{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1440436,
        "msgid": "second-round-threat-to-democracy-1447893297",
        "date": "1999-08-24 00:00:00",
        "title": "Second round threat to democracy",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Second round threat to democracy By Sidesh Kaul JAKARTA (JP): As Indonesia awaits the outcome of its second democratic election since independence (the first democratically held election was in 1955), the aspirations of the people assume frightening proportions. Much is expected out of the new leadership that will be decided in November and the burden of performance is enormous.",
        "content": "<p>Second round threat to democracy<\/p>\n<p>By Sidesh Kaul<\/p>\n<p>JAKARTA (JP): As Indonesia awaits the outcome of its second<br>\ndemocratic election since independence (the first democratically<br>\nheld election was in 1955), the aspirations of the people assume<br>\nfrightening proportions. Much is expected out of the new<br>\nleadership that will be decided in November and the burden of<br>\nperformance is enormous.<\/p>\n<p>These aspirations need to be seen in perspective lest the<br>\npolitical elite once again stymie the fledgling efforts at<br>\ndemocratization.<\/p>\n<p>In order to ensure a lasting democracy it is necessary to<br>\ncarefully analyze the factors that led to the post-independence<br>\nmovement for democratization and the subsequent and early demise<br>\nof Indonesian democracy in the years leading up to the era of the<br>\nNew Order.<\/p>\n<p>Contrary to popular belief, the period just after independence<br>\nwas not entirely conducive for democracy. The class structure at<br>\nthat time comprised mainly of a large body of peasants, a middle<br>\nclass comprised mainly of rent-seeking bureaucrats and a small<br>\ncapitalist class dominated largely by the ethnic Chinese.<\/p>\n<p>Large differences in Indonesian society were not because of<br>\ntypical and inherent class contradictions but more along<br>\nreligious and cultural lines. Despite these differences,<br>\nIndonesia society amalgamated as a whole during the freedom<br>\nstruggle against the tyranny of a foreign oppressor and<br>\ndeveloped, as a result of this amalgamation process, a collective<br>\nsense of pride, nationalism and self-confidence.<\/p>\n<p>Political leaders of that period, irrespective of political<br>\nideology, responsibly channeled the popular sentiment against<br>\ncolonial oppression toward nation building and thus laid the<br>\nfoundations for a new democracy. Democracy was thus seen as a<br>\nlegitimizing principle and as a means of impacting all spheres of<br>\ngovernance -- social, economic and political.<\/p>\n<p>Today, the Indonesian people have risen once again against the<br>\nexcesses of authoritarianism -- and political leaders, once<br>\nagain, have harnessed this power to usher in democratic reforms.<\/p>\n<p>In the early days of the movement in Indonesia, democracy was<br>\nseen neither as a system of representation nor as a system for<br>\nmajority rule. Minority rights, institutionalized opposition,<br>\nchecks and balances on power and the concept of representation<br>\nwere completely ignored or missing altogether.<\/p>\n<p>For a newly independent country that was poverty stricken,<br>\nwhere illiteracy and hunger was rampant and was struggling at<br>\nmanaging the plethora of problems, the notion that a responsible<br>\npolitical elite had the total mandate for governance perhaps<br>\ncould be excused. Today, after three decades of prosperity,<br>\neducation and exposure, the notion of an unrestricted mandate<br>\nwould be dangerous and totally unacceptable.<\/p>\n<p>The debate on the pros and cons of democracy (Feith: 1970)<br>\nwere mainly within the established political streams during the<br>\nperiod 1945-1965 that is Islam, democratic socialism, communism,<br>\nJavanese traditionalism and radical nationalism. The framework<br>\nstill holds true today except for the fact that communism, as a<br>\nmovement, was eradicated in the Soeharto era.<\/p>\n<p>The late 1940s also saw the emergence of other Asian countries<br>\nas independent democracies and this was also a major pressure<br>\nthat influenced political leaders to adopt a more pro-people<br>\nposture. There is no foreign oppressor to overthrow now -- only<br>\nthe tyranny of an authoritarian rule and the burden of an economy<br>\nin tatters that it has left behind.<\/p>\n<p>Interestingly, while the influencing pressures of today might<br>\nbe similar to those experienced by Indonesia during the period of<br>\nits early efforts at democratization, the debate on democracy<br>\nstill rages within Feith's framework.<\/p>\n<p>The elections in 1955 were fair and honest, the bureaucracy<br>\nwas strong and vibrant, there was far reaching popular will for<br>\nthe elections to succeed and there was a relative lack of<br>\ndishonesty and corruption. These were conditions that could<br>\nnurture democracy. Save for the corruption factor (that has<br>\nassumed monstrous proportions), similar conditions exist today.