SE Asia enters the 21st century<\/p>\n
By Hilman Adil<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The Southeast Asian political landscape has
\nchanged significantly from events related to the unwinding of
\nbipolar international relations since the end of the Cold War,
\nthe monetary crisis with its devastating effects on most of the
\ncountries' economies in the region and the problem of leadership
\nchanges which will have political significance for the region's
\npolitical stability.<\/p>\n
Concerning the political and strategic dimension, some of
\nthese changes could have been envisaged, in particular given the
\nextensive involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia. The
\nscope and depth of these changes, however, could hardly be
\nforeseen. Similarly, the monetary crisis, despite the warning
\nsignals detected but generally unheeded, shook the economic
\nfundamentals of these countries. With no institutional safeguards
\nto guarantee a smooth transition, leadership changes in the
\nregion took the world by surprise with the extent of its scope
\nand its depth.<\/p>\n
This article deals with the question of what lies ahead for
\nSoutheast Asia when it enters the twenty-first century. To be
\nmore precise, when we talk about Southeast Asia it actually means
\nthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since most
\ncountries of the region are represented in that regional
\norganization. Another point that should be mentioned from the
\noutset is this article is more concerned about the security and
\nstrategic dimension of the problems caused by threats from
\noutside the region facing these countries in the twenty-first
\ncentury. Unresolved territorial disputes, divided countries and
\nan uncertain balance of power are some of the factors which would
\nhave an impact on the future security in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
What comes immediately to mind is whether ASEAN which is
\nneither a collective security nor a collective defense
\norganization can cope with the challenges without threatening the
\nstability of the region. This problem became increasingly complex
\never since the end of the Cold War when the power structure of
\nthe Asia-Pacific region was in a stage of transition, i.e. from a
\ntriangular structure towards that of a quadrangular or a
\nmultipolar structure.<\/p>\n
The security structure of the Asia-Pacific region in the
\ntwenty-first century will be one of transition towards the
\nformation of a four power structure, consisting of the United
\nStates, China, Russia and Japan. The destiny of Southeast Asia
\nwill be decided by the challenger ASEAN. The organization will
\nhave to face such a structure where the region has strategic,
\neconomic, security and political significance for those major
\npowers.<\/p>\n
The future role China will play in this power structure has
\nalways been the focus of attention among ASEAN members.
\nHistorical experiences suggest that for ASEAN there must always
\nremain a certain prudence about the possibility of a potential
\nthreat from China. The admission of Vietnam to ASEAN may increase
\nthreat perceptions within the regional organization. At present,
\nhowever, ASEAN professes little sense of imminent danger from
\nChina, despite the fact that until now it adopts a hard position
\non maintaining territorial legitimacy. ASEAN regards nationalism
\nas a source of legitimacy as was seen in the dispute over the
\nSpratley Islands. ASEAN members accept the immensity of China as
\na fact of life. Growing ASEAN connections with China are
\naccompanied by an evident willingness to explore the prospect for
\nlong-term relations with the country.<\/p>\n
A fresh assessment of the international security environment
\nwhich ASEAN has to face in the twenty-first century suggests that
\napart from major international schisms caused by conflicts
\nbetween nation-states, there are also those which will not always
\nbe definable in geographic terms. These are, for example,
\nincreased conflicts within states, societies, and civilizations
\nalong ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic or caste lines.
