Semiotic analysis of recent riots<\/p>\n
By Asvi Warman Adam<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): On Jan. 27 rioters set fire to the Tanah Abang
\ndistrict office in Central Jakarta. The incident began at 7 a.m.
\nafter 20 city law enforcement officers and 10 military personnel
\nasked sidewalk traders to move to the market building because
\ntheir presence on the shoulder of Jl. Fachruddin was causing
\nserious traffic congestion. Nothing happened. Some of the traders
\ndid as they were ordered, albeit reluctantly.<\/p>\n
But tension was in the air after one trader was taken away by
\nthe officers. The traders' anger reached its peak in the
\nafternoon when they heard that a sidewalk trader had died after a
\ncar carrying duty officers failed to avoid him.<\/p>\n
Suddenly a crowd of some 3,000 people went wild, setting fire
\nto five cars, including one belonging to an officer. As the
\nsituation got out of hand the angry mob went to the Tanah Abang
\ndistrict office and set fire to the three-story building and cars
\nparked on its premises.<\/p>\n
The Tanah Abang incident echoed the previous riots in the East
\nJava town of Situbondo on Oct. 10, 1996, and Tasikmalaya in West
\nJava, on Dec. 26, 1996. In Situbondo a group of people were
\ndisappointed after a prosecutor sought a five-year jail term for
\na defendant charged with defaming Islam. They believed the
\nprosecutor was too lenient in his request and set fire to the
\ncourt house and 25 churches.<\/p>\n
In Tasikmalaya the riot broke out when a pesantren
\n(traditional Moslem boarding school) community protested the
\nbeating of a religious teacher by police officers. The people
\nburnt down shops, the police office and a number of churches.<\/p>\n
One usually analyzes these events by looking for the person
\nwho masterminded the riot, the intellectual actor. Who are the
\nintellectual actors behind the riots in Situbondo, Tasikmalaya
\nand Tanah Abang? And why did the riot take place? Is the socio-
\neconomic gap the cause of the three incidents?<\/p>\n
But there is an aspect which has been overlooked, which is
\nimportant from a semiotic viewpoint. This focuses on what was
\ndamaged by the mob. The masses wanted to vent their anger on a
\ncertain person, group or institution by attacking certain
\nattributes of the party they loathe such as a vehicle, place of
\nworship, a shop or an office.<\/p>\n
The more expensive the property they damaged, the more angry
\nthey became. They vented hatred which has accumulated in their
\nhearts for years.<\/p>\n
In the three events, the objects damaged or destroyed included
\nofficials' vehicles, ethnic Chinese shops, churches and
\ngovernment offices.<\/p>\n
Shops owned by the Chinese have always been easy targets even
\nin cases unrelated to race. One example is a mass brawl between
\nuniversity students and pedicab drivers in Yogyakarta in 1983.<\/p>\n
Two students living in a hostel were killed by a mob of
\npedicab drivers. Other students went into the street to show
\ntheir solidarity. The dispute centered on people's annoyance of
\nthe large number of Chinese shops on Jl. Malioboro.<\/p>\n
One possible cause of the problem is the economic gap.
\nHowever, I think a more rational explanation is the majority
\nversus the minority problem in the community, or the dominant
\nversus the dominated. If the relationship between the two groups
\nis not harmonious or people are not adequately integrated, the
\ndominant group (the majority) is able to repress the dominated
\ngroup (the minority).<\/p>\n
The ethnic Chinese have been made a target of irrational
\nhostility by the masses. This is all the worse because non-
\nindigenous people (in Indonesia in the New Order era) have no
\npolitical power to speak of.<\/p>\n
But what about the churches which were burnt to the ground? I
\ndo not agree with Sarlito Wirawan Sartono (Kompas, Jan. 27), who
\nsaid one of the causes was the sermons of kiai\/dai (Moslem
\nteachers\/proselytizers) at grassroots level, which cultivated a
\nnegative attitude and prejudice against other religions. Why then
\ndid the riots take place in the East Timor capital of Dili? Does
\nit mean that priests instigated their congregation to demolish
\nmosques? I do not think so.<\/p>\n
The problem is also related to the majority versus the
\nminority. In Situbondo and Tasikmalaya, the church is a symbol of
\nthe minority, likewise the mosque in East Timor. As places of
\nworship they are sacred to certain people. Therefore, any action
\nagainst a place of worship will get the widest and deepest
\nresponse and reaction.<\/p>\n
The Situbondo, Tasikmalaya and Tanah Abang riots were
\ntriggered by a disharmonious relationship between civilians, the
\nmilitary and judicial apparatus and the public. In the first two
\ncases the initial targets of the attacks were the court house and
\nthe police station.<\/p>\n
In the Tanah Abang incident there was heightened
\naggressiveness. The district office, a symbol of government
\nauthority was not only damaged but also burnt down. The concrete
\nbuilding was a symbol of the success of economic development of
\nthe New Order government. In the past a district office was only
\na wooden construction or at the most a small single-floor
\nbuilding.<\/p>\n
The brutal assault against the building was also an attempt to
\nundo the government's activities. The incident took place on a
\nwork day when the administration was busy serving the public. The
\narson, apart from being a manifestation of discontent, was also a
\nstrike against government authority. Our fear is that the Tanah
\nAbang case is an indication of a crisis of credibility in the
\ngovernment. If so, it needs to be addressed immediately and
\nthoroughly.<\/p>",
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