Scenarios for democratization<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented
\nby Mohammad A.S. Hikam, a senior research associate of the
\nIndonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), at a European Union-
\nIndonesia Dialog organized by the International Dialogs
\nFoundation (IDF) and the European Institute for Asian Studies
\n(EIAS) in Brussels on Feb. 23 to Feb. 24.<\/p>\n
BRUSSELS: The gradual process of democratization will be
\nstronger after the coming general election on June 7 if there is
\na change from the current Golkar-supported government to a
\nreform-oriented regime.<\/p>\n
In so doing, proreform groups should be able to obtain
\nmajority seats in the House of Representatives (DPR), which can
\nbe used as bargaining power during the general session of the
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly (MPR).<\/p>\n
This will not be an easy endeavor, since under the existing
\npolitical constellation, Golkar is conceivably maintaining its
\ninfluence.<\/p>\n
It seems reasonable to expect that the 200 seats designated
\nfor regional representatives and groups representatives would be
\nin favor of Golkar. In addition, there is no guarantee that the
\nmilitary, with its 38 seats, will not back Golkar in MPR
\nsessions, given the similarities of political interests in the
\npast. It is therefore safe to say that to win the majority
\nsupport, Golkar only needs approximately 31 percent of the votes,
\nwhile reformist parties should win more than 51 percent in order
\nto be able to form a new government.<\/p>\n
The nagging question is whether Golkar would be capable of
\nobtaining such votes and whether the main reformist parties --
\nPDI Perjuangan, PKB and the National Mandate Party (PAN) -- could
\ngarner more than 51 percent of votes in the next election.<\/p>\n
As mentioned before, Golkar has experienced a serious
\npolitical setback and it seems that a quick recovery is rather
\nremote. Therefore, if the election is conducted fairly and
\nfreely, then it is highly impossible for Golkar to return as a
\nsingle majority winner. Nor can it expect to muster enough votes
\nto form a new government without support from the military and
\nother parties.<\/p>\n
Therefore, there is open speculation that it would adopt money
\npolitics and old patron-client networks, which are by and large
\nstill effective as an instrument for mobilization, particularly
\nin rural areas. In addition, the military's involvement on behalf
\nof Golkar cannot be discounted, especially when the electoral
\nmonitoring system is weak.<\/p>\n
The other side of the coin is that the power of reformist
\nparties is still insufficient to challenge Golkar without
\nestablishing a strong coalition. For PDI Perjuangan, for example,
\ndespite its strong support in rural areas evidenced by the
\nmushrooming of its command posts, it is not clear that it can be
\ndirectly translated into ballot box results in favor of the
\nparty. To date, the overwhelming support to the party basically
\nstill depends on Megawati's personality and the charisma of her
\nfather, the late president Sukarno, in addition to the prevalent
\nantiestablishment mood. As a consequence, PDI Perjuangan still
\nneeds to expand its basis of support to include the urban middle-
\nclass society who are more pragmatic in its political
\norientation. This means that Megawati and her team have to create
\na sound platform in which economic recovery will be its priority
\nin the context of gradual democratization.<\/p>\n
PKB, whose support relies heavily on Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
\nmembers, still has to come up with more adequate mobilization
\nstrategies to expand its voters, including improving its human
\nresources at the elite level. This could be decisive because NU
\nwill become the target of several parties' political maneuvering
\nfor the election. To be sure, such Islamic parties as the United
\nDevelopment Party (PPP), the United Believers Awakening Party
\n(PKU) and the Nahdlatul Ummat Party (PNU), whose main bases of
\nsupport are also NU, will be competing with PKB both on Java and
\nthe other islands.<\/p>\n
But even Golkar will definitely target NU voters, especially
\nin the predominantly Muslim areas of Java. Golkar can and will
\nemploy its networks of the kyai (traditional Islamic scholars)
\nand pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding schools) for such a
\npurpose which, prior to the demise of the New Order regime, was
\nquite effective.<\/p>\n
It is too early, therefore, to predict that NU voters will
\noverwhelmingly support PKB outside NU and even from Muslim voters
\nwho have potential. This is partly the reason why PKB has chosen
\nNU chairman Abdurrahman \"Gus Dur\" Wahid as its presidential
\ncandidate in the coming election.<\/p>\n
Amien Rais' PAN is still struggling to be internally united.
\nThe danger of factionalism is by no means nonexistent despite the
\nefforts to portray the party as a modern, nonsectarian political
\norganization. As a matter of fact, there is tension within its
\nelite between those who tend to use Islam and those who are more
\nsecular in orientation. At the grassroots level, the image that
\nPAN is dominated by the members of Muslim organization
\nMuhammadiyah remains strong which could hinder its capacity to
\naccommodate a large segment of social groups.<\/p>\n
On top of that, PAN is still heavily dependent on Amien's
\npopularity. Amien, for the time being, is still portrayed as the
\nmost outspoken leader of the reformist groups. This means that
\nPAN still has to work for expanding its base of support at the
\ngrass-roots level if it wants to be a more autonomous and a less
\nfigure-oriented party.<\/p>\n
Other political parties such as PPP, the Crescent Star Party
\n(PBB) and the Justice Party are, theoretically, not going to
\nbecome big parties after the election. The exception is probably
\nPPP, which could have strong support in areas outside Java, such
\nas South Kalimantan, Jambi and Aceh. However, it seems difficult
\nfor the party to compete with PKB and PDI Perjuangan.<\/p>\n
Based on the above political mapping, one can pinpoint the
\npossible presidential candidates in the election. Golkar is
\nlikely to support incumbent President Habibie as its presidential
\ncandidate. However, there is an open possibility that Adi Sasono,
\nminister of cooperatives, medium and small enterprises, as well
\nas Akbar Tandjung, the chairman of Golkar and minister\/state
\nsecretary, could also become Golkar's alternatives. Outside
\nGolkar, Megawati, Gus Dur and Amien are the presidential hopefuls
\nfrom PDI Perjuangan, PKB and PAN respectively. The vice
\npresidential candidates are Gen. Wiranto and Yogyakarta Governor
\nSri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, who seem to have strong support from
\nGolkar and PKB respectively. There is still no vice presidential
\nnomination from both PDI Perjuangan and PAN.<\/p>\n
For Golkar, in order to go smoothly with the scenario, it is
\npossible that it would forge alliances with Islamic coalition
\nparties and the military. The former will have no difficulty in
\nsupporting Habibie, who has been known as being close with the
\nAssociation of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). The latter
\ncan be expected to support Habibie if only because of its being
\npragmatic.<\/p>\n
However, it is not entirely impossible that the military
\nfaction will carefully analyze the development of those competing
\nparties. What is clear is that political support from the
\nmilitary is still required by any party to enable it to form the
\nnew government after the election.<\/p>",
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