SE Asia's future ties with West (1)<\/p>\n
This is the first of two articles based on a paper presented
\nby Indonesian Ambassador, Adrianus Mooy, to the European Union,
\nat the Fuji-Wolfensohn Europen Advisory Board Meeting in London
\non Nov. 18.<\/p>\n
LONDON: Notwithstanding the technological miracle and the
\nonset of the post-Cold War order, the world is still not quite as
\nneatly ordered and constant as the authors of the global village
\ntheory would have it. What we find today is not a neat small
\nworld of homogeneous people, but rather one that continues to
\nhold disparate nations within its technologically shortened
\nspace.<\/p>\n
The uniqueness and distinct peculiarities of differing
\ncultures, historical experiences and value orientations will
\ncontinue to make co-habitation an enduring challenge for the
\ninhabitants of the global village.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the global village will continue to face the
\nchallenge of having its inhabitants move more harmoniously in the
\nsame direction. Despite the optimism that the end of the Cold War
\nbrought, in practice the global village was much the same place
\nas before, peopled by countries in different stages of economic
\ndevelopment and approaching political stability with variant
\nstrides, driven by often conflicting definitions of their
\nrespective development needs.<\/p>\n
No where are these dichotomies in the global village more
\nexemplified than in Southeast Asia, representing the vast
\nmajority of people in developing economies, and the broad
\ngrouping of developed countries that are referred to here as the
\n\"Western world\".<\/p>\n
To many minds the map of the unfolding global village today is
\ndominated by three major highways to the future: one points to
\nAmerica, specifically North America, where the United States is
\nstill the leading economic power; a second heads for Europe, an
\nenormously transforming area, rife with potentials; and a third
\nleads to the fast-growing Asia Pacific rim. The first two
\ncomprise, for the main, the developed economies of the West, and
\nSoutheast Asia in one of main engines that propels the third.<\/p>\n
With such crucial roles for the evolution of the global
\nvillage, it is little wonder that so much interest is now being
\ndevoted into studying the prospects for their relations. The
\nquestions, however, is that if we -- the inhabitants of the
\nglobal village -- are likely to remain separate and divided in
\nspite of our shared berth, what does the future hold for
\nrelations between Southeast Asia and the Western world?<\/p>\n
Obviously the global village is still in the midst of change
\nand evolution: a state of constant flux that makes it difficult
\nto decipher even the shape that the relations between Southeast
\nAsia and the Western world will ultimately take. However, there
\nare a few landmarks along the way that may help point to where
\nthe future is heading for. Extrapolating the prospect for the
\nfuture from the experiences of the past, I would like to
\nconjecture that there are some developments that give rise for
\nconcern and at the same time, a few that represent grounds for
\nhope.<\/p>\n
The more disturbing developments in our relations emanate from
\nthe fact that the global village is still, as I mentioned
\nearlier, a divided place. The countries of Southeast Asia and the
\nWest may aim for the same objectives of economic prosperity and
\npolitical stability, but they differ in the pace and approach
\nthat they take towards those very same goal posts.<\/p>\n
Much of this difference is accounted for by the persistence of
\nuneven development within and among nations; countries in
\ndifferent stages of progress respond to the tune of their
\nrespective development needs. Economic and political exigencies
\noften dictate whether countries will choose to tread gradually
\nor, for that matter, rapidly into the future; others are in such
\ndire need of basic development that they do not even have the
\nluxury of option. What is happening to Southeast Asia and the
\nWest, therefore, is that although we share the same end goals,
\nthere are a multitude of speeds with which we find ourselves
\nstriving to achieve those same ends. And to my mind, this is
\nwhere the crux of the disturbing developments in our relations
\nlie.<\/p>\n
By itself, this situation of uneven marches to the same tune
\nshould not have been the springboard of some disturbing elements
\nin our relations. It is a natural part of economic and political
\nevolution which should have merited ample consideration for its
\nown sake. But as I see it, there are some problematic attitudes