\nTherefore, the threats facing ASEAN (Southeast Asia) in the next
\ncentury are from within and without.<\/p>\n
The changes associated with the end of the Cold War were so
\ndramatic and profound that it is reasonable to question whether
\ntraditional assumptions regarding the nature of the global
\nconflict will continue to prove reliable in the post-Cold War
\nera. In particular, one could question whether conflicts between
\nstates will remain the principal form of international ones, or
\nwhether the boundaries between them will continue to constitute
\nthe world's major fault lines. The question was frequently raised
\nin the context of an outbreak of ethnonationalist conflict, as in
\nBosnia and recently in Kosovo, and tribal and religious conflicts
\nin Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, some writers have argued that although the
\nCold War ended, territorial conflicts of earlier periods --
\nnotably those produced by military competition among the major
\npowers -- will be revived in the years ahead. Kenneth Waltz of
\nthe University of California at Berkeley suggests that such
\ncompetition will eventually reappear with Germany, Japan or China
\nas a rising power, with military strength to contest America's
\nglobal hegemony. He wrote in the International Security's summer
\n1993 issue: \"Countries have always competed for wealth and
\nsecurity, and the competition has often led to conflict. Why
\nshould the future be different from the past?\"<\/p>\n
Other writers such as Huntington of Harvard University has
\nsuggested that the principal schisms of the post-Cold War era are
\nto be found along the peripheries of the world's great
\ncivilizations. He argued that the economic and ideological
\nantagonisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will be
\nsuperseded in the twenty first by antagonism over culture and
\ncultural identity. He wrote in the summer 1993 issue of Foreign
\nAffairs: \"Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in
\nworld affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics
\nwill occur between nations and groups of different
\ncivilizations\". He noted that although the boundaries between
\ncivilizations are not as precise as those between sovereign
\nstates, the loose frontiers will be the sight of a major
\nconflict. He predicted that: \"The clash of civilization will
\ndominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations
\nwill be the battle lines of the future\".<\/p>\n
Other writers have argued that the world's future fault lines
\nwill fall not between the major states of civilizations, but
\nbetween the growing nexus of democratic, market-oriented
\nsocieties and those states that refrain from democracy or have
\ndefied the world community in other ways. Such powers, like Iraq
\nand North Korea, are said to harbor aggressive inclinations to
\nsupport terrorism, and to seek the production of nuclear or
\nchemical weapons. President Clinton's former national security
\nadviser, Anthony Lake, wrote in the March-April 1994-edition of
\nForeign Affairs: \"We must face the reality of recalcitrant and
\noutlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family
\nof nations but also to assault its basic values\".<\/p>\n
While these assessments of the international security
\nenvironment differ in many of their particulars, they share a
\ncommon belief that the battle lines of the future will fall along
\ngeographically defined boundaries with the contending powers
\ndisplayed on opposite sides. This in turn, leads generally to the
\nmaintenance of sufficient military strength resulting in an arms
\nrace.<\/p>\n
It is certainly understandable that these writers have
\nproceeded from traditional assumptions regarding the nature of
\nconflict when constructing models of future international
\nrelations, but it is not all apparent that such assessments will
\nprove reliable. While a number of conflicts since the end of the
\nCold War appear to have followed one of the three models above,
\nin Bosnia and Kosovo's case, the source cannot be fully explained
\nas they cannot be confined within geographical boundaries or
\nreferred to as conflicts between particular civilizations.<\/p>\n
Threats from within ASEAN in the next century will most likely
\nbe destabilizing conditions in these member-states, as in
\ndeteriorating economic situations or drastic political change.
\nWhen a member finds itself in such a situation, it will affect
\nthe whole region. In light of this, the problem remains on the
\nagenda of closed-door deliberations in ASEAN meetings but still
\nadheres to the principle of non-interference in the domestic
\naffairs of a member. ASEAN does not violate any fundamentals,
\ni.e. avoids open discussions on domestic problems of a member as
\nit would cause structural tension.<\/p>\n
ASEAN members realize that once a country which faces domestic
\nproblems is accepted, the only way of dealing with the problems
\nis in the quiet Asian way. The moment the issue is open to public
\ndebate allows for a potential confrontation which would be
\ninstitutionally destructive for ASEAN. The policy of non-
\ninterference is being strictly observed in the East Timor issue
\nand the trial of former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
\nIbrahim.<\/p>\n
The writer is Director, Center for Social and Cultural
\nStudies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.<\/p>",
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