Security in the Straits: threats and challenges<\/p>\n
Nugroho Wisnumurti
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
Over the last few years security threats in the Malacca and
\nSingapore straits have heightened. The prospect of terrorist
\nattacks and attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
\nin the waterways are real. These developments have raised serious
\nconcerns, not only among the coastal states bordering the straits
\n(Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore), but also the user states
\nsuch as Japan, China, South Korea, India and the United States.<\/p>\n
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), at
\nleast 50,000 ships sail through the Malacca strait every year,
\ntransporting the oil needs of China and Japan (80 percent of both
\nJapan's and China's oil needs) and about 30 percent of the
\nworld's trade goods. In fact, the strait is a passageway for a
\nthird of the world's crude oil. Thus the Strait of Malacca, which
\nconstitutes the second-busiest shipping lane in the world, has a
\nquite significant strategic value.<\/p>\n
Last year, Adm. Thomas Fargo, head of the U.S. forces in the
\nAsia and Pacific in his testimony to the U.S. House of
\nRepresentatives Armed Services Committee suggested that U.S.
\ntroops assist in patrolling the Strait of Malacca to deter
\nterrorists who might target vessels in the strait, under the so-
\ntermed Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI).<\/p>\n
Indonesia and Malaysia immediately expressed their objections.
\nDeploying foreign forces to the strait, which is part of the
\nterritorial sea and economic zone of the littoral states, would
\ninfringe upon the sovereign rights of those states and would
\ninternationalize the strait.<\/p>\n
Another reason for opposing the deployment of foreign forces
\nis the fear of a backlash from radical elements in the littoral
\nstates.<\/p>\n
While Indonesia and Malaysia have taken a firm stand against
\nthe deployment of foreign forces in the Strait of Malacca to
\ncombat piracy and terrorism, Singapore has shown some flexibility
\non this issue<\/p>\n
While among the states bordering the Malacca and Singapore
\nstraits there have always been some differences of opinion, the
\nthree littoral states have shared responsibility for the safety
\nof the strait and the protection and preservation of its marine
\nenvironment.<\/p>\n
In order to help the littoral states, Japan, for example, as a
\nuser state established the Malacca Strait Council, which provides
\na revolving fund for combating marine pollution from ships in the
\nstraits.<\/p>\n
While the interest of the littoral states was initially driven
\nby the desire to ensure the safety of the straits and to protect
\nthe environment it is undeniable that the straits constitute part
\nof an area that is a major security concern for the coastal
\nstates, as evident in various ASEAN security agreements such as
\nthe 1971 Treaty on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in
\nSoutheast Asia (ZOPFAN), 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free
\nZone (SEANWFZ), 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the
\nrecently adopted ASEAN Security Community as a part of the Bali
\nConcord II.<\/p>\n
There is no doubt that the straits have strategic value for
\nthe major powers that have stakes in the region. The United
\nStates is a major player in the region, which has interest in
\nmaintaining its dominance and influence.<\/p>\n
China is acknowledged as the rising power in the region --
\neconomically, politically and militarily. China is flexing its
\nmilitary muscle as well as its ability to deploy \"soft power\" to
\nchallenge the dominance of the U.S. and to check the growing
\ninfluence of its rival rising power, India. China recently even
\nconducted war games with Russia in the Yellow Sea codenamed
\n\"Peace Mission 2005\".<\/p>\n
Thus it is logical that China opposes the Regional Maritime
\nSecurity Initiative (RMSI) proposed by the U.S. Furthermore,
\nChina with its incredible economic growth is in serious need of
\noil from the Middle East passing through the straits. It is,
\ntherefore, clear that in this power game, the security of the
\nstraits is of paramount importance to China.<\/p>\n
Japan, struggling to regain the status of the economic
\nlocomotive of Asia and to raise its political profile in the
\nregion and in the global arena, has the interest of preventing
\nthe flow of needed oil through being disrupted.<\/p>\n
India as another rising power and an acknowledged nuclear
\npower is also aspiring for dominance in the region, flexing its
\nmilitary muscle and sending its naval fleet to make port visits
\nin the region, including to Jakarta harbour recently.<\/p>\n
These developments can only be construed as a part of the
\nchanging strategic environment in the region, which has to be
\ntaken into account by the littoral states. It is essential that
\nin addressing the security threats in the straits, the littoral
\nstates should avoid being dragged into the power games of outside
\npowers.<\/p>\n
What the littoral states need is for the major players in the
\nregion to be working for the establishment of a new power
\nequilibrium. It is necessary that further efforts for sustainable
\nand effective cooperation be made, inter alia:<\/p>\n
* Upholding the principles contained in the Joint Ministerial
\nStatement on the straits of Malacca and Singapore issued by the
\nforeign ministers of the three littoral states on Aug. 2.<\/p>\n
* Establishing a permanent joint mechanism composed of naval
\nofficers at working level from the three littoral states based in
\none of the littoral states that has the best access to the
\nstraits. This mechanism would serve as a center for monitoring
\nand reporting, the exchange of information and the sharing of
\nintelligence, and for a quick-response command.<\/p>\n
* More effective coordinated patrols by the navies and other
\nenforcement agencies of the littoral states, with an arrangement
\nthat allows \"hot pursuit\" into the territorial sea of another
\nlittoral state.<\/p>\n
* Drawing up clear guidelines or \"rules of engagement\" and
\nother procedures necessary for effective law enforcement
\noperations;<\/p>\n
* Investigating and taking action against perpetrators of
\npiracy\/sea robbers at its source, i.e. at villages or other sites
\nwhere they launch their action from, or where they hide, and
\nisolating them from the local elements supporting them.<\/p>\n
* Ensure the effective implementation of air patrol over the
\nStraits of Malacca and Singapore dubbed \"The Eyes in the Sky\"
\n(EiS) adopted recently by the Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of
\nMalacca and Singapore organized by the three littoral States,
\nThailand and IMO (International Maritime Organization).<\/p>\n
* Oppose the use of a private armed escort to protect ships
\npassing through the straits.<\/p>\n
* User States should provide financial assistance, and for
\nthat purpose establish a system of burden-sharing by, for
\nexample, establishing a revolving fund such as the existing one
\nestablished by Japan;<\/p>\n
* The three littoral states should promote cooperation with
\nand seek assistance from the IMO and other appropriate
\ninternational organizations.<\/p>\n
* User states should provide assistance by providing the
\nnecessary equipment, training for capacity-building, exchange of
\ninformation and sharing of intelligence.<\/p>\n
The writer was formerly Indonesian ambassador\/permanent
\nrepresentative to the United Nations in New York and in Geneva.
\nHe is currently a senior fellow of the Centre for Strategic and
\nInternational Studies (CSIS). The article is an abbreviated
\nversion of an essay due to appear in the forthcoming issue of the
\nDuta Journal, published by the Indonesian Council on World
\nAffairs.<\/p>",
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