\nin the way the Western world appears to be seeing the situation.<\/p>\n
When it comes to political development, I detect a failure in
\nthe West to recognize and comprehend the problems of Southeast
\nAsia, which then breeds a strong impatience that developing
\ncountries in the region are not advancing as fast as they should
\nbe. Its measures of \"political progress\" are often in terms of
\nstandards that mirror those in the West, albeit cloaked in the
\nsweeping guise of \"universality\".<\/p>\n
But what it actually assumes to be universal, are taken to be
\nso because the West is able to adhere to them. There is little
\ntolerance for developing countries calls for respect for national
\nsovereignty, for the right to balance their own political needs
\nin conjunction with their economic and developmental needs, for
\nthe trust and respect to evolve as gradually as the West was able
\nto do in the past, when it was in similar stages of development.<\/p>\n
And just as strong as the feelings of Western impatience are
\nwhen it comes to the speed of Southeast Asia's political growth,
\nwhen it comes to Southeast Asia's economic advancement, there is
\na palpable ambivalence, if not outright discouragement in the
\nWest.<\/p>\n
What makes this discernible hesitance from the West more
\ndisturbing to Southeast Asia is that it has reached its level of
\neconomic advancement largely by acting on cues provided by the
\nWest itself. When the now booming economies of Southeast Asia,
\nfor example, were in the early stages of economic development,
\nthe Western world told us to enact structural adjustments. We
\ncomplied. We were told that the route to economic advancement was
\nthrough industrialization and open, outward market economies.
\nAgain, we complied. But now that the developing countries of
\nSoutheast Asia are finally edging closer to the economies of the
\nWest, the West seems to see their approach as a threat -- a
\nthreat to be nipped in the bud, if not halted, altogether.<\/p>\n
In the Western world's spectacles, in other words, Southeast
\nAsia is politically not progressing fast enough, but economically
\nadvancing too closely for comfort.<\/p>\n
The troubling aspects about this vision do not stop there: the
\nWest seems to aggravate the situation by thinking that the
\nsolution to Southeast Asia's uneven speeds of economic and
\npolitical development is to link the two together. And the main
\ntool for implementing this solution is to introduce political
\nconditionality in its economic relations with Southeast Asia. It
\nappears to me that the West seems to think that linking politics
\nwith economics will automatically solve the problems of uneven
\npolitical and economic developments, and make Southeast Asia a
\nmore acceptable global partner in the evolving global village.<\/p>\n
The question is, however, will it? We in Southeast Asia do not
\nthink so. True, the main challenge for us - as it is to the
\nlarger global village of which we are a part - is how to close
\nthe gap between the different speeds in our developments so that
\nwe are both able to move together more harmoniously towards the
\ndirection of the global good.<\/p>\n
But such a automatic linkage, and putting a conditionality to
\nour relations, will not be the appropriate approach for this
\npurpose. It is a mutually defeating display of a carrot-and-stick
\narrogance that leaves little choice to developing countries but
\nto opt between economic prosperity and political sovereignty,
\nforcing at best only win-lose conclusions to the future of our
\nrelations. At worse, it may even lead to lose-lose conclusions
\nwhen one considers that in this age of global interdependence, a
\nloss or faltering of political or economic advancement in
\nSoutheast Asia will invariably have a knock-on effect on its
\nrelations and impact on the West.<\/p>\n
These are some disturbing developments that I have observed
\nwhile looking at relations between Southeast Asia and the Western
\nworld. They are trends that checker the prospects of our
\nrelations in particular, and that of the global village as a
\nwhole. They need a creative plan of action to correct so that the
\nfuture holds possibilities for what I call \"win-win situations\".
\nPolitically, this may need seeing problems and limitations as
\nthey are, and finding ways to work together that could lead to
\ngreater convergence in perspectives as well as political
\nstability. Economically, it may take seeing each other's progress
\nand potentials for the opportunity that they are, and seeing
\nshortcomings not as something to penalize others about, but
\noccasion for mutual assistance and cooperation.<\/p>",
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