{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1091248,
        "msgid": "seeking-a-balance-between-president-dpr-1447893297",
        "date": "2001-02-20 00:00:00",
        "title": "Seeking a balance between President, DPR",
        "author": null,
        "source": "",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Seeking a balance between President, DPR The following are excerpts of an interview with constitutional law expert Sri Soemantri regarding the current political crisis. Question: What does constitutional law have to say about the current conflict between the legislature and the President? Answer: We are in the middle of an attempt to find a new balance between the House of Representatives (DPR) and the President.",
        "content": "<p>Seeking a balance between President, DPR<\/p>\n<p>The following are excerpts of an interview with constitutional<br>\nlaw expert Sri Soemantri regarding the current political crisis.<\/p>\n<p>Question: What does constitutional law have to say about the<br>\ncurrent conflict between the legislature and the President?<\/p>\n<p>Answer: We are in the middle of an attempt to find a new<br>\nbalance between the House of Representatives (DPR) and the<br>\nPresident. The first two amendments of the Constitution give the<br>\nHouse a much stronger position. For instance, the House must at<br>\nleast be notified (when the President) is appointing new<br>\nofficials. Regardless, the two must maintain consultation so that<br>\nthey understand each other&apos;s positions.<\/p>\n<p>With its new powers, the DPR seems to be asserting its<br>\nfunction as the monitor (of the executive) in addition to its<br>\nfunctions of drawing up legislation and budgets.<\/p>\n<p>This (new confidence) is what has caused problems between the<br>\nDPR and the President, whose political standing is now weak.<\/p>\n<p>Had we adhered to the actual election result, with only a few<br>\nseats gained at the DPR Gus Dur (President Abdurrahman Wahid)<br>\nwould never have become President. He was elected into office<br>\nbecause of the support of the central axis group (an alliance of<br>\nIslamic parties) and Golkar.<\/p>\n<p>Now that they have withdrawn their support his position is<br>\nindeed weak. But Gus Dur retaliates by calling on popular support<br>\ndespite the fact that any action should be taken through<br>\nrepresentation.<\/p>\n<p>The characteristics of a President usually influence the way<br>\nthey run their administration ... Indeed we have yet to see the<br>\npolitical (maturity) needed in a democracy.<\/p>\n<p>Could you elaborate on the above mentioned consultations?<\/p>\n<p>The President and the DPR should continuously be in<br>\nconsultation, because an administration&apos;s performance depends on<br>\nthe quality of the people. Those people in the legislature and<br>\nthe executive branches determine our state administration.<\/p>\n<p>Yet both the DPR and the President stick to their ground in<br>\nthis political rivalry.<\/p>\n<p>Which is why the situation has worsened. Neither respects the<br>\nother. There won&apos;t be any solution (to the tension) if they both<br>\ninsist on having their way.<\/p>\n<p>What is the constitutional legal assessment of the arguments<br>\nof each of the parties?<\/p>\n<p>The basis of their positions is political (logic), but<br>\npolitics should be in line with the law. So, with the DPR<br>\ndeciding on the memorandum, the President should adhere to it. If<br>\nhe believes he is not guilty (of the financial scandals) as<br>\ncharged by the memorandum, then he hasn&apos;t got any reason to<br>\nworry. Because (if he is innocent) there won&apos;t be any second<br>\nmemorandum or a special session of the People&apos;s Consultative<br>\nAssembly (MPR, to impeach him).<\/p>\n<p>How do we break the impasse?<\/p>\n<p>We have to refer back to the Constitution, according to which<br>\nthe MPR holds the final say (in state administration matters).<br>\nEveryone must be willingly accept with grace whatever decisions<br>\nare made by the MPR. This is something that most people have yet<br>\nto realize.<\/p>\n<p>In our system, the MPR represents the people&apos;s sovereignty, so<br>\nall relevant processes must be undertaken by the MPR, unless (the<br>\nnation) wanted to have a re-election. But we will have to wait<br>\nfor an election in 2004. Until we have another election, the MPR<br>\nis the ultimate sovereign so its decisions must be obeyed.<\/p>\n<p>That is the legal solution to the problem. Surely anyone<br>\ninvolved in the decision making process must be committed to<br>\nnational unity and the survival of this country.<\/p>\n<p>So the solution is a special assembly of the MPR?<\/p>\n<p>I am not saying it as such. But constitutionally, the MPR is<br>\nthe authority that must be obeyed by everyone. The question is<br>\nhow do we convene the special MPR assembly in ways that follow<br>\nthe rules of the game.<\/p>\n<p>Which are?<\/p>\n<p>The first was the memorandum. There is a period of three<br>\nmonths (before the issuance) of any second memorandum, and<br>\nanother month (before) a Working Committee (of the MPR) is given<br>\ntwo months to prepare for a special MPR assembly. This means a<br>\ntotal of six months after the issuance of the first memorandum.<\/p>\n<p>Although the MPR does have the authority to convene a special<br>\nsession now, doing so would create problems ... because the<br>\npolitical overtones of the motion would simply be overwhelming.<\/p>\n<p>The annual session of the MPR could actually be used to<br>\nprepare regulations on when the body, for instance, can call for<br>\na special assembly or regarding the procedures, in ways that are<br>\nclear and comprehensive so that they won&apos;t invite conflicting<br>\ninterpretations.<\/p>\n<p>With such clear guidelines there wouldn&apos;t be problems like we<br>\nare experiencing now, which stem from the fact that the National<br>\nAwakening Party (PKB, founded by Gus Dur) is a minority in the<br>\nMPR, and has to resort to demonstrations of mass support.<\/p>\n<p>Has such a conflict between a president and legislature<br>\noccurred in other countries?<\/p>\n<p>No, because no other country has an MPR. We have a different<br>\nsystem to many countries. We are a country with a mixture of<br>\nsystems ... between the presidential system first developed in<br>\nthe United States which is influential in Latin America, and the<br>\nparliamentary system of the European countries.<\/p>\n<p>Does that mean our administrative system is in a shambles?<\/p>\n<p>No, it&apos;s just that it is unfavorable for the development of a<br>\nmultiparty political system.<\/p>\n<p>The MPR must soon establish a state committee of experts on<br>\nconstitutional law, whose task is to set up the preparatory<br>\nstages for constitutional change. They should sit together and<br>\ncome up with alternatives. If the people want to have a direct<br>\npresidential election then we must have a real presidential<br>\nsystem. In that situation there wouldn&apos;t be any MPR and the<br>\npresident would be very powerful. However, to prevent violations<br>\nby a President, we must also have a law on impeachment.<\/p>\n<p>The team should be able to finish the task within two or three<br>\nyears. (Deka Kurniawan)<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/seeking-a-balance-between-president-dpr-1447893297",
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    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}