Should Indonesia consider new ties with Australia?<\/p>\n
By Siswo Pramono<\/p>\n
CANBERRA (JP): The recently released Australian defense white
\npaper calls for new defense ties with Indonesia. Indonesia-
\nAustralia relations have crashed since East Timor crisis. Deep
\nsuspicion, rather than trust, is now the basis of the bilateral
\nrelationship. Should Indonesia consider the call?<\/p>\n
Mutual distrust is acute in the relations of the two nations.
\nMany Australians still believe that hostile forces will come from
\nthe North. Ironically, history records Australian military
\noperations in the Indonesian archipelago, from the start of World
\nWar II until post-ballot East Timor; while the Indonesian army
\nhas never engaged in any combat with the Australian military.<\/p>\n
After East Timor, and now facing the delicate issue of
\nseparatism in Papua, some Indonesians also believe that Australia
\nposes a threat to Indonesia's integrity.<\/p>\n
This is because, despite assurances from the Australian
\ngovernment that Irian Jaya is an integral part of Indonesia, \"the
\nbattle lines over the West Papuan cause are being drawn in
\n[Australia]\" (Paul Kelly, The Australian, Nov. 1).<\/p>\n
With mutual distrust lingering on both sides, the relations
\nare hard to get off the ground.<\/p>\n
The Australian defense white paper is not a panacea of this
\nmutual distrust but rather a starting point for confidence
\nbuilding measures. It might be useful to see how Australia is now
\npositioning Indonesia in the new defense policy. The defense
\nwhite paper emphasizes three main issues.<\/p>\n
The first is a slight increase in defense spending.
\nNotwithstanding the increase, Australia would hardly threaten
\nIndonesia or anyone else in the region because the extra defense
\nspending of A$23.5 billion over 10 years is actually less then
\ntwo percent of the gross domestic product.<\/p>\n
Conversely, with half a million internal refugees, an acute
\npolitical crisis, and the worst nightmare scenario of
\ndisintegration, it is Indonesia that poses a \"threat\" through the
\npossible influx of refugees that might burden Australia.<\/p>\n
The second is greater self-reliance. The so-called Howard
\nDoctrine, portraying Australia as a \"deputy\" of the United
\nStates, earlier irritated Indonesia. But now the defense white
\npaper assures that Australia is not becoming anyone's deputy.
\nAustralia can no longer take the U.S. for granted if a crisis
\ndeveloped in its vital northern approach.<\/p>\n
East Timor is a recent example of how the U.S. abandoned
\nAustralia. Conversely, while the alliance with the U.S. remains
\nstrategically important, Australia is now unlikely to allow its
\nground troops to be deployed to defend U.S. interests in North
\nAsia (e.g. to defend Taiwan against China or to defend South
\nKorea against North Korea).<\/p>\n
If Australia were to join U.S. maneuvers in North Asia, it
\nwould provide only diplomatic support or, at the most, some naval
\nand aerial support. Thus, Australia is now learning to stand on
\nits own.<\/p>\n
The third is the restructuring of Australia's military
\ncapability. The main tasks of the Australian Defense Force are
\nto defend the mainland and to secure its immediate neighborhood.<\/p>\n
The white paper seems to have reconciled the contending
\nstrategies of \"fortress Australia\" and \"forward defense\" when it
\ncomes to promoting the stability of Australia's immediate
\nneighborhood.<\/p>\n
This neighborhood looks pretty messy with various hotspots,
\nstarting from Aceh, to Maluku, Papua, East Timor, Bougainville,
\nVanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Fiji. The Indonesian
\narchipelago provides straits for international navigation, which
\nare vital for the life and well being of Australians.<\/p>\n
The fact that the Indonesian archipelago now represents the
\nsea of instability is Australia's concern. Anything that happens
\nin Indonesia will directly affect Australia.<\/p>\n
With its neighborhood in a state of instability, the white
\npaper commits the Australian Defense Forces to become a mobile
\nforce capable of sustaining operations outside Australia.<\/p>\n
The commitment will be met with an increase in the size of
\nregular army infantry battalions to allow deployment of a brigade
\nfor extended periods.<\/p>\n
The big procurement of early warning aircraft, 100 aircraft to
\nreplace existing F\/A-18s and F-111s, as well as the upgrades for
\nthe Anzac frigates and Collins-class submarines will foster
\nAustralian military capacity to operate outside the mainland.<\/p>\n
For Indonesia, this new commitment can be reassuring or
\ndisturbing. And the worst of it is the collapse of the 1995
\nIndonesia-Australia defense treaty, following Australian military
\ninvolvement in East Timor.<\/p>\n
Any military build up of one side can easily trigger suspicion
\nand hence, insecurity of the other. However, it might be
\nexaggerating to consider this improved Australian military muscle
\nas a threat to Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The improved military capacity might be useful to sustain a
\nlimited deployment in small areas such as East Timor or
\nBougainville, but it is not big enough to support operations in
\nan area the size of Irian Jaya.<\/p>\n
Thus, it would be naive to think that Australia would secure
\nits interest in the northern neighborhood entirely through
\nmilitary support.<\/p>\n
Australia knows too well that unless its relations with
\nIndonesia are normalized, it is unlikely for Australia to enjoy
\nmaximum security in its forefront area. The white paper positions
\nthe strategic relationship with Indonesia as one of the main
\npillars of Australian defense strategy.<\/p>\n
In this regard, it pledges to establish \"a new defense
\nrelationship that will serve our enduring shared strategic
\ninterests\".<\/p>\n
Labor's opposition leader has signaled support for such
\nintensified diplomatic strategy of engagement (Kim Beazley, The
\nSydney Morning Herald, Dec. 6). And Minister Downer has already
\ncalled for renewed military ties with Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Surely, both countries have interlocking interests in defense
\nand security matters. Indonesia is a catalyst for the security
\nof Australian frontage. Australia is a catalyst for the security
\nof the eastern part of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
One should remember that the separatist issue in Irian Jaya
\nremains a potential obstacle for bilateral relations. As a
\nterritory bordering the South Pacific, Papua has added to the
\nlong strained relations with Jakarta by internalizing the endemic
\ncrisis of national identity.<\/p>\n
Irian Jaya could not escape the political dynamics of the
\nSouth Pacific. Papua, Bougainville, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands
\nand Fiji have all experienced the vertical conflicts challenging
\ntheir respective central government authorities.<\/p>\n
There are great expectations from the Papuan secessionists
\nthat Australia and the South Pacific will help them break away
\nfrom Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Australia considers the South Pacific its strategic backyard.
\nIrian Jaya has strong ties with the South Pacific for ethnic and
\ngeopolitical reasons.<\/p>\n
Indonesia must consider an intensified diplomatic engagement
\nwith Australia, and hence, the South Pacific part of the solution
\nof the Irian Jaya problem. Thus, it is timely for Indonesia to
\nconsider Australia's call for new defense ties.<\/p>\n
The writer is a doctoral student at the department of
\npolitical science, Australian National University in Canberra.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/should-indonesia-consider-new-ties-with-australia-1447893297",
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