<\/p>\n<p>In the 1995 elections, several minority and four major parties<br>\ngained representation; the nationalist PNI received 22.3 percent<br>\nof the votes, the Muslim modernist Masyumi 20.9 percent, the<br>\nMuslim traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama 18.4 percent and the<br>\ncommunist PKI 16.4 percent.<\/p>\n<p>Like today, there was no single party that had the outright<br>\nmandate of the people. Despite the favorable conditions<br>\nprevailing in 1955, democracy was unceremoniously dumped in 1957.<br>\nWhat were the conditions that forced the political leaders to<br>\nbetray the aspirations of the people in 1957? Did the ruling<br>\nelite have the political will back then to bow to the demands of<br>\ndemocracy? Did power hungry rulers sacrifice democracy on the<br>\naltar of political expediency?  More importantly, could this<br>\nhappen again?<\/p>\n<p>The period under question stretches from 1959, when Sukarno<br>\nintroduced his brand of authoritarianism under the guise of<br>\nGuided Democracy, to 1965 when the New Order took charge and<br>\ndumped democracy for good. This tumultuous period saw several<br>\nconflicts that played a decisive role in shaping Indonesian<br>\npolity and this can be roughly divided into three sub-periods<br>\n(Liddle: 1996): religious conflict from 1950-1955; ethnic<br>\nconflict from 1956-1961; and class conflict from 1961-1965.<br>\nSuperimposed on these periods the era of parliamentary democracy<br>\nfrom 1950-1957 and that of Guided Democracy from 1959-1965.<\/p>\n<p>The period from 1950-1955 saw the most important religious<br>\nconflict within the Muslim community. Muslims then, as even now,<br>\ncomprised the majority of the population and most of them had<br>\ntheir hopes pinned on Masyumi. However, the schism between the<br>\nmodernist and traditionalist factions in Masyumi caused the party<br>\nto be split before the elections and put to rest any hope of a<br>\nstrong and united representation. The split, in turn, spawned<br>\nsecession movements in some parts of the country. In West Java,<br>\nfor example, an Islamic guerrilla group that had fought long and<br>\nhard for independence proclaimed an Islamic State of Indonesia.<br>\nAceh soon followed suit and later formed an alliance with the<br>\nWest Java rebels.<\/p>\n<p>The period from 1956-1961 was witness to an ethnic struggle<br>\nthat was fanned basically by elements from outside Java who<br>\nperceived the government's Java-centric form of tightly<br>\nadministered, centralized rule as a hindrance. This period also<br>\nsaw the emergence of the communist party (actively encouraged by<br>\nSukarno as a countervailing check on the growing influence of the<br>\narmy) as well as a brief period of anarchy when provincial<br>\nmilitary commanders staged coups at the local level and formed<br>\nrevolutionary governments in defiance of the central command.<\/p>\n<p>Sukarno, in a move that can only be labeled as political<br>\nexpediency, forged an alliance with the army in quelling this<br>\nrebellion and thus paved the way for the army to be intimately<br>\ninvolved in the process of governance. In a strident defense of<br>\nthe perceived threat to his position, Sukarno decreed a return to<br>\nthe 1945 constitution thus giving the executive branch of the<br>\ngovernment dominance over the legislative.<\/p>\n<p>There were pressures on the economic side as well and the<br>\nbrief period of representative democracy, owing to its fragmented<br>\nnature, could not cope with the challenges. Policy<br>\ninconsistencies, a weak executive and a sharply divided polity<br>\nappeared to provide enough evidence that democracy had failed and<br>\nit was time for decisive leadership to emerge.  Unchecked and<br>\nsurrounded by a weak opposition, Sukarno seized the opportunity<br>\nto usher in authoritarianism thus setting the clock back for<br>\nIndonesia's democratic efforts.<\/p>\n<p>We see the emergence of similar pressure factors (except that<br>\nthese factors seem to be at play all at once) even today and the<br>\nconcern is that, like in 1957, democracy faces the danger of<br>\nbeing abandoned once again. Religious and ethnic conflicts in<br>\nAceh, West and Central Java and Ambon; persecution of minorities;<br>\na divided polity; rampant corruption within the government and<br>\nbureaucracy; a disunited army; separatist movements in Aceh and<br>\nTimor; and a weak economy: These are the very same factors that<br>\nstalled the emergence of Indonesia as a democratic power in the<br>\nmid-fifties.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is a commentator on economic and political affairs<br>\nbased in Jakarta.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/second-round-threat-to-democracy-1447893297",
        "image": ""
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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