even the need for
\nIslamic political parties, are increasingly regarded as out of
\ndate also by Moslem intellectuals and politicians.<\/p>\n
But the same cannot be said on point three and four. On the
\ncontrary, the discussion about democracy and human rights grows
\nand then is cut back, like the banning of Tempo and two other
\njournals last year, which increases the sense that, 50 years
\nafter independence, the time has come to give Pancasila democracy
\nmore substance.<\/p>\n
The same is true for labor. If we want to develop a higher
\nquality labor force, workers will have to be treated as partners
\nand be able to organize. The still unresolved murder of Marsinah
\nhas, in fact, become a catalyst for more openness on the labor
\nfront.<\/p>\n
Pancasila is and remains the basic consensus upon which the
\nunity of Indonesia and her dignity as a civilized state is based.
\nIn order to shield Pancasila from inflationary devaluation, a
\nmore careful, less self-serving use of Pancasila language by
\nthose in power seems to be well advised.<\/p>\n
Dr. Franz Magnis-Suseno SJ is professor for social philosophy
\nat Driyarkara School of Philosophy in Jakarta.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/sielding-pancasila-from-inflationary-devaluation-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}