{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1162756,
        "msgid": "seven-years-after-soehartos-resignation-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-05-21 00:00:00",
        "title": "Seven years after Soeharto's resignation",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Seven years after Soeharto's resignation J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Jakarta Exactly seven years ago on May 21, under intense pressure from university students who had been demonstrating continuously for a week on end, then-president Soeharto resigned.",
        "content": "<p>Seven years after Soeharto's resignation<\/p>\n<p>J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Jakarta<\/p>\n<p>Exactly seven years ago on May 21, under intense pressure from<br>\nuniversity students who had been demonstrating continuously for a<br>\nweek on end, then-president Soeharto resigned. These thousands of<br>\nstudents, many even climbing over the dome of the huge and<br>\nmagnificent parliament building, waving red and white national<br>\nflags, gradually managed to occupy the People's Consultative<br>\nAssembly (MPR), supposedly the symbol of the people's supreme<br>\npower.<\/p>\n<p>For once, the MPR, which had in fact just reelected the<br>\nPresident for another four-year term through the voice of its<br>\nchair, supported the students' demand for the resignation of<br>\nSoeharto. In addition, the night before, a number his ministers<br>\nhad tendered their resignations.<\/p>\n<p>Under such circumstances. Soeharto could no longer run a<br>\ngovernment and announced his resignation and immediately<br>\nappointed Vice President Habibie as his successor. Immediately<br>\nthe Chief Justice of the Supreme Court swore in Habibie as<br>\nPresident.<\/p>\n<p>This commentary is a modest attempt to learn the lessons for<br>\nthe betterment of life in this nation in the years ahead. It is<br>\nto be a simple analysis but with honest, scholarly pretension.<\/p>\n<p>For an average person, the lessons learned from the past are<br>\nalmost instinctively felt, if not rationally understood. It seems<br>\nquite human for people disappointed with current developments to<br>\nglorify the past, though not without exaggeration.<\/p>\n<p>I believe Sukarno and Soeharto were equally smart and<br>\nintelligent, despite their different formal educational<br>\nbackgrounds. They understood the 1945 Constitution equally well,<br>\nparticularly in terms of its weaknesses and apparent strengths.<br>\nWhile both cultivated in the Javanese concept of \"tolerance\" and<br>\n\"harmony\", both believed that democracy is the best system of<br>\ngovernment. Sukarno left it to the Constituent Assembly to<br>\ndetermine the constitution to replace the \"provisional\" 1945<br>\nConstitution promulgated the day after the proclamation of<br>\nIndonesian independence.<\/p>\n<p>However, having enjoyed the sweetness of power for 14 years,<br>\nbut having witnessed the failure of the Constitutional Assembly<br>\nin enacting a permanent constitution as required by the 1945<br>\n\"provisional\" constitution, in 1959 Sukarno decreed the<br>\ndissolution of the Assembly and the return to the original<br>\nprovisional 1945 Constitution. There were, however, three<br>\nessential weaknesses of the 1945 Constitution:<\/p>\n<p>First, it created an institution with unlimited power, the<br>\nMPR.<\/p>\n<p>Second, it provided no separation of powers, with the office<br>\nof President combining both executive and legislative powers.<\/p>\n<p>And third, it provided no system of judicial review. Sukarno<br>\nwas cunning enough to manipulate the constitution by dominating<br>\nthe MPR: He created the provisional MPRS.<\/p>\n<p>He was cunning enough to manipulate the constitution by<br>\ndominating the MPR: He created his own \"provisional\" MPR (called<br>\nthe MPRS), and his own provisional House of Representatives DPRG<br>\n(the \"G\" standing for \"Gotong Royong\", \"mutually cooperative\").<\/p>\n<p>That was, I believe, the main lesson Soeharto learned from<br>\nSukarno, and that was precisely how he seized and later<br>\naccumulated power when he finally dominate the MPRS by accusing<br>\nSukarno of betraying the 1945 Constitution, particularly<br>\nPancasila, the nation's gravest political sin, by his alleged<br>\ninvolvement in the so-called Gestapu (\"September 30 Movement\"), a<br>\ncoup attempt allegedly staged by the Indonesian Communist Party<br>\n(PKI).<\/p>\n<p>Then Soeharto created the \"New Order\" regime to \"implement<br>\nPancasila in a consistent way\", Pancasila Democracy. It was to<br>\nreplace what he called Sukarno's \"Old Order\" with his \"Guided<br>\nDemocracy\". This was the main basis for the legitimacy of<br>\nSoeharto's \"New Order\". And the transfer of power was based on<br>\nthe so-called Supersemar (March 11 Order).<\/p>\n<p>Interestingly, since Soeharto's resignation, a question<br>\nthroughout the entire period of the \"New Order\" was taken for<br>\ngranted and never questioned, has now emerged. That is whether<br>\nthe so-called Supersemar ever really existed, and if so, who has<br>\nkept the original document? And a document has been made public<br>\nand shown on TV of Sukarno's speech, in which he said that \"the<br>\nMarch 11 Order\" was \"not a transfer of authority\".<\/p>\n<p>It is also interesting that both Sukarno's \"guided democracy\"<br>\nand Soeharto's \"Pancasila democracy\" were claimed to be based on<br>\nPancasila. Both used the decision-making mechanism called<br>\n\"deliberations for unanimity\".<\/p>\n<p>Sukarno made sure it worked by making himself \"the Great<br>\nLeader of the Revolution\", and then \"President for Life\", and<br>\nSoeharto did the same by making himself chairman of the \"Dewan<br>\nPembina\" (a kind of \"Council of Advisers\") of Golkar.<\/p>\n<p>So it is no wonder that \"national unity\" has since been<br>\nchanged to \"unity and uniformity\" (persatuan dan kesatuan), a<br>\nterm still parroted by the present generation of politicians.<br>\nNowadays, a new mechanism of decision-making is one that is done<br>\n\"without voting.\"<\/p>\n<p>The current generation of politicians also knows the<br>\nweaknesses of the 1945 Constitution and may want to exploit them<br>\nby making its core values remain ambivalent but sacrosanct, not<br>\nsubject to change, so as to benefit every group depending on<br>\ntheir guiles, but they continue to be split among themselves.<br>\nNone has leadership over a strong group such as the military or<br>\nthe Golkar. They started reforming the constitution, but in a<br>\ndevious way.<\/p>\n<p>The common people can easily see the difference. No strong<br>\nleadership. As a general, Soeharto had a lot more \"flying hours\"<br>\nthan the current leader.<\/p>\n<p>Under Soeharto there was a high degree of peace and stability.<br>\nThat explains in part why foreign policy was not in disarray as<br>\nit has been in the reform era. Security was more assured. People<br>\nwere not afraid to go at night as they are now, when people tend<br>\nto take law in their own hands. The gap between the rich and the<br>\npoor was not as wide as it is now.<\/p>\n<p>Unemployment is getting worse. Corruption? One writer put it<br>\nin this paper earlier this week on the fight against corruption,<br>\n\"lots of talk, little action\". Are we getting better, worse, or<br>\njust staying where we are, like a dog chasing after its own tail?<\/p>\n<p>The writer is a political analyst.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/seven-years-after-soehartos-resignation-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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